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  Palestine: 








This project seeks to critique the occupation of Palestine with the categories and methods 
of a critical theological aesthetics. The theological aesthetics employed here is critical 
because it develops Theodor Adorno’s aesthetic project: beauty is dialectical, historical, 
and, above all, negative. Beauty is negative as it is founded on renunciation: beauty 
renounces ugliness. Adorno’s project is advanced through an encounter with Christ. 
Christ, as witnessed on the Cross, is the absolute fulfillment of negative beauty: Christ, 
who is absolutely personal, material, and relational, renounces renunciation itself. This 
fulfillment of negative beauty demands engagement and participation: to follow Christ is 
to do beauty; it is to renounce ugliness in a beautiful way. The occupation of Palestine, 
especially revealed through the phenomenon of suicide bombing, stands as an unsettling 
and dark ugliness. Because the occupation is funded and supported by so-called Christian 
Zionists, it is an occupation that challenges that character of God. Because occupation 
works aesthetically to occupy flesh and relationship, it is an occupation that desacralizes 
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Palestine:	  Toward	  a	  Critical	  Theological	  Aesthetics	  
	  
“For the sun comes up with its scorching heat and dries up the grass, its flower 
droops, and the beauty of its appearance vanishes.”	  
	   -­‐-­‐James	  1:11 
	  
	  
Introduction:	  Why	  critical	  theological	  aesthetics?	  
	  
Last	  spring,	  I	  led	  a	  discussion	  at	  Babson	  College,	  my	  undergraduate	  alma-­‐matter,	  about	  
the	  oppression	  of	  Palestinian	  people.	  I	  began	  the	  talk	  by	  sharing	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  
Palestinian	  occupation.	  My	  belief	  was	  that	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  injustices	  of	  1948	  and	  
1967	  would	  elicit	  an	  emotional	  response	  from	  my	  audience.	  It	  did,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  
manner	  or	  mode	  in	  which	  I	  anticipated.	  Some	  of	  my	  Jewish	  listeners	  voiced	  concerns	  
that	  the	  plight	  of	  Palestinians	  was	  receiving	  “too	  much	  attention.”	  Palestinians	  in	  the	  
room	  each	  offered	  various	  critiques	  of	  my	  historical	  narrative—often	  these	  critiques	  
reflected	  a	  view	  that	  my	  narrative	  did	  not	  accurately	  capture	  a	  sense	  of	  personal	  loss;	  a	  
critique	  fitting,	  perhaps,	  of	  any	  narrative	  delivered	  by	  an	  outsider.	  	  American	  listeners	  
showed	  a	  mixed	  response.	  Some	  listeners	  did	  not	  show	  engagement	  of	  any	  kind,	  and	  
their	  silence	  spoke	  as	  much	  to	  their	  political	  convictions	  as	  did	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  who	  
vehemently	  argued	  for	  Israel’s	  “right	  to	  self	  defense.”	  My	  point	  is	  not	  to	  belabor	  the	  
brute	  fact	  of	  plurality	  in	  political	  opinion.	  Rather,	  my	  experience	  helped	  confirm	  my	  
suspicion	  that	  the	  raising	  of	  (new)	  historical	  information,	  far	  from	  being	  revelatory,	  is	  
2	  
	  
more	  commonly	  read	  through	  whichever	  preexistent	  hermeneutic	  is	  valued	  by	  the	  
recipient.	  New	  stories	  are	  more	  commonly	  read	  with	  old	  grammars.	  
	   This	  insight,	  which	  is	  hardly	  original,	  is	  partly	  why	  Israeli	  historian	  Illan	  Pappé	  
	  has	  called	  for	  a	  “new	  dictionary”	  of	  Palestinian	  liberation.	  This	  new	  dictionary	  “contains	  
decolonization,	  regime	  change,	  one-­‐state	  solution”	  and	  is	  designed	  to	  challenge	  the	  
“hegemonic	  discourse	  employed	  by	  both	  the	  powers	  that	  be	  and	  the	  solidarity	  
movement	  with	  Palestine.”1	  That	  is,	  rather	  than	  (primarily)	  speak	  of	  the	  need	  for	  
coexistence	  between	  Israel	  and	  Palestine,	  Pappé	  encourages	  activists	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  
need	  for	  Israeli	  to	  decolonize	  Palestine;	  to	  not	  work	  through	  a	  “peace	  process,”	  but	  to	  
instead	  demand	  an	  Israeli	  regime	  change;	  to	  avoid	  capitulation	  of	  the	  land,	  and	  instead	  
insist	  upon	  the	  rights	  of	  all	  to	  live	  in	  a	  shared	  state.	  In	  short,	  the	  popular	  narratives	  that	  
shape	  public	  understanding	  of	  the	  conflict	  must	  be	  belied.	  The	  hegemonic	  discourse—
hegemonic	  at	  least	  among	  the	  American	  public2—is	  that	  of	  Israel’s	  “right	  to	  self-­‐
defense.”	  This	  must	  be	  fought	  with	  anti-­‐hegemonic,	  subversive,	  and	  in	  America,	  
counter-­‐cultural,	  narratives:	  perhaps	  narratives	  built	  upon	  and	  focused	  on	  Israel’s	  war	  
crimes	  and	  commitments	  to	  injustice.	  Those	  who	  “read-­‐off”	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  1948	  
and	  1967	  injustices	  need,	  in	  Pappé’s	  view,	  to	  be	  hermeneutically	  challenged:	  historical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Pappé,	  I.	  (2015).	  The	  Old	  and	  New	  Conversations.	  In	  F.	  Barat	  (ed)	  On	  Palestine	  (9-­‐49).	  Chicago:	  
Haymarket	  Books.	  
2	  In	  fact,	  despite	  the	  United	  Nation	  Secretary	  General	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon’s	  recent	  condemnation	  of	  Israeli	  
policies	  toward	  and	  attacks	  on	  Gaza,	  American	  favorability	  of	  Benjamin	  Netanyahu	  has	  increased	  since	  
2	  In	  fact,	  despite	  the	  United	  Nation	  Secretary	  General	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon’s	  recent	  condemnation	  of	  Israeli	  
policies	  toward	  and	  attacks	  on	  Gaza,	  American	  favorability	  of	  Benjamin	  Netanyahu	  has	  increased	  since	  
the	  late	  90s.	  Likewise,	  	  the	  percentage	  of	  Americans	  who	  think	  America	  is	  “not	  supportive	  enough”	  of	  




and	  current	  injustices	  will	  not	  demand	  revolutionary	  political	  action	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  
interpreted	  as	  just.	  Justice	  comes	  when	  injustice	  is	  recognized	  as	  such.	  
	   This	  reeducation	  of	  the	  Western	  masses	  may	  very	  well	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  
for	  the	  liberation	  of	  Palestinian	  people.	  As	  Noam	  Chomsky	  notes,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  
Palestinian	  freedom	  is	  possible	  without	  a	  change	  in	  American	  state	  policy—this	  because	  
of	  America’s	  obdurate	  support	  of	  Israel’s	  crimes.3	  However,	  there	  is	  some	  reason	  for	  
hope.	  There	  is	  a	  long	  history	  of	  oppressive	  American	  foreign	  policy	  changing	  in	  favor	  of	  
liberation,	  often	  after	  being	  the	  last	  international	  hold	  out,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  
think	  such	  a	  change	  is	  impossible	  now.4	  A	  change	  in	  public	  opinion	  would	  only	  serve	  to	  
help	  initiate	  such	  policy	  changes,	  and	  changes	  in	  discourse—a	  “new	  dictionary”—would	  
only	  serve	  to	  help	  change	  public	  opinion.	  
	   Tragically,	  Palestinian	  victims	  do	  not	  have	  the	  leisure	  of	  waiting	  for	  the	  American	  
public	  to	  undergo	  a	  discourse-­‐driven	  reeducation	  campaign.	  To	  again	  quote	  Chomsky:	  
“The	  clock	  of	  destruction	  continues	  at	  every	  historical	  juncture	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  pace	  
than	  our	  clock	  of	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  get	  out	  of	  this.”5	  If	  Pappé’s	  new	  dictionary	  is	  necessary	  
for	  liberation,	  it	  is	  in	  no	  way	  sufficient	  as	  an	  immediate	  platform.	  Pappé	  himself	  hints	  at	  
this	  recognition:	  “The	  relevant	  question	  is	  while	  one	  waits	  for	  the	  fundamental	  change	  
in	  American	  policy,	  can	  one	  win	  small	  battles	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  policies?	  Are	  there	  loopholes	  
that	  would	  …	  stop	  isolated	  atrocious	  cases?”	  For	  Pappé,	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  “isolated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Chomsky,	  N.	  (2014).	  The	  Nightmare	  in	  Gaza.	  Retrieved	  from:	  http://www.alternet.org/world/noam-­‐
chomsky-­‐nightmare-­‐gaza	  
4	  Chomsky,	  N.	  (2014).	  Outrage.	  Retrieved	  from:	  
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article39311.htm	  




atrocious	  cases”	  one	  must	  find	  political	  loopholes.	  Or	  else,	  one	  can	  have	  “optimism,”	  as	  
Pappé	  does,	  that	  a	  “catalytic	  event”	  will	  occur	  and	  subsequently	  shift	  public	  and	  state	  
opinion.6	  Thus,	  I	  am	  in	  agreement	  with	  Pappé	  and	  Chomsky	  that	  both	  a	  basic	  shift	  in	  
discourse	  and	  something	  more	  immediate,	  something	  that	  will	  initiate	  or	  at	  least	  
quicken	  change—a	  “catalytic	  event”—are	  necessary	  for	  Palestinian	  liberation.	  	  
	   This	  “catalytic	  event”	  is	  what	  I	  would	  like	  to	  pursue.	  Pappé	  hypothetically	  
suggests	  that	  the	  falling	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  could	  serve	  as	  this	  event.	  
Perhaps.	  And,	  with	  oil	  prices	  instable	  and	  environmental	  movements	  finally	  taking	  off,	  
Pappé’s	  once	  far-­‐fetched	  hypothetical	  may	  be	  nearer	  to	  reality	  than	  previously	  
thought.7	  My	  hope	  though,	  and	  my	  interest	  here,	  is	  that	  this	  “catalytic	  event”	  has	  
already	  occurred.	  Further,	  it	  is	  always	  occurring.	  The	  brutality	  of	  occupation—and	  here	  
the	  occupation	  of	  Palestine	  must	  be	  recognized,	  if	  nothing	  else,	  as	  brutal—is	  not	  waiting	  
on	  a	  justice-­‐bringing	  event,	  but	  actively	  suppresses	  justice.	  If	  justice	  is	  beautiful,	  and	  I	  
hope	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is,	  then	  occupation	  is	  unjust	  because	  it	  is	  a	  constant	  defacement	  of	  
beauty:	  occupation	  is	  ugliness.	  Hence,	  a	  thesis:	  ugliness	  is	  our	  catalyst.	  	  
And	  so	  the	  sort	  of	  “reeducation	  of	  the	  masses”	  that	  I	  am	  after	  here	  is	  not	  a	  
reeducation	  of	  discourse;	  it	  is	  at	  least	  not	  discursive	  if	  discourse	  is	  understood	  as	  
grammatical	  or	  lexical.	  While	  the	  contributions	  of	  post-­‐structuralism,	  literary	  theory,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Chomsky,	  N.	  and	  Pappe,	  I.	  (2015).	  The	  Present.	  In	  F.	  Barat	  (ed.)	  On	  Palestine	  (77-­‐99).	  Chicago:	  Haymarket	  
Books.	  
7	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  environmental	  movement	  has	  some	  indirect	  affect	  on	  Palestinian	  liberation	  shows	  both	  
the	  integrity	  of	  justice—and	  beauty,	  which	  I	  will	  argue—and	  the	  intricate	  role	  Palestine	  plays	  in	  a	  plethora	  
of	  political	  and	  moral	  issues	  of	  the	  day.	  We	  cannot	  understand	  the	  refugee	  crisis	  without	  understanding	  
Palestine.	  We	  cannot	  understand	  the	  environment	  without	  understanding	  Palestine.	  We	  cannot	  
understand	  colonialism	  or	  late	  capitalism	  without	  understanding	  Palestine.	  Finally,	  we	  cannot	  understand	  
or	  do	  aesthetics	  without	  engaging	  the	  sheer	  ugliness	  of	  the	  occupation.	  
5	  
	  
and	  colonial	  studies	  are	  influential	  on	  me	  and	  are	  undoubtedly	  an	  ally	  in	  this	  fight,	  my	  
concerns	  are	  aesthetic.	  As	  a	  practicing	  theologian,	  my	  concerns	  are	  theologically	  
aesthetic.	  As	  someone	  interested	  and	  immersed	  in	  the	  critical	  philosophy	  and	  liberation	  
theology	  traditions,	  my	  concerns	  are	  with	  a	  critical	  theological	  aesthetics.	  What,	  
precisely,	  this	  means	  will	  be	  hashed	  out	  in	  due	  time.	  For	  now,	  I	  let	  my	  understanding	  of	  
critical	  theological	  aesthetics	  mean	  that	  any	  theological	  treatment	  of	  aesthetics	  must	  
not	  privilege	  the	  aesthetic	  category	  of	  beauty.	  Rather,	  full	  treatment	  of	  aesthetics	  
engages	  beauty’s	  play	  partners.	  Aesthetics	  is	  also	  the	  study	  of	  ugliness.	  And,	  with	  
ugliness,	  the	  study	  of	  injustice	  and	  suffering.	  Our	  conceptions	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness	  
need	  challenging.	  The	  structures	  through	  which	  we	  approach	  these	  categories	  are	  in	  
need	  of	  a	  good	  critique.	  If	  we	  are	  serious	  when	  we	  say	  that	  God	  issues	  a	  call	  forward,	  
then	  we	  cannot	  accept	  the	  static	  and	  formal,	  if	  not	  lackadaisical	  and	  numbing,	  status	  
quo.	  	  
There	  is	  empirical	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  this	  political	  potential	  of	  aesthetics.	  
Recently,	  to	  take	  just	  one	  example,	  it	  was	  the	  image	  of	  a	  deceased	  boy,	  Aylan	  Kurdi,	  
washed	  ashore	  in	  Turkey,	  which	  spurred	  interest	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  refugee	  crisis.	  
Fortunately	  for	  victims	  in	  Palestine,	  a	  theological	  aesthetics	  for	  liberation	  does	  not	  need	  
to	  wait	  for	  more	  bodies	  to	  wash	  up	  shore.	  Christian	  theology	  proclaims	  that	  our	  Lamb	  
has	  already	  been	  offered.	  And	  yet,	  it	  is	  precisely	  those	  who	  profess	  Christ	  as	  the	  Lamb	  of	  
God	  who	  most	  occlude	  Palestinian	  liberation.	  It	  was	  originally	  Christian	  Zionists,	  led	  by	  
Lord	  Shaftesbury	  of	  England	  in	  the	  1840s,	  not	  Jewish	  Zionists,	  who	  insisted	  on	  the	  need	  
for	  “a	  country	  without	  a	  nation	  for	  a	  nation	  without	  a	  country.”	  Naim	  Ateek	  notes	  that	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Lord	  Shaftesbury’s	  phrase	  was	  the	  predecessor	  to	  the	  modern	  Zionist	  slogan,	  “A	  land	  of	  
no	  people	  for	  a	  people	  with	  no	  land.”8	  Of	  course,	  the	  land	  in	  question,	  modern	  day	  
Israel,	  did	  have	  people:	  Palestinians.	  The	  seeds	  of	  the	  rejection	  of	  Palestinian	  being	  were	  
planted	  by	  Christians.	  These	  Christian	  Zionists,	  often	  engrossed	  with	  apocalyptic	  
speculation	  and	  millennial	  fever,	  are	  too	  quickly	  dismissed	  by	  both	  the	  academy	  and	  
mainstream	  Christianity	  as	  naïve	  and,	  frankly,	  intellectually	  underdeveloped.9	  This	  
dismissal,	  based	  on	  correct	  judgment,	  overlooks	  the	  very	  real	  damage	  caused	  by	  
Zionists.	  The	  fantasies	  of	  these	  Zionists	  have	  caused	  real	  suffering.	  Phantasms	  have	  
become	  real	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  really	  ugly.	  This	  damage	  is	  inflicted	  not	  only	  upon	  
Palestinians,	  but	  also	  upon	  the	  glory	  of	  Christ.	  Indeed,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  developed	  later,	  to	  
inflict	  damage	  upon	  victims	  is	  to	  inflict	  damage	  upon	  Christ.	  That	  God	  can	  be	  
misappropriated	  in	  such	  a	  doubly	  dangerous	  way	  is	  precisely	  why	  our	  theological	  
aesthetics	  must	  be	  critical.	  If	  theological	  aesthetics	  aims	  to	  contemplate	  the	  beauty	  of	  
God,	  a	  critical	  theological	  aesthetics	  must,	  among	  other	  tasks,	  question	  how	  this	  beauty	  
is	  understood	  and	  employed.	  	  
	   This	  criticism	  will	  also	  help	  define	  my	  audience.	  For	  if	  Chomsky	  is	  right	  that	  no	  
liberation	  is	  possible	  without	  a	  change	  in	  American	  policy,	  and	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Christian	  
Zionists	  are	  largely	  responsible	  for	  the	  initial	  displacement	  of	  Palestinian	  people,	  then	  
our	  criticism	  must	  be	  directed	  toward	  these	  people	  and	  policies,	  and	  toward	  the	  harm	  
they	  have	  caused.	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  victims	  are	  neither	  Christian	  nor	  “western,”	  
it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  victimizers—at	  least	  the	  ones	  I	  wish	  to	  speak	  about—are	  largely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




both	  Christian	  and	  western,	  if	  not	  more	  specifically	  American.	  I	  do	  not	  speak	  on	  behalf	  
of	  the	  victims	  of	  Palestine—such	  temerity	  would	  be	  just	  vulgar.	  I	  do	  claim,	  though,	  to	  
critique	  the	  aesthetic	  categories,	  structures,	  and	  understandings—employed	  by	  “my	  
people”—that	  have	  contributed	  to	  injustice.	  My	  allies,	  then,	  include	  those	  who	  will	  join	  
this	  critique—and	  I	  can	  only	  hope	  that	  the	  oppressed	  will	  find	  my	  efforts	  suitable.	  
To	  conclude	  this	  introduction,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  faith	  in	  the	  person	  of	  God	  
demands	  faith	  in	  the	  beauty	  of	  God.	  This	  means	  that	  over	  and	  above	  the	  
misunderstandings	  and	  misappropriations,	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  true	  beauty.	  We	  must	  
be	  critical	  to	  engage	  it.	  In	  being	  critical,	  we	  must	  question	  the	  aesthetic	  assumptions	  
inherent	  in	  typical	  theological	  aesthetic	  discourse:	  relationships	  between	  beauty	  and	  
ugliness,	  flesh	  and	  spirit,	  the	  culture	  industry	  and	  God,	  gazing	  and	  relationality,	  and	  
aesthetics	  and	  justice	  must	  be	  fleshed	  out.	  	  
The	  above	  will	  be	  the	  task	  of	  the	  first	  section	  of	  my	  work:	  to	  clarify	  the	  aesthetic	  
component	  of	  theological	  aesthetics,	  and	  to	  ensure	  its	  critical	  stance.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  will	  
rely	  heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Theodor	  Adorno.	  First,	  I	  will	  show	  how	  Adorno’s	  “negative	  
beauty”	  both	  challenges	  and	  is	  challenged	  by	  a	  theological	  conception	  of	  beauty.	  Above	  
all,	  Adorno’s	  commitment	  to	  negativity	  calls	  us	  to	  rebuke	  satisfaction	  with	  our	  norms,	  
and	  this	  I	  find	  essential	  for	  theology.	  My	  almost	  sole	  reliance	  on	  Adorno	  is	  intentional:	  
because	  he	  has	  received	  little	  attention	  in	  theological	  circles—especially	  aesthetically—
the	  very	  act	  of	  treating	  Adorno	  theologically	  is	  a	  critical	  act.	  As	  will	  become	  clear,	  the	  
ossification	  of	  the	  “status	  quo”	  is	  beauty’s	  enemy.	  And	  so,	  taking	  a	  point	  of	  departure	  
radically	  removed	  from	  the	  theological	  status	  quo	  is	  a	  necessary	  first	  critical	  move.	  As	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the	  category	  of	  “displacement”	  becomes	  more	  important	  in	  the	  argument,	  this	  choice	  
will	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  necessary	  “displacement”	  of	  traditional	  sources.10	  Then,	  after	  clarifying	  
what	  is	  meant	  by	  beauty,	  I	  will	  raise	  some	  obstacles	  to	  approaching	  beauty.	  I	  take	  these	  
obstacles	  to	  have	  been	  mostly	  pointed	  out	  by	  Adorno	  and	  Max	  Horkheimer—and	  their	  
progeny—in	  their	  work	  on	  the	  culture	  industry.	  The	  culture	  industry	  forms	  subjectivity	  
as	  consumeristic,	  but	  we	  simply	  cannot	  approach	  God	  as	  consumers.	  This	  part	  of	  my	  
text	  may	  appear	  abstract	  and	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  pressing	  issue	  of	  Palestinian	  
liberation.	  But	  no.	  My	  eye	  will	  be	  forever	  toward	  liberation.	  Throughout	  the	  coming	  
rigorous	  aesthetic	  analysis,	  Palestine	  will	  be	  forever	  present—Palestine	  is	  the	  point	  of	  
departure	  of	  and	  context	  for	  this	  work.	  My	  hope	  is	  to	  show,	  indeed,	  that	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  political—liberation—and	  aesthetics	  is	  intrinsic.	  This	  intrinsic	  
relationship	  will	  be	  revealed	  through	  aesthetics,	  which	  is	  our	  first	  word.	  Further,	  and	  I	  
do	  not	  wish	  here	  to	  argue	  this	  point	  but	  rather	  to	  presuppose	  it,	  I	  hold	  that	  no	  theology	  
can	  be	  properly	  considered	  liberation	  theology	  without	  giving	  account	  of	  aesthetics.	  I	  
am	  doing,	  then,	  an	  integrated	  theology.	  Harsh	  academic	  distinctions	  between	  
theological	  aesthetics	  and	  liberation	  theology	  have	  no	  place	  here.	  
These	  meditations	  form	  the	  theoretical	  undergirding	  for	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  
text,	  which	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  practice	  in	  applied	  aesthetics.	  These	  aesthetic	  insights	  will	  be	  
used	  to	  engage	  the	  theological	  concerns	  raised	  by	  Naim	  Ateek.	  Because	  the	  breadth	  of	  
Ateek’s	  work	  demands	  more	  attention	  than	  I	  can	  give	  it	  here,	  I	  will	  narrowly	  focus	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  other	  reasons	  for	  avoiding	  classical	  and	  popular	  conceptions	  of	  beauty.	  To	  take	  
one	  example:	  It	  seems	  obvious	  that	  I	  would	  start	  with	  von	  Balthasar.	  But	  von	  Balthasar’s	  reliance	  on	  
forms,	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  was	  his	  intent,	  carries	  an	  essentialist	  and	  Platonic	  baggage.	  This	  essentializing	  
and	  Platonizing	  baggage	  cannot	  be	  squared	  with	  my	  project.	  
9	  
	  
two	  of	  his	  concerns:	  suicide	  bombing	  and	  the	  questioning	  of	  God’s	  character.	  On	  the	  
negative	  and	  dialectical	  grounds	  developed	  in	  this	  first	  half	  of	  the	  text,	  I	  will	  offer	  an	  
aesthetic	  critique	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  that	  does	  not	  devolve	  into	  mere	  moral	  repudiation	  
or	  dismissal:	  Suicide	  bombing	  is	  aesthetically	  ugly	  because	  it	  trades	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  
destruction	  and	  ugliness,	  and	  so	  does	  damage	  to	  beauty.	  However,	  we	  must	  not	  ignore	  
the	  “truth	  content”	  inherent	  in	  suicide	  bombing,	  and	  I	  plan	  on	  giving	  more	  than	  
recognition	  to	  this	  truth	  content.	  Finally,	  I	  agree	  with	  Ateek	  that	  God’s	  character	  has	  
been	  called	  into	  question.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  in	  part	  because	  the	  faithful	  approach	  God	  
in	  the	  stance	  of	  consumer,	  and	  not	  participator.	  God	  becomes	  an	  object	  in	  the	  
marketplace;	  God	  is	  a	  mere	  commodity	  placed	  in	  the	  pantheon	  and	  sold	  to	  all	  the	  
bidders.	  	  This	  must	  change,	  for	  everyday	  that	  God’s	  beauty	  is	  reduced	  and	  sold	  as	  kitsch	  














Part	  One:	  Toward	  Critical	  Theological	  Aesthetics	  
	  
Beauty	  as	  Theological	  Problem	  
	  
Beauty	  is	  dangerous.	  The	  beautiful	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  idol,	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  
appreciation	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  life	  of	  an	  aesthete,	  where	  the	  “weightier	  matters”	  
undergo	  a	  sort	  of	  aesthetic	  reduction.	  In	  von	  Balthasar’s	  parlance,	  a	  theological	  
aesthetic	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  degrading	  into	  an	  aesthetic	  theology.	  Concretely,	  any	  even	  
rudimentary	  historical	  survey	  will	  show	  numerous	  abuses	  of	  beauty:	  Beauty	  is	  
constructed	  to	  deny	  the	  being	  of	  the	  racialized	  other,	  beauty	  falsely	  construed	  as	  glory	  
is	  given	  as	  reason	  to	  subjugate	  groups	  of	  people	  on	  explicitly	  religious	  grounds,	  displays	  
of	  awesome	  form	  and	  grandeur	  are	  used	  to	  cultivate	  nationalist	  fever,	  and	  so	  on.	  With	  
ever	  an	  eye	  to	  the	  direct	  issue	  at	  hand—Palestine—we	  can	  see	  how	  damaging	  
constructions	  of	  beauty	  can	  be	  when	  considering	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  keffiyeh.	  The	  
keffiyeh,	  a	  symbol	  of	  Palestinian	  resistance,	  has	  been	  appropriated	  by	  the	  west	  and	  is	  
sold	  in	  mass	  by	  cheap	  retailers	  like	  H&M.	  Our	  aesthetic	  sensibilities,	  and	  the	  profits	  
derived	  therefrom,	  flout	  Palestinian	  resistance.	  	  
	   For	  these	  reasons,	  theological	  engagement	  with	  beauty	  must	  be	  critical.	  Any	  
uncritical	  acceptance	  of	  current	  constructions	  of	  the	  beautiful	  not	  only	  risks	  the	  above	  
injustices,	  but,	  perhaps	  more	  theo-­‐centrically,	  denies	  the	  reality	  that	  God	  always	  has	  
“more”	  in	  store	  for	  us.	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  beauty,	  qua	  beauty,	  demands	  to	  be	  taken	  
11	  
	  
on	  its	  own	  terms:	  it	  seems	  that	  beauty,	  despite	  the	  range	  in	  which	  it	  manifests	  
historically—or	  perhaps	  this	  scope	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  fact?—resists	  conceptualization.	  
Theory	  cannot	  “get	  on	  top	  of”	  beauty,	  because	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  does,	  beauty	  ceases	  to	  be	  
beautiful.	  	  
	   And	  so,	  beauty	  is	  enigmatic.	  We	  must	  be	  critical	  of	  beauty,	  yet	  if	  we	  attempt	  to	  
judge	  beauty	  by	  or	  subject	  beauty	  to	  the	  means	  of	  some	  other	  criteria—be	  they	  
political,	  material,	  or,	  even,	  theological—we	  lose	  it.	  But	  we	  must	  not	  lose	  it.	  I	  believe	  
that	  Adorno’s	  aesthetic	  theory,	  articulated	  in	  Aesthetic	  Theory,	  provides	  a	  helpful	  way	  of	  
thinking	  through	  this	  enigma.	  Adorno’s	  negative	  dialectics	  of	  beauty	  conceives	  of	  beauty	  
as	  itself	  always	  unreconciled:	  the	  “negative”	  is	  constitutive	  of	  beauty,	  and	  in	  this	  sense,	  
beauty	  is	  “the	  ever	  broken	  promise	  of	  happiness.”11	  Insofar	  as	  he	  supplies	  and	  
articulates	  a	  necessary	  critical	  edge	  for	  theological	  aesthetics,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  Adorno’s	  
insights	  are	  instructive	  for	  theological	  aesthetics.	  This	  critical	  edge	  is	  found	  primarily	  in	  
beauty’s	  dialectic,	  which,	  at	  its	  simplified	  core,	  is	  the	  dialectic	  of	  renunciation	  and	  
beatification.	  While	  remaining	  sensitive	  to	  Adorno’s	  distrust	  of	  theology,	  I	  wish	  here	  to	  
bring	  Adorno’s	  critical	  aesthetics	  and	  theology	  into	  conversation.	  Ultimately,	  theology	  
does	  not	  undermine	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics,	  but	  challenges	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  by	  
introducing	  new	  contours	  to	  the	  categories	  of	  relationship,	  hope,	  and	  negativity.	  In	  
bringing	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  into	  conversation	  with	  theological	  aesthetics	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  
to	  discredit	  either	  one	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  other.	  Instead,	  Adorno	  provides	  a	  rich	  dialectic	  for	  
thinking	  about	  a	  revelation-­‐centric	  negative	  theological	  aesthetics,	  and	  theology	  offers	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Adorno,	  Thedoro.	  (1996).	  Aesthetic	  Theory.	  (Robert	  Hullot-­‐Kentor,	  trans.).	  Minneapolis,	  MN:	  University	  
of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  (originally	  published	  1970).	  Page,	  136.	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way	  of	  expanding	  Adorno’s	  thought.	  That	  is,	  I	  will	  treat	  beauty	  as	  a	  theological	  problem,	  
but	  will	  do	  so	  aided	  by	  the	  critical	  insights	  formed	  by	  Adorno’s	  negative	  aesthetics	  
	  
Adorno	  on	  the	  Beautiful	  and	  the	  Ugly	  
	  
The	  posthumously	  published	  Aesthetic	  Theory	  stands	  as	  Adorno’s	  unfinished	  
attempt	  at	  producing	  an	  historical	  and	  critical	  aesthetics.	  The	  book	  is	  wide	  in	  scope	  and	  
written	  paratatically.	  It	  lacks	  direction	  and	  simple	  paragraph	  breaks.	  There	  are	  few	  
citations.	  It	  is	  as	  if	  Adorno	  wished	  to	  create	  a	  work	  that	  rebelled,	  in	  its	  very	  form,	  against	  
the	  academic	  market	  that	  would	  receive	  it.12	  All	  of	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  Adorno’s	  
aesthetic	  theory	  is	  critical	  in	  form	  as	  well	  as	  content,	  and	  can	  be	  analyzed	  on	  both	  
fronts.	  Here	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  perform	  a	  literary	  analysis	  of	  the	  function	  of	  parataxis	  for	  
Adorno;	  however,	  his	  desire	  to	  eschew	  what	  he	  saw	  to	  be	  the	  academic	  status	  quo	  gives	  
insight	  into	  one	  of	  the	  text’s	  few	  unifying	  strands	  of	  thought:	  the	  negative.	  
	   The	  basic	  act	  of	  renunciation—here	  exemplified	  by	  Adorno’s	  renunciation	  of	  
what	  he	  saw	  to	  be	  the	  academic	  status	  quo—stands,	  in	  Aesthetic	  Theory,	  as	  beauty’s	  
genesis.13	  This	  renunciation	  is	  the	  renunciation	  of	  the	  ugly.	  Importantly,	  it	  is	  the	  act	  of	  
renunciation	  that	  names	  the	  ugly	  and	  the	  beautiful	  as	  such.	  It	  is	  not	  that,	  as	  in	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Indeed,	  “throughout	  his	  years	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Adorno	  on	  many	  occasions	  met	  with	  the	  rejection	  of	  
his	  work	  by	  publishers	  who	  saw	  his	  writings	  simply	  as	  disorganized.”	  AT,	  Introduction,	  xiv.	  
13	  Adorno	  thinks	  that	  a	  history	  of	  German	  idealism	  has	  given	  beauty	  an	  undeservedly	  privileged	  place	  in	  
philosophical	  aesthetics.	  There	  is	  more	  to	  aesthetics	  than	  beauty.	  I	  agree,	  but,	  in	  staying	  true	  to	  Adorno’s	  
own	  form	  of	  immanent	  criticism,	  we	  should	  meet	  beauty	  head	  on,	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  its	  rule.	  Beauty	  
must	  be	  worked	  through.	  
13	  
	  
Platonic	  scheme,	  the	  ugly	  and	  the	  beautiful	  are	  “there”	  and	  the	  artist’s	  job	  is	  to	  
recognize	  them	  as	  such.	  The	  act	  of	  renunciation	  is	  the	  primordial	  aesthetic	  act:	  	  
Beauty	  is	  not	  the	  platonically	  pure	  beginning	  but	  rather	  something	  that	  originated	  in	  the	  
renunciation	  of	  what	  was	  once	  feared,	  which	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  renunciation—
retrospectively,	  so	  to	  speak,	  according	  to	  its	  own	  telos—became	  the	  ugly.14	  
	  
Adorno	  is	  aware	  that	  such	  a	  view	  gives	  beauty	  structural,	  or	  “formal,”	  contours.	  This	  is	  
by	  design,	  because	  to	  treat	  beauty	  as	  anything	  but	  formal	  would	  be	  to	  resort	  to	  an	  
archiving	  of	  historical	  manifestations	  of	  the	  category.15	  This	  historical	  reduction	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  content	  would	  miss	  that	  which	  is	  fundamental	  to	  beauty:	  its	  dialectical	  
constitution.16	  	  
This	  dialecticism	  is	  the	  dialectic	  between	  renunciation	  and	  beatification.	  That	  is,	  
because	  beauty	  renounces	  the	  ugly,	  beauty	  is	  always	  also	  negating	  itself.	  Beauty	  has	  to	  
negate	  itself	  because	  Adorno	  sees	  beauty’s	  renouncing	  of	  the	  ugly	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  “cruelty”	  
to	  the	  ugly.	  Here	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that,	  for	  Adorno,	  the	  ugly	  and	  the	  
beautiful	  do	  not	  exist	  a	  priori	  before	  this	  act	  of	  renunciation.	  Thus,	  the	  renouncing,	  by	  
naming	  the	  ugly	  as	  the	  ugly,	  is	  “cruel”	  to	  the	  ugly,	  even	  “violent.”17	  And,	  in	  being	  cruel,	  
beauty	  is	  always	  already	  entangled	  with	  ugliness.	  To	  say	  that	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  ugly	  
have	  a	  dialectical	  relationship	  is	  not	  just	  to	  say	  that	  the	  beautiful	  always	  arises	  out	  of	  
the	  ugly;	  rather,	  it	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  ugly	  is	  always	  constitutive	  of	  the	  beautiful.	  Without	  
renunciation—without	  negation—there	  is	  no	  beauty,	  but	  because	  beauty	  is	  born	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  AT,	  47	  
15	  AT,	  51	  
16	  Beauty’s	  dialectic	  forbids	  an	  historical	  archive	  standing	  in	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  ostensive	  definition	  of	  the	  
category.	  This	  is	  ultimately	  because	  beauty,	  as	  dialectical,	  is	  self-­‐defacing.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  define	  beauty	  
through	  historical	  archive	  would	  be	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  ever-­‐incomplete	  chasing	  after	  beauty’s	  next	  
particular	  manifestation.	  
17	  AT,	  48	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scars	  and,	  in	  a	  sense,	  “creates”	  the	  ugly,	  it	  is	  never	  free	  of	  sin.	  And	  so,	  it	  soon	  renounces	  
itself.	  So	  on,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  
This	  may	  all	  seem	  unnecessarily—perhaps	  perilously—abstract,	  but	  
developments	  in	  art	  history,	  at	  least,	  seem	  to	  give	  credibility	  to	  Adorno’s	  view.	  Manet’s	  
proto-­‐impressionism,	  for	  example,	  was	  in	  part	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  representational	  
realism	  of	  his	  time.	  The	  beauty	  of	  impressionism	  was	  that	  it	  renounced	  the	  
objectification	  found	  in	  realism—which	  was	  previously	  held	  as	  the	  standard	  of	  beauty.	  
Adorno	  remarks	  that	  abstract	  impressionism	  partakes	  in	  this	  dialectic	  by	  trying	  to	  
renounce	  art	  altogether:	  “It	  is	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  beautiful	  that	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  
beauty:	  because	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  beautiful.”18	  Here,	  the	  dialectic	  of	  beauty	  reaches	  a	  fever	  
pitch:	  abstract	  impressionism	  recognizes	  that	  beauty	  itself	  is	  ugly,	  and	  so	  tries	  to	  
renounce	  it.	  The	  stumbling	  block,	  though,	  is	  that	  this	  renunciation	  of	  “beauty”	  is	  itself	  a	  
claim	  to	  beauty:	  by	  producing	  abstract	  art,	  the	  artist	  produces	  beauty.	  And	  so,	  the	  
dialectic	  marches	  on.	  
Now,	  as	  this	  brusque	  historical	  example	  shows,	  that-­‐which-­‐is-­‐called-­‐ugly	  is	  
historically	  dependent	  (which	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  Adorno	  argues,	  “contingent”).19	  But,	  again,	  
this	  historicism	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  category	  of	  the	  ugly	  cannot	  follow	  some	  basic	  
structural	  criteria.	  Indeed,	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  beauty	  suggests	  its	  structural	  
form:	  “The	  transition	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  form	  codified	  by	  the	  category	  of	  the	  beautiful	  
inherently	  tends	  toward	  that	  formalism	  from	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  beauty	  suffers.”20	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That	  is,	  as	  artists	  struggle	  with	  the	  dialectic	  of	  beauty,	  they	  constantly	  turn	  to	  form	  and	  
structure	  as	  those	  elements	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  object	  that	  can	  overcome	  and	  renounce	  
ugliness:	  the	  form,	  as	  formal	  and	  so	  ideal,	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  rough	  and	  terse	  status	  
quo	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome.	  But	  if	  beauty’s	  dialectic	  unfolds	  in	  history,	  then	  so	  too	  
does	  ugliness’s—for	  the	  two	  inhere.	  One	  contour	  of	  this	  structural	  unfolding,	  for	  
Adorno,	  is	  that	  the	  ugly	  is	  intimately	  bound	  up	  with	  suffering:	  “The	  aesthetic	  
condemnation	  of	  the	  ugly	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  inclination,	  verified	  by	  social	  psychology,	  
to	  equate,	  justly,	  the	  ugly	  with	  the	  expression	  of	  suffering	  and,	  by	  projecting	  it,	  to	  
despise	  it.”21	  If	  we	  are	  to	  be	  at	  all	  honest	  with	  empirical	  reality,	  then	  we	  must	  admit	  that	  
suffering	  is	  ugly.	  Thus,	  given	  what	  has	  been	  said	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  
ugliness	  and	  beauty,	  that	  which	  renounces	  suffering	  must	  be	  beautiful.	  	  
Ugliness	  as	  suffering	  seems	  to	  make	  good	  phenomenological	  sense,	  but	  
phenomenology	  is	  not	  what	  Adorno	  is	  doing.	  By	  identifying	  ugliness	  with	  suffering	  he	  is	  
not	  making	  a	  claim	  as	  to	  some	  essence	  of	  ugliness.	  Rather,	  he	  is	  making	  note	  that	  the	  
category	  of	  ugliness	  is	  employed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  aesthetically	  value	  suffering.	  What	  
counts	  as	  suffering	  is	  mediated	  aesthetically.	  That	  is,	  suffering	  is	  deemed	  ugly	  when	  one	  
wants	  to	  be	  rid	  of	  it.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  oppressed,	  who	  suffer	  oppression,	  are	  
deemed	  ugly	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  renounced	  by	  their	  oppressors.	  
Nietzsche’s	  trace	  must	  be	  recognized:	  the	  ugly	  are	  ugly	  because	  they	  are	  renounced,	  
and	  the	  beautiful	  are	  beautiful	  because	  they	  do	  the	  renouncing.	  This	  relationship	  is	  cruel	  
because,	  for	  Adorno,	  there	  is	  no	  “real”	  or	  “true”	  beauty	  that	  resides	  behind	  these	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socially	  constructed	  beauties,	  which	  arise	  out	  of	  renunciations.	  Thus,	  while	  it	  is	  
aesthetically	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  the	  oppressive	  beauty	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  also	  always	  
ugly,	  it	  is	  incorrect	  to	  attribute	  this	  ugliness	  to	  its	  failure	  to	  correspond	  with	  some	  ideal	  
type	  or	  form	  of	  “Beauty.”	  	  
And	  so	  there	  is	  an	  inherent	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  Or	  
rather,	  there	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  mediation	  of	  the	  ethical.	  Relationships	  of	  power—those	  
relationships	  between	  oppressed	  and	  oppressor—give	  themselves	  in	  aesthetic	  forms.	  It	  
is	  not	  just	  that	  political	  relationships	  construct	  notions	  of	  the	  beautiful.	  In	  such	  a	  
schema,	  aesthetics	  would	  be	  reducible	  to	  the	  political.	  Rather,	  aesthetics	  are	  political	  by	  
virtue	  of	  their	  dialectic,	  which	  deals	  with	  social	  relationships	  and	  treats	  of	  ugliness	  and	  
suffering.	  It	  may	  very	  well	  be	  “natural”	  that	  one	  finds	  suffering	  to	  be	  ugly,	  but	  what	  
specific	  content	  one	  counts	  as	  suffering	  is	  socially	  mediated.	  The	  meat	  of	  the	  argument	  
here	  is	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  people	  suffer	  and	  others	  suffer	  less—the	  fact	  that	  some	  
are	  ugly	  and	  some	  are	  beautiful—is	  historically	  and	  socially	  mediated,	  not	  natural.	  It	  is	  
because	  of	  these	  competing	  interests	  and	  histories	  that	  beauty,	  despite	  having	  one	  
form,	  can	  manifest	  with	  such	  varying	  content.	  	  
Here	  we	  may	  wonder	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  at	  all	  between	  ethics	  
and	  aesthetics,	  or	  if	  such	  identifying	  the	  ugly	  with	  suffering	  has	  conflated	  the	  disciplines.	  
For	  Adorno,	  who	  was	  not	  as	  radical	  in	  claims	  to	  mediation	  as	  some	  of	  the	  postmoderns	  
who	  follow	  him,	  the	  primordial	  suffering	  that	  is	  named	  ugly	  does	  exist	  before	  it	  is	  
named	  ugly.	  It	  exists	  as	  part	  of	  an	  undifferentiated,	  nameless	  mass	  of	  matter	  which	  he,	  
paradoxically,	  names	  “first	  nature.”	  Because	  we	  are	  social	  beings,	  we	  only	  have	  access	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to	  this	  “first	  nature”	  as	  mediated;	  that	  is,	  as	  “second	  nature.”22	  So,	  suffering	  is	  given	  as	  
always	  mediated.	  That	  is,	  we	  never	  have	  access	  to	  first,	  or	  unmediated,	  nature.	  Yet,	  we	  
must	  claim	  its	  reality.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  make	  this	  transcendent	  claim—and	  here	  is	  Kant’s	  
trace—then	  social	  constructions	  of	  the	  beautiful	  are	  all	  we	  have.	  In	  this	  sense,	  first	  
nature	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  apparition:	  it	  appears	  as	  never	  real,	  always	  ghostly.	  From	  our	  situation	  
in	  the	  mediated	  world,	  we	  make	  appear—we	  hallucinate—the	  first	  nature.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
aesthetics	  are,	  for	  Adorno,	  always	  a	  bit	  haunted,	  and	  always,	  ultimately,	  deceitful.	  This	  
deceit,	  though,	  promises	  happiness,	  promises	  beauty,	  promises	  to	  renounce	  suffering.	  
Such,	  in	  short,	  is	  Adorno’s	  conception	  of	  beauty.	  	  Beauty	  and	  ugliness	  have	  a	  
formally	  dialectical	  relationship	  to	  each	  other:	  the	  beautiful	  is	  that	  which	  renounces	  the	  
ugly,	  and	  the	  ugly	  is	  that	  which	  is	  renounced.	  However,	  by	  engaging	  in	  the	  act	  of	  
renouncing,	  beauty	  becomes	  “cruel,”	  and	  thus	  incorporates	  ugliness	  into	  itself,	  which	  it	  
must	  then	  renounce.	  Beauty	  is	  never	  pure.	  The	  oppressor	  and	  aesthetic	  decider	  cannot	  
escape	  beauty’s	  absolute	  negativity:	  beauty,	  rather,	  escapes	  the	  oppressor.	  Beauty	  flees	  
from	  the	  ugliness	  and	  cruelty	  of	  renouncing	  others,	  and	  escapes	  untouched—but	  
ghostly.	  This	  formal	  relationship	  is	  always	  filled	  with	  particular	  social	  and	  historical	  
content.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  art	  in	  undermining	  all	  manifestations	  
of	  this	  content.	  In	  short,	  art,	  by	  always	  renouncing	  the	  world,	  points	  toward	  the	  utopic	  
image.	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Art	  and	  the	  Negative	  Image	  
Adorno’s	  treatment	  of	  art	  is,	  in	  part,	  a	  reaction	  to	  German	  idealism.	  If	  Kant	  saw	  
natural	  beauty	  as	  higher	  than	  artistic	  beauty,	  and	  if	  Hegel	  saw	  fine	  art	  as	  the	  proper	  
object	  of	  aesthetics,	  then	  Adorno	  wishes	  to	  complicate	  this	  hierarchy	  of	  fine	  and	  natural	  
beauty.	  Again	  making	  use	  of	  his	  first	  and	  second	  nature	  distinction,	  Adorno	  holds	  that	  
we	  only	  have	  access	  to	  natural	  beauty	  through	  artistic	  beauty.	  This	  is	  because	  any	  
approach	  to	  what	  is	  commonly	  called	  “nature”	  is	  always	  already	  mediated;	  it	  is	  always,	  
in	  fact,	  an	  approach	  to	  “second	  nature.”	  Art’s	  promise	  is	  that	  it	  can	  present	  natural	  
beauty:	  art,	  by	  creating	  and	  using	  the	  mediated	  world,	  can	  imagine	  natural,	  non-­‐
mediated,	  beauty.	  In	  perhaps	  his	  most	  mystical	  moment,	  Adorno	  describes	  the	  
relationship	  as	  follows:	  
Artworks	  say	  that	  something	  exists	  in	  itself,	  without	  predicating	  anything	  about	  it.	  …	  With	  human	  
means	  art	  wants	  to	  realize	  the	  language	  of	  what	  is	  not	  human.	  …	  The	  total	  subjective	  elaboration	  
of	  art	  as	  a	  nonconceptual	  language	  is	  the	  only	  figure,	  at	  the	  contemporary	  stage	  of	  rationality,	  in	  
which	  something	  like	  the	  language	  of	  the	  divine	  creation	  is	  reflected,	  qualified	  by	  the	  paradox	  
that	  what	  is	  reflected	  is	  blocked.	  Art	  attempts	  to	  imitate	  an	  expression	  that	  would	  not	  be	  
interpolated	  human	  intention.23	  
	  
The	  passage	  demands	  some	  unpacking.	  Adorno’s	  repeated	  references	  to	  “human	  
means”	  and	  “intentions”	  are	  references	  to	  the	  mediation	  of	  “second	  nature.”	  Nature	  is	  
given	  as	  mediated.	  Art,	  though,	  promises	  to	  somehow	  overcome	  this	  mediation	  and	  
give	  the	  immediate.	  That	  is,	  art	  falsely	  promises	  the	  nonhuman.	  Art,	  through	  its	  ability	  
to	  avoid	  conceptualization—maybe	  even	  because	  of	  its	  antithesis	  to	  conceptualization—
promises	  to	  transcend	  our	  social	  constructions	  and	  the	  trap	  of	  mediated	  experience.	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   For	  Adorno,	  this	  promise,	  which	  would	  amount	  to	  happiness,	  is	  never	  realized.	  
Because	  there	  is	  no	  transcendent	  truth,	  in	  order	  to	  promise	  transcendence,	  art	  must	  
feign	  divine	  creation:	  it	  must	  promise	  to	  create	  something	  out	  of	  nothing.	  It	  is	  precisely	  
this	  “nothing”	  that	  captures	  Adorno’s	  critical	  eye.	  For,	  although	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  art	  
can	  give	  itself	  immediately—it	  is,	  upon	  creation,	  mediated	  by	  its	  “situation”24—it	  is	  the	  
case	  that	  art	  can	  obstinately	  negate	  that	  which	  it	  comes	  from	  and	  comes	  into.	  Art	  
radically	  negates	  the	  empirical	  world.	  	  This	  negation	  occurs	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
creates	  out	  of	  “empirical	  reality”	  something	  that	  is	  not,	  by	  reality’s	  own	  standards,	  
empirical	  reality.	  The	  content	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  artistic	  content,	  not	  part	  of	  the	  
administered	  world.	  In	  this	  way,	  every	  act	  of	  creation	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  empirical	  
world	  insofar	  as	  its	  content	  resides	  outside	  of	  the	  empirical	  world.	  Adorno	  says	  that	  the	  
empirical	  world,	  especially	  the	  enlightenment	  world	  of	  world-­‐constituting	  subjects,	  has	  
become	  enchanted	  with	  itself.	  Art,	  because	  of	  beauty’s	  attraction,	  offers	  a	  sort	  of	  
counter-­‐hegemonic	  enchantment:	  “By	  their	  very	  existence	  artworks	  postulate	  the	  
existence	  of	  what	  does	  not	  exist	  and	  thereby	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  latter’s	  actual	  
nonexistence.”25	  For	  this	  reason,	  “the	  new	  is	  akin	  to	  death.”26	  This	  is	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  
negativity.	  
	   But	  this	  “no”	  that	  art	  constantly	  cries	  out	  to	  the	  world,	  which	  is	  a	  promise	  of	  a	  
better	  world,	  is	  never	  satisfied.	  As	  a	  radical	  no,	  it	  cannot	  be	  satisfied.	  For	  Adorno,	  the	  
no,	  the	  not-­‐here,	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  yes	  and	  the	  now.	  Utopia,	  then,	  which	  is	  art’s	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promise,	  is	  a	  negative	  image.	  Because	  the	  beautiful	  is	  also	  always	  ugly,	  and	  must	  then	  
also	  always	  renounce	  itself,	  we	  can	  never	  escape	  total	  criticism.	  The	  image	  of	  utopia	  
exists,	  but	  it	  exists	  as	  that-­‐which-­‐is-­‐not.	  The	  “is”	  here	  is	  ontological,	  not	  
phenomenological.	  Put	  otherwise,	  nonexistence,	  or	  “not-­‐here,”	  the	  “negative,”	  is	  
constitutive	  of	  utopia.	  Again	  poetically,	  Adorno	  ruminates	  on	  this	  sad	  fate:	  
Art	  does	  not	  have	  it	  in	  its	  power	  to	  decide	  over	  the	  possibility	  that	  everything	  may	  indeed	  not	  
come	  to	  anything	  more	  than	  nothing;	  it	  has	  its	  fictiveness	  in	  the	  assertion	  implicit	  in	  its	  existence	  
that	  it	  has	  gone	  beyond	  the	  limit.	  …	  Artworks	  are	  a	  priori	  negative	  by	  the	  law	  of	  their	  
objectivation:	  They	  kill	  what	  they	  objectify	  by	  tearing	  it	  away	  from	  the	  immediacy	  of	  its	  life.	  Their	  
own	  life	  preys	  on	  death.27	  
	  
How	  cruel	  indeed!	  Here,	  art’s	  absolute	  negativity	  is	  approached	  two	  different	  ways,	  and	  
the	  ways	  converge.	  First,	  art	  is	  negative	  because	  “the	  limit,”	  the	  mediated	  second	  
nature	  of	  empirical	  reality,	  cannot	  be	  transcended—at	  least	  not	  by	  art.	  Indeed,	  by	  
creating,	  art	  adds	  something	  to	  empirical	  reality:	  an	  artwork.	  The	  artwork’s	  content	  is	  
not	  the	  content	  of	  the	  empirical	  world,	  but	  the	  empirical	  world	  appropriates	  and	  
mediates	  the	  artwork	  nonetheless.	  Art	  pretends	  to	  have	  transgressed	  these	  limits,	  but	  
all	  it	  has	  done	  is	  shifted	  them.	  At	  its	  best,	  art	  negates	  one	  status	  quo	  and	  brings	  about	  
another.	  The	  formal	  character	  of	  beauty	  remains	  the	  same,	  and	  it	  is	  still	  filled	  with	  
particular	  and	  historically	  dependent	  content.	  Complimentarily,	  art	  is	  always	  negative	  
because	  if	  indeed	  there	  was	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  immediacy,	  art	  must	  kill	  it	  in	  order	  to	  be	  art.	  
Art,	  by	  speaking,	  destroys	  mute	  immediacy.	  Thus,	  while	  art	  promises	  happiness,	  and	  
indeed	  is	  quite	  beautiful,	  its	  promises	  are	  always	  empty,	  and	  its	  beauty	  is	  always	  prime	  
for	  negation.	  The	  artist	  is	  the	  beautiful	  liar.	  
	   This	  incapability	  of	  imagining	  natural	  beauty	  is	  theology’s	  first	  point	  of	  entry:	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  The	  Old	  Testament	  prohibition	  on	  images	  has	  an	  aesthetic	  as	  well	  as	  a	  theological	  dimension.	  
That	  one	  should	  make	  no	  image,	  which	  means	  no	  image	  of	  anything	  whatsoever,	  expresses	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  make	  such	  an	  image.	  Through	  its	  duplication	  in	  art,	  what	  
appears	  in	  nature	  is	  robbed	  of	  its	  being-­‐in-­‐itself,	  in	  which	  the	  experience	  of	  nature	  is	  fulfilled.	  28	  
	  
For	  Adorno,	  then,	  the	  Abrahamic	  prohibition	  on	  images	  is	  more	  descriptive	  than	  
prescriptive:	  one	  simply	  cannot	  imagine	  the	  divine,	  and	  for	  the	  reasons	  mentioned—it	  
would	  result	  in	  mediation	  and	  objectification,	  it	  would	  give	  speech	  to	  the	  mute,	  it	  would	  
find	  some	  positive	  result	  from	  absolute	  negation,	  and	  so	  on.	  As	  a	  contemporary	  
theologian	  interested	  in	  both	  liberation	  and	  aesthetics,	  I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  with	  letting	  
the	  relationship	  between	  theology	  and	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  end	  with	  this	  musing	  on	  the	  
Old	  Testament.	  Instead,	  I	  want	  to	  pursue	  Adorno’s	  aesthetic	  insights	  to	  their	  theological	  
limit:	  Must	  beauty’s	  promise	  always	  be	  broken?	  This	  pursuit	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  next	  
section.	  	  
	  
Differentiating	  Between	  Adorno’s	  Conception	  of	  Beauty	  and	  Christ’s	  Beauty	  
	  
	   For	  Adorno,	  then,	  beauty	  is	  found	  in	  art,	  which	  tries	  to	  show	  natural	  beauty	  
through	  artistic	  beauty.	  Precisely,	  though,	  this	  is	  where	  beauty	  is	  found	  materially,	  or	  
empirically.	  Structurally,	  beauty	  is	  found	  where	  ugliness	  is	  renounced.	  For	  theology,	  this	  
structure	  and	  material	  coincide	  in	  the	  person	  of	  Jesus.	  Eventually,	  I	  will	  explicate	  this	  
structure	  with	  a	  meditation	  on	  the	  Cross,	  and	  will	  explicate	  this	  material	  with	  a	  
meditation	  on	  the	  prologue	  of	  John’s	  gospel.	  It	  is	  my	  claim	  that	  an	  identity	  of	  promise	  
and	  fulfillment	  of	  promise	  has	  occurred	  in	  Christ,	  and	  this	  identity	  offers	  new	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possibilities	  for	  Adorno’s	  thought.	  Precisely:	  The	  negative	  utopic	  image	  need	  not	  be	  only	  
hallucination;	  rather,	  it	  is	  the	  claim	  of	  theology	  that	  this	  absolute	  negative	  image	  is	  the	  
person	  of	  Jesus.	  The	  incarnation	  is	  both	  the	  revelation	  of	  formal	  beauty	  par	  excellence	  
and	  the	  absolute	  renunciation	  of	  ugliness.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  will	  work	  
toward	  unpacking	  this	  thesis.	  
	   To	  say	  that	  the	  incarnation	  is	  both	  formally	  and	  materially	  the	  absolute	  
revelation	  of	  the	  beautiful	  is	  somewhat	  tautological.	  If	  the	  form	  is	  absolute,	  then	  so	  
must	  be	  the	  content.	  And	  vice-­‐versa.	  Now,	  where	  theology	  must	  begin	  to	  draw	  its	  line	  
against	  Adorno	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  claim	  to	  absoluteness:	  for	  Adorno,	  the	  revelation	  of	  
Christ	  is	  not	  a	  revelation	  of	  anything	  but	  another	  form	  of	  second	  nature—there	  is	  no	  
transcendent	  truth	  to	  which	  it	  can	  appeal.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  theology	  can	  simply	  
disagree,	  it	  can,	  in	  faith,	  presuppose	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  revelation,	  and	  take	  
Christ’s	  transcendent	  reality	  as	  given.	  Maybe	  such	  presupposing	  is	  on	  some	  level	  
inescapable—contemporary	  critics	  of	  Adorno	  accuse	  him	  of	  eventually	  resorting	  to	  a	  
transcendental	  positive	  ethics,	  because	  how	  can	  we	  know	  suffering	  without	  
presupposing	  some	  form	  of	  the	  good?—but	  my	  goals	  are	  more	  explicitly	  aesthetic.	  
Rather	  than	  appeal	  to	  the	  presupposed	  truth	  of	  revelation,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  the	  method	  of	  
theological	  aesthetics	  ought	  to	  be	  to	  engage	  seriously	  with	  the	  beauty	  of	  revelation.	  In	  
this	  way,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  presuppose,	  I	  think,	  the	  supernatural.	  Rather,	  we	  can	  




	   Now,	  if	  we	  can	  escape	  Adorno’s	  criticism	  by	  avoiding	  direct	  appeals	  to	  the	  
supernatural,	  we	  must	  be	  firmer	  against	  Adorno	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  “the	  limit”	  here	  on	  
earth.	  But	  even	  on	  this	  point,	  ultimately,	  we	  can	  use	  Adorno’s	  immanent	  criticism	  to	  
make	  theological	  room.	  For	  Adorno,	  as	  has	  been	  discussed,	  the	  promise	  of	  beauty—
which	  is	  happiness—can	  never	  be	  fulfilled.	  For	  theology,	  the	  promise	  of	  Christ	  not	  only	  
will	  be	  fulfilled,	  but	  indeed	  is	  fulfillment	  itself.	  Thus	  a	  crucial	  difference	  between	  
Adorno’s	  negative	  beauty	  and	  the	  beauty	  of	  Christ	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  take	  beauty	  to	  
be	  trustworthy.	  For	  Adorno,	  the	  “truth	  content”	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  that,	  in	  encounter	  with	  
art,	  the	  subject	  comes	  face	  to	  face	  with	  its	  own	  finitude,	  with	  its	  own	  negation.29	  
Contrary	  to	  Hegelian	  dialectics,	  Adorno’s	  negative	  dialectics	  says	  that	  the	  subject	  and	  
the	  beautiful	  piece	  are	  non-­‐identical:	  the	  subject	  has	  no	  domination	  over	  the	  thing,	  is	  
not	  the	  thing,	  and	  never	  will	  be	  the	  thing.	  Fair	  enough.	  But	  the	  particular	  logic	  of	  
aesthetic	  encounter	  with	  Christ—Christ’s	  own	  “truth	  content”—says	  not	  just	  that	  
subject	  and	  beautiful	  piece	  are	  non-­‐identical,	  but	  that	  the	  subject,	  the	  faithful,	  is	  
somehow	  dependent	  on	  the	  beautiful	  Christ.	  There	  is	  both	  autonomy	  and	  dialogue,	  or	  
both	  freedom	  and	  dependence.	  Christ	  is	  both	  beauty	  and	  person,	  and	  so	  aesthetic	  
encounter	  with	  Christ	  is	  both	  one	  of	  aesthetic	  admiration	  and	  one	  of	  personal	  
relationship.	  But	  because	  it	  is	  the	  person	  of	  Christ	  that	  does	  the	  aesthetic	  renouncing,	  it	  
is	  ultimately	  the	  person	  of	  Christ	  that	  is	  beautiful.	  In	  Christ,	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  the	  
personal	  coincide.	  Whereas	  Adorno	  sees	  the	  aesthetic	  relationship	  as	  ultimately	  one	  of	  
tragedy,	  the	  theological	  aesthetic	  relationship	  is	  ultimately	  one	  of	  (still	  non-­‐identical)	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relationship.	  Put	  otherwise,	  for	  Adorno,	  finitude	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  “the	  limit.”	  For	  theological	  
aesthetics,	  finitude	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  relationship,	  and	  thus	  of	  expansion	  and	  love.	  	  
	   There	  are	  certainly	  other	  important	  differences	  between	  a	  theological	  aesthetics	  
and	  Adorno’s	  critical	  aesthetics.	  However,	  I	  take	  this	  difference—that	  between	  tragedy	  
and	  the	  promise	  and	  offer	  of	  relationship—to	  be	  prominent.	  While	  staying	  true	  to	  
Adorno’s	  rejection	  of	  supernatural	  realms,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  that	  theology	  still	  has	  
something	  to	  offer	  to	  aesthetics	  that	  a	  radically	  critical—as	  Adorno	  conceives	  it—
aesthetics	  does	  not;	  namely,	  non-­‐identical,	  aesthetic,	  personal	  relationship.	  	  	  
	   But	  how	  does	  this	  personal	  aesthetic	  relationship	  look?	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  say	  that	  
relationship	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  Christ	  encounter,	  but	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  
this	  relationship	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  relationship?	  Following	  Adorno’s	  aesthetic	  negative	  
dialectics,	  it	  means	  that	  renunciation	  is	  the	  relationship’s	  primordial	  act.	  When	  it	  comes	  
to	  Christ,	  this	  renunciation	  is	  achieved	  in	  God’s	  becoming	  flesh.	  John’s	  prologue	  shows	  
that	  this	  divine	  renunciation	  has	  unexpected	  contours—eventually,	  we	  see,	  
renunciation	  itself	  is	  beatified:	  	  
In	  the	  beginning	  was	  the	  Word,	  and	  the	  Word	  was	  with	  God,	  and	  the	  Word	  was	  God.	  He	  was	  in	  
the	  beginning	  with	  God.	  All	  things	  came	  to	  be	  through	  him,	  and	  without	  him	  nothing	  came	  to	  be.	  
What	  came	  to	  be	  through	  him	  was	  life,	  and	  this	  life	  was	  the	  light	  of	  the	  human	  race;	  the	  light	  
shines	  in	  the	  darkness,	  and	  the	  darkness	  has	  not	  overcome	  it.	  …	  And	  the	  Word	  became	  flesh	  and	  
made	  his	  dwelling	  among	  us,	  and	  we	  saw	  his	  glory,	  the	  glory	  as	  of	  the	  Father’s	  only	  Son,	  full	  of	  
grace	  and	  truth.	  
	  
In	  taking	  up	  flesh,	  God	  takes	  up	  a	  space	  and	  body	  in	  our	  shared,	  aesthetic	  history.	  God	  
becomes	  a	  person	  who	  can	  be	  perceived,	  and	  who	  can	  perceive	  with	  us.	  And	  so	  God’s	  
aesthetic	  call,	  the	  call	  of	  beauty,	  is	  never	  just	  to	  admire	  God’s	  beauty,	  but	  is	  also	  to	  
perceive	  and	  do	  beauty	  as	  Christ	  did.	  As	  “light	  of	  the	  human	  race,”	  Christ	  illumines	  not	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just	  divine	  truth	  but	  also	  flesh	  itself.	  The	  prologue	  is	  a	  radical	  materialization	  of	  beauty.	  
Beauty	  cannot	  be	  merely	  transcendent,	  because	  absolute	  beauty,	  Christ	  himself,	  was	  
made	  of	  matter,	  ate	  with	  us,	  walked	  with	  us,	  and	  gazed	  with	  us.	  By	  doing	  miracles	  here	  
in	  the	  flesh—miracles	  that	  were	  unexpectedly	  concerned	  with	  physical	  well-­‐being;	  Jesus	  
fed	  and	  healed—Jesus	  brought	  beauty	  here,	  to	  the	  flesh.	  Hence	  Christ	  unsettles	  the	  old	  
and	  worn	  distinction	  between	  “divine”	  and	  “worldly”	  or	  “supernatural”	  and	  “natural”	  
beauty:	  No,	  we	  can	  speak	  plainly	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness,	  of	  participating	  with	  Christ,	  in	  
the	  flesh,	  or	  not.	  	  
	   Yet,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  beauty,	  Christ	  subjects	  himself	  to	  the	  ugliness	  of	  the	  world.	  
Christ	  did	  not	  come	  only	  as	  flesh,	  but	  as	  poor	  flesh,	  ugly	  flesh,	  in	  truth,	  occupied	  
Palestinian	  flesh.	  	  By	  remaining	  obedient	  and	  loyal	  to	  the	  Word	  of	  God	  and	  refusing	  to	  
stray	  from	  the	  way	  of	  love—the	  way	  that	  he	  revealed	  to	  be	  the	  way	  of	  the	  kingdom—
Christ	  knew	  that	  the	  powerful	  would	  renounce	  him.	  By	  remaining	  faithful	  to	  true	  
beauty,	  Christ	  would	  face	  true	  ugliness:	  he	  would	  be	  renounced,	  he	  would	  be	  murdered.	  
This	  is	  where	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  stops.	  For	  Adorno,	  the	  crucifiers	  have	  the	  last	  word:	  
The	  cruel	  crucifiers	  name	  Christ	  ugly,	  and	  their	  ways	  of	  domination	  remain	  accepted	  as	  
“beauty.”	  But	  for	  us,	  for	  John,	  for	  Christ,	  there	  is	  a	  renunciation	  of	  another	  sort.	  “The	  
light	  shines	  in	  the	  darkness,	  and	  the	  darkness	  has	  not	  overcome	  it.”	  Because	  Christ	  stays	  
true	  to	  beauty—which	  renounces	  ugliness	  always	  and	  everywhere—to	  the	  very	  end,	  
Christ	  renounces	  the	  darkness	  that	  kills	  him.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  fighting	  darkness	  with	  
darkness,	  a	  fighting	  ugliness	  with	  more	  of	  the	  same.	  No,	  it	  is	  what	  Adorno	  could	  not	  
fathom:	  it	  is	  a	  beautiful	  renunciation,	  a	  renunciation	  of	  forgiveness:	  “Father,	  forgive	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them,	  they	  know	  not	  what	  they	  do.”	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  total	  darkness,	  Christ	  remains	  light,	  
remains	  beautiful.	  
“Forgive	  them,”	  and	  so,	  renunciation	  finds	  its	  fulfillment	  in	  the	  Cross.	  The	  Cross	  
is	  beautiful	  not	  because	  of	  some	  static,	  predicated,	  reified	  property	  of	  crucifixion,	  but,	  
because	  as	  salvation	  history,	  it	  renounces	  the	  ugliness	  to	  which	  it	  responds—and	  which	  
it	  leaves	  behind.	  The	  Cross	  is	  that	  revealed	  moment	  that	  radically	  says	  no	  to	  the	  world	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  Adorno	  could	  conceive	  of	  as	  only	  utopic.	  Which	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  Cross,	  which	  is	  
in	  the	  world,	  beatifies	  the	  world	  by	  renouncing	  the	  ugliness	  in	  and	  of	  the	  world.	  
Compare	  this	  to	  art:	  Art,	  for	  Adorno,	  says	  no	  to	  the	  world,	  but	  it	  can	  only	  say	  no	  to	  the	  
world	  by	  imagining	  a	  negative	  utopia.	  The	  Cross	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  its	  scandalous	  
aesthetics,	  says	  no	  to	  the	  world	  by	  saying	  yes	  to	  the	  world:	  it	  reveals	  here	  in	  order	  to	  
beatify	  the	  here,	  but	  does	  so	  by	  renouncing	  all	  that	  is	  ugly	  here.	  In	  this	  way,	  theological	  
aesthetics	  is	  both	  more	  material	  and	  more	  immanent	  than	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics:	  the	  
world	  is	  beatified	  by	  working	  through	  the	  world,	  not	  through	  ghosts	  and	  apparitions.	  
The	  Cross	  rejects	  the	  ugliness	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  Christ’s	  beauty,	  and	  does	  so	  by	  
ever	  affirming	  forgiveness	  and	  love	  as	  content	  that	  shape	  the	  contours	  of	  Christ’s	  life.	  
This	  means	  that,	  in	  a	  move	  that	  further	  separates	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  Cross	  from	  
Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  of	  art,	  the	  Cross	  renounces	  the	  world	  by	  forgiving	  it.	  In	  an	  ultimate	  
move	  that	  Nietzsche	  found	  unpardonable,	  Christ’s	  beauty	  is	  so	  radically	  negative	  that	  it	  
ultimately	  rejects	  rejection	  itself:	  Christ’s	  beauty	  rejects	  ugliness	  not	  cruelly,	  which	  was	  
the	  only	  way	  Adorno,	  surely	  a	  product	  of	  his	  “situation,”	  knew,	  but	  through	  forgiveness,	  
which	  is	  to	  say,	  beautifully.	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   So,	  the	  Cross,	  as	  renunciation-­‐forgiveness,	  is	  the	  primordial	  act	  for	  Christian	  
theological	  aesthetics.	  The	  Cross,	  the	  whole	  Pascale	  mystery,	  is	  the	  materialization	  of	  
John’s	  pronouncement	  that	  darkness	  has	  not	  overcome	  the	  light.	  Renunciation	  remains	  
the	  primordial	  aesthetic	  act,	  but	  the	  form	  of	  renunciation	  has	  been	  transfigured.	  But	  I	  
am	  not	  here	  straying	  far	  from	  Adorno.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  I	  think	  the	  Cross	  illustrates	  the	  
fulfillment	  of	  aesthetics	  as	  both	  dialectical	  and	  negative,	  and	  these	  components	  of	  the	  
Cross’s	  aesthetic	  deserve	  some	  attention.	  
Following	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics,	  the	  Cross,	  qua	  beautiful,	  is	  dialectical.	  I	  have	  
already	  elaborated	  this	  dialectics	  as	  one	  of	  “renunciation	  and	  beatification.”	  This	  
dialectic	  is	  historical:	  it	  exists	  in	  time,	  and	  renounces	  in	  particular	  historical	  places	  and	  
moments.	  A	  great	  strength	  of	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  is	  that	  Adorno	  was	  able	  to	  
“materialize”	  aesthetics,	  and	  I	  have	  already	  suggested	  one	  way	  in	  which	  a	  theological	  
aesthetics	  is	  more	  material	  than	  Adorno’s.	  Reciprocally—and	  especially	  important	  for	  
aesthetic	  engagements	  with	  liberation	  theology—ugliness	  is	  not	  a	  theoretical	  construct,	  
but	  is	  the	  renounced	  of	  the	  earth.	  Things,	  places,	  and,	  at	  least	  for	  Adorno,	  people	  are	  
ugly—just	  as	  it	  is	  to	  things,	  places,	  and	  people	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  turn	  to	  find	  the	  
beautiful.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  further	  beatify	  the	  earth,	  then	  we	  only	  need	  to	  find	  suffering,	  
mark	  it	  as	  ugly,	  and	  partake	  in	  the	  process	  of	  doing	  beauty.	  Because	  it	  is	  actively	  
dialectical,	  Adorno	  has	  made	  “beauty”	  more	  verb	  than	  noun.	  One	  does	  beauty.	  
Aesthetics	  are	  lived.	  
I	  suggest	  that,	  theologically,	  this	  doing	  of	  beauty	  is	  achieved	  by	  partaking	  in	  the	  
“life-­‐form”	  illustrated	  by	  Christ	  and	  the	  Cross.	  We	  know	  what	  to	  renounce,	  because	  the	  
28	  
	  
Word	  has	  told	  us.30	  Beauty	  has	  been	  revealed,	  and	  we	  participate	  in	  it.	  Adorno	  also	  
holds	  that	  the	  subject	  participates	  in	  objective	  beauty,	  but	  it	  is	  society	  at	  large	  that	  
underwrites	  the	  objectivity	  of	  his	  beauty.	  Here,	  I	  am	  merely	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Cross,	  
which	  as	  revealed	  is	  part	  of	  society,	  offers	  both	  a	  renunciation	  and	  a	  beatification	  of	  the	  
world,	  and	  that	  Christ	  revealed	  the	  particular	  contours—the	  specific	  content—necessary	  
for	  partaking	  in	  and	  responding	  to	  this	  dialectic.	  Thus,	  theological	  aesthetics	  is	  material	  
(but	  surely	  not	  just	  material)	  on	  both	  ends:	  it	  stems	  from	  an	  earthly	  revelation,	  and	  it	  
deals	  with	  specific	  and	  particular	  things	  here	  on	  earth.	  	  
For	  Adorno,	  of	  course,	  the	  dialectic	  is	  always	  negative,	  and	  no	  reconciliation	  is	  
ever	  had	  between	  renunciation	  and	  beatification.	  I	  have	  also	  suggested	  that,	  because	  
the	  Cross’s	  particular	  logic	  is	  renunciation-­‐forgiveness,	  it	  may	  offer	  a	  way	  beyond	  
negative	  dialectics:	  by	  renouncing	  renunciation	  itself	  in	  favor	  of	  forgiveness,	  the	  Cross	  
may	  negate	  the	  category	  of	  negation—and	  so	  beauty	  would	  triumphantly	  survive	  the	  
dialectic.	  However,	  such	  logic	  risks	  that	  which	  is	  gained	  by	  recognizing	  the	  historical	  
dialectics	  of	  the	  Cross.	  It	  is	  not	  as	  if	  the	  Cross,	  as	  one	  off	  event,	  once	  and	  only	  once	  
negated	  dialectics.	  Rather,	  the	  Cross,	  as	  living	  and	  relational,	  constantly	  lives	  and	  
constantly	  negates.	  The	  Cross,	  as	  part	  of	  salvation	  history,	  is	  historical.	  This	  historical	  
and	  living	  negation	  is	  the	  beauty	  in	  which	  we	  can	  partake.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Clearly	  a	  certain	  hermeneutics	  needs	  to	  be	  involved	  here:	  I	  am	  not	  naively	  suggesting	  that,	  just	  because	  
revelation	  has	  happened,	  that	  somehow	  Christendom	  ought	  or	  can	  interpret	  revelation	  to	  mean	  
something	  uniform.	  Perhaps	  this	  itself	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  revelation.	  Here,	  then,	  and	  
although	  I	  have	  avoided	  him	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  be	  “more	  critical,”	  I	  must	  lean	  on	  volume	  one	  of	  von	  




The	  tension	  here	  is	  as	  follows:	  How	  can	  the	  Cross	  be	  at	  once	  definitive—in	  that	  it	  
offers	  forgiveness—and	  produce	  a	  living,	  historical	  dialectic?	  The	  form	  of	  negativity	  
found	  in	  the	  Cross	  explains	  this	  tension.	  Returning	  to	  Adorno’s	  comments	  on	  the	  Old	  
Testament	  prohibition	  of	  images,	  we	  see	  that	  Adorno	  misunderstands	  the	  doxological	  
content	  of	  the	  prohibition:	  We	  can	  build	  icons,	  but	  not	  idols.	  This	  is	  because	  we	  know	  
that	  every	  effort	  to	  see	  and	  represent	  God	  will	  assuredly	  fail,	  but	  so	  long	  as	  we	  point	  
and	  work	  toward	  God,	  then	  we	  move	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  Aesthetically:	  God	  reveals	  
beauty	  (by	  renouncing	  ugliness),	  and	  our	  attempts	  to	  live	  in	  and	  participate	  in	  God’s	  
dialectic	  never	  do	  justice	  to	  God’s	  beauty.	  It	  is	  never	  enough,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  beautiful.	  The	  
Kingdom	  move	  is	  to	  renounce	  that	  part	  of	  our	  praxis	  and	  theology	  that	  falls	  shorts,	  and	  
so	  on	  and	  so	  forth,	  all	  the	  while	  doing	  beauty.	  Such	  is	  the	  aesthetic	  dialectic.	  	  
We	  are	  reminded	  of	  Adorno’s	  utopia,	  with	  a	  rather	  stark	  difference:	  For	  Adorno,	  
the	  “not	  here”	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  “here.”	  For	  theological	  aesthetics	  interested	  in	  the	  
participation	  of	  the	  building	  of	  the	  Kingdom,	  it	  is	  the	  “not	  yet	  here”	  that	  is	  constitutive	  
of	  the	  “here.”	  The	  addition	  of	  the	  “yet”	  introduces	  hope,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  hope	  that	  is	  founded	  
not	  in	  the	  pie	  in	  the	  sky	  supernatural,	  but	  in	  the	  revealed	  content	  of	  faith:	  Our	  hope	  in	  
the	  reconciliation	  of	  earth’s	  renunciation	  and	  earth’s	  beatification	  finds	  its	  legs	  in	  what	  
has	  been	  revealed	  here	  on	  earth.	  By	  becoming	  flesh,	  Christ	  has	  entered	  our	  history	  to	  
promise	  that	  darkness	  will	  not	  overcome	  the	  light.	  The	  light,	  though,	  is	  still	  negative:	  
beauty	  requires	  work	  and	  renunciation,	  and	  we	  can	  never	  rest	  easy	  with	  the	  status	  quo:	  
beauty	  is	  lived,	  active,	  demands	  more.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Cross	  does	  not,	  like	  Adorno’s	  
artwork,	  promise	  happiness.	  By	  always	  demanding	  more,	  the	  Cross’s	  beauty	  promises	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failure.	  But	  also	  forgiveness.	  We	  hope	  in	  the	  future	  to	  come	  with	  the	  promise	  that	  God’s	  
beauty	  is	  greater	  than	  whatever	  we	  can	  create.	  Absolute	  beauty	  has	  been	  revealed	  and	  




	   And	  so,	  theological	  aesthetics	  could	  benefit	  from	  incorporating	  a	  critical	  edge.	  
Theodor	  Adorno’s	  work	  can	  help	  provide	  that	  edge.	  Conceiving	  of	  beauty	  as	  dialectical	  
and	  negative,	  Adorno	  successfully	  materialized	  and	  historicized	  aesthetics.	  Although	  he	  
was	  no	  fan	  of	  theology,	  Adorno’s	  framework	  offers	  room	  for	  a	  revelation-­‐centric	  
theological	  aesthetics	  to	  flourish.	  I,	  too,	  hold	  that	  beauty	  is	  socially	  and	  historically	  to	  
Adorno	  insofar	  as	  it	  sheds	  a	  different	  light	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  “second	  nature.”	  Where	  
Adorno,	  perhaps	  still	  influenced	  by	  a	  sort	  of	  Kantian	  subjectivism,	  sees	  contact	  with	  the	  
aesthetic	  object	  as	  bringing	  me	  to	  the	  limit	  and	  as	  a	  confrontation	  with	  mortality,	  the	  
Christ	  encounter	  is	  an	  encounter	  both	  with	  beauty	  and	  with	  person,	  and	  so	  both	  brings	  
me	  to	  my	  limit	  and	  expands	  it.	  Because	  of	  this	  relationality—which	  does	  not	  betray	  
Adorno’s	  method	  but	  merely	  considers	  a	  possibility	  that	  he	  did	  not—theology	  offers	  
hope,	  where	  Adorno	  sees	  only	  the	  promise	  of	  broken	  promises.	  We,	  though,	  see	  
fulfilled	  promise	  as	  revealed	  in	  Jesus.	  The	  Cross	  offers	  forgiveness,	  and	  does	  so	  in	  
history	  and	  does	  so	  dialectically;	  that	  is,	  it	  always	  renounces	  ugliness	  and	  reveals	  
beauty.	  As	  revealed,	  Christ’s	  beauty	  allows	  a	  relationship	  of	  participation	  with	  it,	  and	  it	  
is	  the	  life	  of	  faith	  to	  claim	  that	  such	  revelation	  is	  God’s	  revelation.	  Finally,	  constitutive	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negativity	  can	  be,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Cross	  is,	  of	  the	  form	  “not	  yet	  here.”	  This	  form	  of	  
negativity	  offers	  hope	  based	  on	  promise,	  and	  is	  the	  proper	  theological	  form.	  	  
	   Now,	  this	  preliminary	  conversation	  between	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  and	  theological	  
aesthetics	  is	  far	  from	  complete.	  If	  my	  analysis	  has	  taken	  Christ	  as	  the	  absolute	  beautiful	  
social	  fact—in	  a	  sea	  of	  social	  constructions—then	  how	  is	  the	  Christian	  to	  engage	  with	  
other	  social	  constructions	  and	  other	  social	  facts?	  And	  so,	  this	  approach	  raises	  
interreligious	  and,	  given	  Adorno’s	  atheism,	  religious-­‐secular	  dialogue	  concerns.	  
Although	  I	  have	  already	  claimed	  my	  audience	  as	  Christians,	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  offend	  or	  
undermine	  the	  very	  people—Palestinians—with	  whom	  I	  wish	  to	  side.	  Another	  concern:	  
what,	  precisely,	  does	  “renouncing”	  the	  ugly	  look	  like	  in	  a	  contemporary	  context—
especially	  given	  Christ’s	  model	  of	  forgiveness?	  Much	  work	  has	  been	  done	  on	  the	  
dialectic	  of	  repentance	  and	  forgiveness,	  and	  I	  fear	  that	  my	  analysis	  has	  not	  given	  enough	  
respect	  to	  this	  work;	  that	  is,	  I	  worry	  that,	  paradoxically,	  this	  critical	  aesthetics	  may	  lead	  
to	  a	  sort	  of	  quietism,	  at	  least	  if	  the	  “forgiveness”	  component	  of	  the	  dialectic	  acts	  as	  a	  
pseudo-­‐synthesis.	  Far	  from	  quietism,	  I	  hold	  that	  the	  materiality	  of	  this	  aesthetics	  leads	  
to	  a	  demand	  for	  action—walls,	  checkpoints,	  and	  other	  material	  strongholds	  of	  ugliness	  
must	  be	  beatified.	  This	  beatification	  of	  dirt	  and	  grime,	  and	  not	  just	  structure	  and	  form,	  
will	  be	  addressed	  shortly.	  However,	  despite	  these	  concerns,	  my	  major	  concern	  is	  this:	  
Have	  we,	  we	  in	  the	  west	  who	  have	  allowed	  apartheid	  to	  occur	  under	  our	  nose	  and	  with	  
our	  money,	  become	  so	  administered	  and	  removed	  from	  beauty	  that	  God’s	  glory	  no	  
longer	  holds	  sway	  over	  us?	  It	  appears	  that	  this	  may	  be	  so.	  Thus,	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  
work	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  Adorno	  and	  Horkheimer’s	  account	  of	  the	  “culture	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industry”	  and	  how	  this	  industry	  may	  prevent	  us	  from	  engaging	  with	  and	  participating	  in	  
beauty.	  For	  aesthetic	  rigor	  is	  simply	  useless	  if	  beauty	  is	  unapproachable.	  The	  above	  was	  






















Part	  Two:	  The	  Culture	  Industry	  
	  
Two	  Concerns:	  Production	  of	  Sameness,	  Constitution	  of	  Consumerism	  
	  
That	  a	  discussion	  of	  aesthetics	  should	  be	  concerned	  with	  “culture,”	  never	  mind	  
“industry,”	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  obvious.	  However,	  that	  a	  discussion	  of	  critical	  aesthetics	  
must	  account	  for	  culture	  should,	  by	  this	  point,	  be	  clear.	  The	  beautiful	  and	  the	  ugly	  are	  
social,	  and	  so	  they	  are	  cultural.	  Theologically,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  beauty	  of	  Christ	  
both	  renounces	  and	  beautifies	  this	  world,	  and,	  with	  it,	  worldly	  cultures.	  As	  negative,	  this	  
beauty	  calls	  for	  ever-­‐greater	  participation.	  Any	  such	  participation	  occurs	  as	  mediated	  by	  
what	  Adorno	  calls	  “the	  situation,”	  a	  part	  of	  which	  is	  surely	  culture.	  All	  of	  this	  be	  
unpacked.	  Eventually,	  I	  intend	  to	  show	  that	  the	  culture	  industry	  argument	  advanced	  by	  
Adorno	  and	  Max	  Horkheimer	  is	  dependent	  upon	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics.	  Even	  though	  
Aesthetic	  Theory	  came	  temporally	  after	  the	  culture	  industry	  writings,	  aesthetic	  theory	  
comes	  logically	  prior	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  culture	  industry;	  put	  otherwise,	  
aesthetics	  is	  a	  condition	  for	  culture.	  Adorno’s	  writings	  on	  the	  culture	  industry	  are	  too	  
often	  read	  out	  of	  their	  proper	  aesthetic	  context—they	  are	  not	  (merely)	  the	  ravings	  of	  a	  
grump,	  but	  are	  (also)	  the	  result	  of	  rigorous	  aesthetic	  thinking.	  
But	  it	  does	  not	  take	  a	  keen	  or	  rigorous	  aesthetic	  spirit	  to	  discern	  that	  the	  
western	  culture	  of	  today	  is	  antithetical	  to	  participation	  in	  Christ’s	  beauty:	  economic	  
inequalities,	  political	  oppressions,	  social	  alienations,	  suburban	  depression,	  urban	  
despair,	  and	  a	  certain—and	  terrifying—nationalism	  have	  all	  become	  recognizably	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“western.”	  Whatever	  else	  is	  meant	  by	  “western,”	  and	  whatever	  else	  the	  “west”	  is	  or	  is	  
not,	  it	  takes	  but	  little	  engagement	  with	  it	  to	  recognize	  that	  this	  culture—whatever	  
precisely	  it	  is—provides	  a	  logic	  for	  oppression	  and	  apartheid.	  This	  logic	  manifests	  in	  
museums,	  where	  the	  most	  commercial	  products	  are	  often	  marketed	  as	  the	  most	  
beautiful	  products;	  or	  where,	  at	  least,	  class	  distinctions	  are	  ossified	  (“low	  culture”	  
representational	  oil	  paintings	  are	  partitioned	  far	  from	  “high	  culture”	  abstract	  and	  
performative	  pieces).	  And	  this	  logic	  manifests	  itself	  in	  our	  relationship	  with	  God,	  who	  is	  
too	  often	  approached	  as	  a	  commodity.	  Thus,	  this	  logic	  of	  the	  west—its	  culture—
operates	  on	  two	  levels:	  it	  constitutes	  intention	  (gazing,	  praying-­‐as-­‐buying)	  and	  it	  
constitutes	  the	  intended	  (the	  museum,	  “God”).	  These	  two	  poles	  cannot,	  of	  course,	  be	  
ontologically	  separated.	  However,	  my	  primary	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  the	  subject-­‐constituting	  
power	  of	  culture.	  This	  power	  is	  what	  Adorno	  most	  trenchantly	  critiqued.	  	  
The	  term	  “culture	  industry”	  first	  found	  widespread	  use	  in	  Adorno	  and	  
Horkheimer’s	  Dialectic	  of	  Enlightment	  (1944),	  which	  is	  a	  core	  text	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  
School.31	  In	  1963,	  Adorno	  returned	  to	  and	  clarified	  themes	  explored	  in	  Dialectic	  of	  
Enlightenment	  with	  his	  brief	  but	  influential	  essay,	  “Culture	  industry	  reconsidered.”32	  In	  
Dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment,	  Adorno	  and	  Horkheimer	  appear	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  
articulating	  the	  sameness	  produced	  by	  the	  culture	  industry.	  In	  the	  later	  essay,	  Adorno	  
stresses	  that	  people	  subjected	  to	  the	  culture	  industry	  are	  constituted	  as	  consumers	  built	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for	  consuming	  sameness.	  In	  fact,	  this	  essay	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  produced	  sameness	  of	  
Dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment	  is	  the	  sameness	  of	  the	  consumer.	  Hence,	  while	  the	  two	  
writings	  have	  different	  concerns	  and	  rhetorical	  strategies,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  take	  
them	  as	  addressing	  disparate	  phenomena.	  Theologically,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  this	  subjective	  
constitution	  has	  changed	  the	  basic	  way	  one	  thinks	  of	  and	  approaches	  God.	  	  
I	  should	  not	  make	  too	  strong	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  objective	  sameness	  
discussed	  in	  Dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment	  and	  the	  constitution	  of	  subjectivity-­‐as-­‐
consumerist	  found	  in	  “Culture	  industry	  reconsidered.”	  The	  two	  claims	  imply	  each	  other,	  
and	  this	  implication	  will	  be	  a	  turning	  point	  for	  my	  own	  text.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  
Adorno’s	  focus	  seems	  to	  change	  between	  the	  two	  works	  is	  suggestive:	  The	  rhetoric	  of	  
sameness	  suggests	  inescapability	  and	  monotony;	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  subjectivity,	  though,	  at	  
least	  hopes	  for	  freedom:	  the	  subject	  need	  not	  surrender	  to	  total	  administration	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  industry.	  Art	  is	  still	  art,	  and	  art’s	  promise,	  if	  not	  the	  piece	  of	  art	  itself,	  escapes	  
commoditization:	  precisely	  this	  is	  art’s	  promise.	  Ultimately,	  this	  aesthetic	  renunciation	  
of	  the	  commodification	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  is	  where	  theology	  must	  prepare	  for	  battle.	  In	  
due	  time.	  First,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  work	  out	  in	  closer	  fashion	  what	  Adorno,	  and	  
Horkheimer	  in	  the	  earlier	  text,	  meant	  by	  “culture	  industry.”	  
	   As	  good	  critical	  theory	  ought	  do,	  I	  should	  contextualize	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  culture	  
industry.	  Adorno	  and	  Horkheimer’s	  initial	  work	  on	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  the	  essay	  
“Culture	  Industry:	  Enlightenment	  as	  Mass	  Deception.”	  This	  essay	  is	  a	  chapter	  of	  the	  text	  
Dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment.	  As	  a	  whole,	  the	  text	  is	  concerned	  with	  “showing	  that	  the	  
cause	  of	  enlightenment’s	  relapse	  into	  mythology	  is	  …	  the	  fear	  of	  truth	  which	  petrifies	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enlightenment	  itself.”33	  Enlightenment	  reason	  seeks	  to	  dominate.	  This	  domination	  
especially	  seeks	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  nature.	  The	  dialectical	  stumble	  arises	  when	  
reason	  must	  construct	  myths	  of	  nature	  in	  order	  to	  dominate	  nature.	  That	  is,	  
enlightenment	  reason	  must	  presuppose	  and	  invent—give	  substance	  to—the	  very	  thing	  
it	  wants	  to	  dominate.	  In	  this	  way,	  enlightenment	  reason	  itself	  becomes	  a	  myth.	  The	  
relationship	  between	  the	  ordering	  and	  dominating	  rationalism	  of	  Descartes	  and	  other	  
Enlightenment	  thinkers	  finds	  mythical	  substance	  in	  its	  construction	  of	  a	  dominate-­‐able	  
and	  orderly	  nature.	  The	  myths	  of	  dominating	  reason	  and	  dominated	  nature	  are	  two	  
sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  This	  mythologizing	  of	  nature	  rebukes	  not	  only	  domination	  
(indeed	  it	  is	  the	  presupposition	  of	  domination,	  and	  so	  domination	  is	  dependent	  on	  
myth),	  but	  also	  truth	  itself:	  “Myth	  is	  already	  enlightenment,	  and	  enlightenment	  reverts	  
to	  mythology.”34	  Myth	  and	  enlightenment	  run	  together,	  and	  in	  the	  dialectic	  between	  
the	  two,	  enlightenment’s	  dominating	  reason	  undermines	  itself.	  	  
	   It	  is	  from	  these	  dominating	  roots	  that	  the	  culture	  industry	  sprouts.	  Interested	  
only	  in	  domination,	  and	  constantly	  threatened	  by	  its	  own	  undoing,	  enlightenment	  
normalizes	  the	  calculable	  as	  the	  real:	  “For	  enlightenment,	  anything	  which	  does	  not	  
conform	  to	  the	  standard	  of	  calculability	  and	  utility	  must	  be	  viewed	  with	  suspicion.”35	  
Because	  enlightenment	  wants	  to	  order	  and	  dominate	  nature	  by	  way	  of	  reason,	  anything	  
that	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  order	  and	  reason	  is	  deemed	  unnatural,	  unworthy	  of	  the	  
mantle	  of	  the	  real.	  So	  while	  I	  maintain	  the	  reading	  that	  the	  culture	  industry	  of	  Dialectic	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of	  Enlightenment	  was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  objective	  consequences,	  already	  we	  can	  
see	  subjective	  political	  dimensions	  unfold:	  only	  those	  subjects	  who	  are	  orderly	  and	  open	  
to	  reason’s	  domination	  are	  deemed	  real.	  Those	  who	  resist	  ordering	  and	  the	  norms	  of	  
reason	  are	  treated	  with	  suspicion	  at	  best,	  and	  vitriol	  and	  genocide	  at	  worst.	  	  
	   And	  so,	  intellectual	  history,	  philosophy,	  dialectics,	  ideology,	  and	  normalization	  all	  
co-­‐penetrate	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  place	  where	  truth	  is	  resisted.	  Adorno	  and	  Horkheimer	  are	  
careful	  here:	  it	  is	  not	  that	  one	  truth	  is	  rejected	  in	  favor	  of	  some	  other,	  or	  even	  that	  truth	  
is	  rejected	  in	  favor	  of	  falsity.	  Rather,	  truth	  as	  such	  is	  resisted.	  Enlightenment,	  which	  
cannot	  escape	  myth	  but	  must	  dominate	  myth,	  tries	  to	  reject	  all	  trace	  of	  the	  
metaphysical	  or	  epistemological	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  object.	  And	  so	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  
that	  process	  by	  which	  cultural	  objects	  are	  sold	  not	  as	  true	  or	  false,	  not	  as	  ends	  of	  
means,	  but	  as	  self-­‐sufficient	  myths.	  Yes,	  the	  marketer	  tells	  the	  consumer	  that	  she	  has	  an	  
artificial	  need,	  and	  the	  consumer	  then	  purchases	  a	  product.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  bad	  enough.	  
The	  situation	  is	  worse,	  though:	  neither	  the	  marketer	  nor	  the	  consumer	  actually	  believe	  
in	  the	  need.	  All	  is	  myth.	  The	  consumer	  knows	  that	  the	  marketed	  product	  cannot	  truly	  
fulfill	  the	  artificial	  need,	  nor	  does	  she	  have	  any	  pretense	  that	  the	  artificial	  need	  is	  a	  true	  
need—but	  truth	  is	  not	  what	  is	  sought	  after.	  	  
	   This	  resistance	  to	  truth	  is	  what	  the	  culture	  industry	  most	  fervently	  seeks	  to	  
foster	  and	  protect.	  However,	  and	  here	  the	  connection	  with	  aesthetics	  is	  made	  explicit,	  it	  
is	  unable	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  culture	  industry	  wants	  to	  mindlessly	  stir	  out	  allegedly	  apolitical,	  
truthless	  products.	  But,	  as	  cultural	  and	  aesthetic	  products,	  they	  necessarily	  have	  a	  
political	  and	  social	  component.	  Here	  an	  understanding	  of	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  is	  crucial	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for	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  totalizing	  nature	  of	  the	  culture	  industry.36	  It	  is	  not	  just	  that	  
the	  culture	  industry	  rejects	  the	  disorderly	  and	  unreasonable—although	  it	  does	  this	  
(often	  by	  subjecting	  the	  disorderly	  and	  unreasonable	  to	  another	  type	  of	  order:	  the	  
insane	  have	  their	  “natural,”	  orderly	  place	  in	  the	  asylum,	  for	  instance).	  Over	  and	  beyond	  
this	  normalizing	  tendency,	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  totalizing	  because	  the	  aesthetic	  
products	  it	  produces	  do	  not	  show	  the	  negative	  utopic	  image.	  Rather	  than	  fostering	  
autonomous	  works	  of	  art	  and	  the	  “disenchantment	  with	  disenchantment”	  that	  these	  
works	  produce,	  the	  culture	  industry	  churns	  out	  “Volkswagons	  and	  sports	  palaces”	  which	  
are	  “themselves	  becoming	  metaphysics,	  an	  ideological	  curtain,	  within	  the	  social	  whole,	  
behind	  which	  real	  doom	  is	  gathering.”37	  That	  is,	  the	  culture	  industry,	  which	  is	  the	  result	  
of	  the	  dialectic	  between	  enlightenment	  and	  myth,	  bans	  from	  production	  the	  negative	  
component	  of	  the	  dialectic	  of	  beauty.	  	  Which	  is	  to	  say:	  the	  culture	  industry	  aborts	  
beauty.	  	  
However,	  the	  imaginary	  nature	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  is	  not	  optional.	  The	  culture	  
industry	  forbids	  the	  negative,	  but	  it	  cannot	  help	  but	  produce	  utopic	  images.	  The	  
absolute	  aesthetic	  crime	  of	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  that	  it	  peddles	  positive	  images	  as	  
utopia.	  There	  is	  still	  a	  utopic	  image	  produced—the	  aesthetic	  object	  must	  produce	  a	  
utopic	  image.	  The	  culture	  industry	  says:	  “Utopia	  is	  here.”	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  culture	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  To	  my	  reading	  of	  the	  secondary	  literature,	  while	  much	  has	  been	  made	  of	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  
Adorno’s	  aesthetics,	  not	  enough	  has	  been	  made	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  nature	  of	  Adorno’s	  politics.	  Some,	  
Thomas	  Levin	  and	  and	  John	  Caughie	  are	  notable	  here,	  have	  complicated	  the	  old	  academic	  orthodoxy	  that	  
Adorno	  was	  simply	  a	  cultural	  curmudgeon.	  But	  these	  thinkers	  defend	  Adorno’s	  politics	  and	  cultural	  
critiques	  via	  a	  rereading	  of	  his	  cultural	  writings.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  underlying	  aesthetic	  problem,	  that	  of	  
the	  positive/negative	  image,	  has	  been	  adequately	  addressed	  in	  the	  conversation.	  So,	  while	  I	  take	  my	  
reading	  of	  Adorno	  to	  be	  faithful	  to	  Adorno	  and	  helpful	  for	  this	  conversation,	  it	  is	  more	  or	  less	  original,	  and	  
I	  cannot	  rely	  on	  secondary	  literature	  for	  confirmation.	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industry’s	  ideology	  is	  the	  “idolization	  of	  the	  existing	  order.”38	  And,	  because	  it	  is	  precisely	  
this	  existing	  order	  which	  is	  given	  as	  utopic,	  the	  future	  and	  the	  different	  is	  forbidden.	  
Hence	  the	  famous:	  “Enlightenment	  is	  totalitarian.”39	  Thus,	  the	  “sameness”	  referred	  to	  
by	  Adorno	  and	  Horkheimer	  throughout	  Dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  
to	  mean	  that	  all	  products	  are	  necessarily	  “the	  same.”	  Of	  course	  this	  is	  not	  true—the	  
market	  offers	  a	  variegated	  plethora	  of	  products.	  Not	  just	  Volkswagons,	  but	  also	  now	  
electric	  cars,	  hummers,	  and	  scooters	  are	  sold	  as	  replacements	  of	  the	  metaphysical.	  The	  
point	  is	  not	  that	  these	  products	  are	  the	  “same”	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  a	  marketer.	  
Rather,	  the	  point	  is	  that	  the	  difference	  preached	  by	  a	  marketer	  is	  no	  real	  difference	  at	  
all:	  it	  is	  rather	  an	  idolization	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  which	  is	  the	  myth	  of	  enlightenment	  and	  
dominating	  reason.	  There	  are,	  indeed,	  false	  notions	  of	  diversity	  and	  difference.	  Without	  
these	  notions	  the	  market	  could	  not	  sustain	  its	  status	  as	  self-­‐sustainable	  myth,	  and	  the	  
artificial	  needs	  peddled	  by	  marketers	  demand	  these	  artificial	  differences.	  So,	  the	  
sameness	  that	  is	  produced	  cannot	  be	  in	  the	  objects	  produced.	  It	  must	  instead	  be	  in	  the	  
sociological	  methods	  of	  their	  production	  and	  distribution,	  and	  in	  the	  impoverished	  
aesthetic	  sameness	  constructed	  in	  the	  consumer:	  the	  consumer	  rests	  still	  in	  the	  false	  
comfort	  of	  positive	  images,	  and	  forgets	  the	  true	  anxiety	  of	  negative	  images.40	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40	  If	  I	  had	  the	  space,	  I	  would	  here	  explore	  Foucault’s	  treatment	  of	  representational	  art	  and	  the	  
constitution	  of	  the	  “viewer.”	  Foucault’s	  impressive	  and	  penetrating	  essay	  on	  Manet,	  “Manet	  and	  the	  
Object	  of	  Painting,”	  demonstrates	  the	  relationship	  between	  objective	  aesthetic	  structures	  and	  the	  
constitution	  of	  aesthetic	  subjectivity.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  culture	  industry	  idolizes	  the	  status	  quo,	  it	  
wishes	  to	  re-­‐present	  itself	  always	  and	  forever,	  and	  is	  thus	  the	  logical	  fulfillment	  of	  representational	  art.	  
Following	  Foucault’s	  work,	  we	  would	  say	  that	  this	  fulfillment	  of	  representational	  art	  creates	  a	  completely	  
immovable	  and	  static	  subject,	  it	  creates	  a	  place	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  gaze.	  	  
40	  
	  
The	  constitution	  of	  the	  subject	  as	  consumer,	  then,	  is	  required	  by	  the	  culture	  
industry.	  Nato	  Thompson,	  art	  critic	  and	  former	  curator	  of	  MASS	  MoCA,	  notes	  that	  this	  
constitution	  is	  a	  result	  of	  industrial	  life	  more	  generally:	  	  
(The	  rise	  of	  industrial	  capitalism	  meant)	  not	  just	  that	  new	  products	  were	  being	  produced	  using	  
new	  methods—to	  hear	  the	  wailing	  of	  coal	  smelting	  at	  the	  factoris	  and	  to	  conclude	  that	  
industrialization	  was	  changing	  the	  world	  did	  not	  require	  making	  a	  huge	  leap.	  There	  were	  other	  
kinds	  of	  changes—the	  workday,	  the	  salary,	  and	  the	  basic	  relationship	  of	  worker	  and	  employer—
that	  were	  also	  rapidly	  reshaping	  daily	  life.	  These	  were	  as	  much	  psychological	  and	  existential	  as	  
they	  were	  material.	  …	  Industry	  began	  to	  approach	  production	  from	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  dynamic—it	  
would	  create	  a	  subject	  who	  would	  want	  what	  it	  sold.	  	  …	  The	  city	  was	  a	  place	  of	  looking:	  looking	  
at	  strangers,	  looking	  at	  buildings,	  and	  looking	  at	  objects	  to	  consume.41	  
	  
Adorno	  agrees,	  and	  his	  “Culture	  industry	  reconsidered”	  expresses	  this	  agreement.	  Here,	  
Adorno	  stresses	  that,	  yes,	  while	  consumer	  and	  marketer	  are	  both	  “in	  on”	  the	  lie	  that	  
needs	  are	  artificial,	  the	  consumer	  is	  truly	  deceived	  insofar	  as	  she	  thinks	  that	  the	  
“customer	  is	  king.”	  In	  truth,	  “the	  customer	  is	  not	  king,	  as	  the	  culture	  industry	  would	  
have	  us	  believe,	  not	  its	  subject	  but	  its	  object.”42	  It	  is	  not	  that	  marketers	  sell	  objects	  of	  
sameness	  to	  consumers.	  Consumers	  are	  those	  objects	  of	  sameness.	  	  
	   What	  does	  this	  consumer	  look	  like?	  The	  consumer	  looks	  like	  conformity,	  like	  
sameness.	  The	  enlightenment	  ideals	  of	  orderly	  and	  ordering	  reason,	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  
self-­‐preservation,	  find	  a	  host	  in	  consumers.	  Consumers	  judge	  and	  weigh	  products,	  as	  
skeptical,	  and	  work	  as	  “rationally	  self-­‐interested”	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  and	  fulfill	  (artificial)	  
desires.	  This	  is	  how	  order	  and	  reason	  propagate	  themselves,	  and	  this	  is	  how	  the	  
hegemonic	  power	  of	  dominating	  reason	  is	  strengthened	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	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culture	  industry.	  The	  culture	  industry’s	  economy	  is	  the	  status	  quo,	  and	  disorderly	  
disruption—which	  we	  Christians	  hold	  to	  be	  beautiful—is	  unthinkable:	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  order	  which	  (the	  culture	  industry)	  hammers	  into	  human	  beings	  are	  always	  those	  
of	  the	  status	  quo	  …	  (The	  culture	  industry)	  proclaims:	  you	  shall	  conform,	  without	  instruction	  as	  to	  
what;	  conform	  to	  that	  which	  exists	  anyway,	  and	  to	  that	  which	  everyone	  thinks	  anyway	  as	  a	  reflex	  
of	  (the	  culture	  industry’s)	  power	  and	  omnipresence.43	  
	  
And	  so	  conformity	  and	  sameness	  as	  such,	  a	  blind	  structural	  obedience	  to	  the	  present,	  is	  
ultimately	  produced	  by	  the	  culture	  industry.	  The	  ghost	  of	  the	  negative	  image	  has	  been	  
exorcised.	  The	  negative	  is	  negated,	  in	  a	  way.	  It	  is	  negated	  insofar	  as	  truth	  itself	  has	  been	  
suppressed.	  Surely	  this	  is	  enough	  to	  make	  us	  long	  for	  the	  empty,	  but	  true,	  promises	  of	  
beauty!	  
	  
A	  Theological	  Response	  
	  
	   In	  truth,	  Adorno	  did	  not	  hold	  that	  the	  cultural	  industry’s	  constituting	  of	  subjects	  
was	  entirely	  totalizing.	  As	  hinted	  earlier,	  he	  held	  that,	  ultimately,	  the	  promise	  of	  art—
which	  is	  a	  promise	  that	  always	  fails—escapes	  complete	  totalizing.	  Some	  recognition	  of	  
art	  remains,	  and	  so	  the	  ghostly	  negative	  haunts	  the	  shadows,	  but	  only	  barely:	  	  
Only	  their	  deep	  unconscious	  mistrust,	  the	  last	  residue	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  art	  and	  
empirical	  reality	  in	  the	  spiritual	  makeup	  of	  the	  masses	  explains	  why	  they	  have	  not,	  to	  a	  person,	  
long	  since	  perceived	  and	  accepted	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  constructed	  for	  them	  by	  the	  culture	  
industry.44	  
	  
The	  claim	  elicits	  good	  feeling,	  but	  is	  rather	  perplexing.	  Adorno	  is	  not	  clear	  about	  how	  art	  
is	  able	  to	  escape	  the	  culture	  industry’s	  totalizing.	  Perhaps	  he	  lapses	  into	  a	  sort	  of	  





German	  idealism—such	  a	  critique	  would	  not	  be	  novel.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  mere	  hope.	  
Speculatively,	  one	  could	  imagine	  that	  the	  culture	  industry	  must	  allow	  the	  aesthetic	  
object	  to	  remain	  aesthetic	  insofar	  as	  it	  commodifies	  aesthetic	  objects	  and	  not,	  say,	  pure	  
tools.	  That	  is,	  in	  order	  to	  sell	  paintings,	  the	  culture	  industry	  must	  still	  give	  the	  painting	  
the	  freedom	  to	  be	  a	  painting—even	  if	  this	  freedom	  is	  dominated	  by	  reason	  and	  sold	  as	  a	  
cultural	  commodity.	  Such	  a	  dialectic	  would	  be	  fitting	  within	  the	  greater	  scheme	  of	  
enlightenment.	  	  
Regardless,	  this	  speculation	  does	  not	  need,	  for	  us,	  to	  find	  a	  resolution.	  Rather	  
than	  speculate	  upon	  the	  subversive	  and	  resistant	  power	  of	  the	  negative	  utopic	  image	  in	  
the	  midst	  of	  an	  all-­‐administering	  culture	  industry,	  the	  sort	  of	  theological	  aesthetics	  I	  
have	  been	  developing	  holds	  that	  the	  negative	  image	  is	  really	  and	  empirically	  “present”	  
insofar	  as	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  lived	  experience	  and	  shared	  history	  of	  us	  all:	  Christ	  happened.	  
The	  culture	  industry	  is	  so	  daunting	  for	  Adorno	  because	  its	  idolizing	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  
seems	  to	  squash	  all	  hope	  of	  the	  crashing	  in	  of	  the	  negative.	  Remember,	  for	  Adorno,	  
“second	  nature”	  is	  all	  there	  is.	  The	  role	  of	  aesthetics	  is	  to	  introduce	  the	  (always	  false)	  
promise	  of	  first	  nature,	  of	  immediacy	  and	  happiness,	  into	  second	  nature.	  However,	  the	  
culture	  industry	  constructs	  second	  nature	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  first	  nature—the	  truly	  false	  
promise—is	  given	  no	  way	  of	  promising	  itself.	  Hence,	  Adorno	  is	  forced	  into	  a	  corner	  and	  
simply	  proclaim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  “unconscious”	  or	  in	  the	  “spiritual”	  
between	  art	  and	  the	  empirical	  world.	  Theology,	  though,	  makes	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  
material	  claim:	  Second	  nature	  itself	  has	  already	  been	  beatified	  and	  made	  witness	  to	  
beauty.	  So,	  the	  culture	  industry	  not	  only	  has	  to	  compete	  for	  domination	  with	  art’s	  
43	  
	  
powers	  over	  the	  unconscious,	  but	  more	  starkly	  has	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  living	  negative	  
beauty	  of	  Christ.	  
Christ	  says	  no	  to	  the	  culture	  industry	  because	  Christ’s	  beauty,	  as	  negating,	  resists	  
domination:	  The	  darkness	  has	  not	  overcome.	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  resisting	  of	  domination	  
that	  allows	  for	  participation:	  because	  we	  cannot	  get	  on	  top	  of	  this	  beauty,	  in	  order	  to	  
engage	  it,	  we	  must	  participate	  in	  it.	  The	  mode	  of	  aesthetic	  encounter,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
Christ,	  is	  participation.	  We	  do	  beauty	  with	  Jesus	  as	  we	  do	  Jesus’s	  beauty.	  Because	  this	  
beauty	  is	  a	  doing	  as	  a	  negating,	  it	  can	  never	  be	  satisfied	  with	  re-­‐presenting	  the	  status	  
quo.	  Theological	  aesthetics	  completely	  undermines	  representational	  aesthetics,	  and	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  to	  re-­‐present	  its	  own	  sameness	  ad	  infinitum.	  	  
This	  tension	  between	  beauty	  and	  the	  culture	  industry	  has	  two	  consequences:	  On	  
the	  one	  hand,	  the	  life	  of	  faith	  must	  resist	  the	  ossification	  and	  idolization	  nurtured	  by	  the	  
culture	  industry;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  life	  in	  the	  culture	  industry	  actively	  resists—
stronger,	  constitutively	  does	  not	  allow	  for—the	  negative	  dialectic	  of	  Christ.	  We	  are	  
seemingly	  stuck	  between	  an	  absolute	  negative	  beauty	  and	  an	  absolute	  idol	  of	  the	  
present.	  Thompson,	  following	  Adorno,	  captures	  the	  (apparent)	  inescapability	  of	  the	  
situation:	  	  
As	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  unfolded,	  an	  industry	  of	  musical	  and	  political	  
subcultures	  brought	  with	  it	  a	  barrage	  of	  potential	  identifies,	  and	  each	  developed	  alongside	  
specific	  micro-­‐economies	  that	  were	  eventually	  bought	  and	  sold	  into	  the	  mainstream.	  …	  Today,	  
any	  culture	  that	  sticks	  around	  for	  more	  than	  a	  few	  months	  becomes	  a	  cultural	  product—there	  is	  
nothing	  outside	  he	  culture	  industry’s	  grasp,	  no	  matter	  how	  authentic	  it	  may	  seem.45	  
	  
Thompson’s	  text	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  pervasive	  intermingling	  of	  culture	  and	  
economy:	  “creative	  economies”	  and	  “sharing	  economies”	  are	  but	  ways	  for	  the	  capital-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  SP,	  12	  	  
44	  
	  
cultural	  industry	  to	  give	  just	  enough	  illusion	  of	  difference	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  sameness	  
and	  an	  aversion	  to	  truth.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  in	  which	  the	  culture	  industry’s	  idolizing	  
of	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  power	  par	  excellence,	  the	  Christian	  tradition—and	  the	  negative	  
theological	  aesthetics	  inherent	  in	  it—is	  a	  subculture	  ripe	  for	  commodification	  and	  
cooptation.	  Not	  only	  ripe	  for,	  but	  inescapably	  doomed	  to.	  As	  a	  subculture	  and	  part	  of	  
second	  nature—which	  is,	  indeed,	  what	  I	  have	  been	  arguing—it	  will	  be	  coopted	  by	  the	  
culture	  industry.	  That	  is,	  if	  such	  cooptation	  has	  not	  already	  happened.	  Such	  is	  simply	  the	  
logic	  of	  the	  dominating	  culture	  industry.	  	  
	   This,	  clearly,	  cannot	  be	  our	  position.	  While	  maintaining	  that	  the	  culture	  industry	  
poses	  legitimate	  challenges	  to	  participation	  in	  beauty—and	  holding	  that	  these	  
challenges	  have	  some	  degree	  of	  explanatory	  value	  for	  the	  current	  situation—I	  see	  
beauty	  as	  offering	  at	  least	  two	  strong	  points	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  culture	  industry.	  These	  
points	  of	  resistance	  are	  beauty’s	  negative	  and	  historical	  components.	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  negativity	  of	  beauty,	  we	  can	  simply	  say	  that	  whatever	  image	  of	  
God	  the	  culture	  industry	  constructs	  in	  order	  to	  commoditize	  and	  dominate	  it,	  this	  image	  
cannot	  be	  God.	  Which	  is	  as	  much	  to	  say,	  the	  beauty	  presented	  by	  marketers,	  precisely	  
as	  presented	  by	  marketers,	  cannot	  be	  beauty	  as	  we	  call	  it.	  Beauty,	  at	  least	  as	  I	  have	  
described	  it	  here,	  simply	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  commodification	  or	  consumption.	  This	  is	  
because	  the	  negativity	  of	  beauty	  negates	  the	  status	  quo,	  whatever	  the	  status	  quo	  is.	  To	  
present	  beauty	  is	  to	  get	  beauty	  wrong:	  The	  culture	  industry	  idolizes	  the	  status	  quo.	  
Beauty	  renounces	  the	  status	  quo.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  culture	  industry	  and	  beauty	  are	  
antithetical.	  As	  soon	  as	  beauty	  is	  “owned,”	  beauty	  renounces	  this	  particular	  owned	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construction	  of	  beauty	  and	  calls	  for	  more.	  Beauty	  is	  chased	  after,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  calls	  
for	  participation.	  Beauty	  is	  not	  dominated.	  As	  witnessed	  in	  John’s	  prologue	  and	  on	  the	  
Cross,	  we	  see	  that	  Christ	  is	  the	  epitome	  of	  this	  negation:	  Christ’s	  beauty	  absolutely	  
renounces	  even	  renunciation	  itself.	  When	  Christ	  was	  dominated	  on	  the	  Cross,	  when	  
Christ	  was	  renounced,	  he	  forgave.	  He	  responded	  to	  dominated	  by	  renouncing	  and	  
transfiguring	  the	  very	  category	  of	  domination.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  whatever	  is	  
dominated,	  this	  is	  not	  God.	  God	  is	  neither	  dominating	  nor	  dominated:	  there	  is	  no	  
darkness	  here.	  
If	  the	  negativity	  of	  beauty	  forbids	  the	  culture	  industry	  from	  commodifying	  true	  
beauty,	  the	  historicism	  of	  beauty	  forbids	  the	  culture	  industry	  from	  washing	  over	  the	  
category	  all	  together.	  True	  beauty	  resists	  its	  complete	  replacement	  with	  idols—which	  is	  
what	  the	  culture	  industry	  wishes	  to	  do.	  While	  I	  have	  been	  primarily	  tuned	  into	  the	  lived,	  
active	  nature	  of	  beauty—we	  do	  beauty	  and	  in	  this	  way	  keep	  beauty	  alive—it	  is	  also	  the	  
case	  that,	  as	  not	  just	  revelatory	  but	  as	  revealed,	  we	  remember	  beauty.	  We	  remember	  
that	  Christ	  has	  both	  promised	  us	  beauty	  and	  fulfilled	  this	  promise	  with	  his	  life.	  A	  doing	  
of	  beauty,	  then,	  is	  both	  a	  partaking	  in	  and	  a	  remembering	  of	  this	  promise.	  	  The	  doing	  of	  
beauty	  is	  an	  active	  remembrance.	  	  
In	  thus	  remembering	  beauty,	  we	  remember	  both	  that	  we	  can	  never	  live	  up	  to	  
beauty	  and	  that	  this	  failure	  has	  been	  forgiven	  in	  advance.	  The	  promise	  of	  beauty	  is	  the	  
promise	  that	  we	  will	  fail,	  but	  that	  beauty	  will	  still	  be—and	  in	  Christ	  has	  already	  been—
fulfilled.	  And	  so	  the	  remembrance	  of	  beauty	  is	  the	  remembrance	  both	  of	  failure	  and	  of	  
forgiveness,	  of	  promise	  and	  fulfillment.	  And	  so	  the	  culture	  industry	  begins	  to	  lose	  its	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idolatrous	  ground.	  The	  culture	  industry	  wants	  to	  idolatrize	  the	  present,	  which	  makes	  it	  
incapable	  of	  engaging	  with	  memories—especially	  the	  absolutely	  beautiful	  memory	  of	  
Christ.	  	  We	  are	  not	  merely	  beings	  of	  the	  eternal,	  dominated,	  truthless	  now—remember,	  
for	  Adorno,	  not	  even	  those	  most	  beguiled	  by	  the	  culture	  industry	  actually	  believe	  its	  
scheme.	  Belief	  is	  not	  the	  economy	  at	  work	  in	  the	  culture	  industry.	  We	  are	  not	  only	  
present	  beings,	  but	  we	  are	  also	  beings	  of	  memory.	  Through	  spirit	  and	  tradition,	  through	  
wounds	  and	  joys,	  through	  beauty	  and	  ugliness,	  the	  memory	  of	  Christ—despite	  the	  
culture	  industry’s	  efforts—persists.	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  content	  of	  this	  
memory	  remains	  negative,	  remains	  beautiful.	  
These	  beautiful	  memories	  are	  not	  abstract	  intellectualizations.	  Rather,	  these	  
memories	  are	  manifested	  in	  our	  churches,	  relationships,	  faiths,	  and,	  in	  direct	  
confrontation	  with	  the	  culture	  industry,	  in	  our	  myths.	  These	  memories	  are	  lived	  and	  
shared	  in	  our	  doings	  of	  beauty.	  Every	  beautiful	  work	  done	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  kingdom	  is	  
a	  rejection	  of	  the	  culture	  industry.	  This	  rejection	  says	  “no”	  to	  the	  idolatrizing	  of	  the	  
status	  quo	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  active	  remembrance	  of	  the	  past	  and	  of	  an	  active	  hope	  in	  a	  
more	  beautiful	  future.	  As	  beauty	  negates	  the	  status	  quo,	  it	  contextualizes	  and	  
temporalizes	  it,	  and	  this	  proper	  contextualization	  is	  the	  death	  of	  idols.	  	  
In	  our	  doings	  of	  beauty,	  then,	  we	  participate	  not	  only	  with	  Christ,	  but	  with	  a	  
whole	  community.	  Because	  Christ’s	  beauty	  is	  absolutely	  negative,	  it	  promises	  that	  our	  
beatifying	  cannot	  be	  an	  absolute	  beatifying.	  Instead,	  when	  we	  renounce	  ugliness,	  there	  
is	  always	  more	  to	  renounce.	  In	  this	  way,	  especially	  understood	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  static	  
and	  dominating	  logic	  of	  the	  culture	  industry,	  beauty	  always	  fails.	  This	  promise	  of	  failure	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creates	  a	  common	  community:	  all	  who	  do	  beauty	  experience	  the	  coming-­‐short	  that	  is	  
constitutive	  of	  beauty,	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  experience	  the	  same	  community	  of	  failure.	  
When	  we	  do	  beauty,	  we	  do	  it	  with	  the	  knowledge	  not	  just	  that	  we	  will	  fail	  and	  be	  
forgiven,	  but	  that	  the	  whole	  community	  of	  beauty-­‐doers	  has	  failed	  and	  been	  forgiven	  
before	  us.	  We	  are	  a	  community	  of	  failures,	  working	  in	  hope.	  This	  communal	  failure—
which	  itself	  has	  been	  beatified—stands	  as	  the	  ultimate	  renunciation	  of	  the	  culture	  
industry.	  In	  its	  search	  to	  dominate	  and	  order	  everything,	  enlightenment	  reason	  is	  
unwilling	  and	  unable	  to	  accept	  the	  possibility	  of	  failure.	  That	  failure	  should	  be	  both	  
promised	  and	  beautiful	  is	  absurd	  to	  this	  reason.	  In	  a	  willingness	  to	  fail—even	  a	  desire	  to	  
try	  so	  hard	  to	  beatify	  that	  failure	  is	  certain—the	  doer	  of	  beauty	  rejects	  the	  underlying	  
logic	  of	  the	  culture	  industry.	  She	  says,	  “I	  choose	  this	  community,	  not	  yours.	  I	  choose	  it	  
not	  because	  I	  dominate	  it,	  but	  precisely	  because	  I	  can’t.”	  	  	  
And	  so	  these	  two	  categories—memory	  and	  failure—stand	  as	  lines	  in	  the	  sand	  
that	  the	  culture	  industry	  cannot	  and	  dares	  not	  cross.	  Revelation,	  beauty,	  memory,	  and	  
failure	  are	  part	  of	  culture—even	  though	  the	  culture	  industry	  wishes	  this	  was	  not	  so.	  	  
Against	  Adorno,	  then,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  hope	  in	  the	  unconscious	  rebellion	  against	  all	  
second	  nature	  and	  all	  culture.	  Instead,	  we	  can	  double	  down	  into	  culture—into	  the	  
beautiful	  culture	  that	  constantly	  renounces	  itself.	  Which	  is	  to	  say	  in	  a	  more	  technical	  
way:	  Because	  the	  aesthetic	  crime	  of	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  that	  it	  replaces	  the	  negative	  
utopic	  image	  with	  a	  false	  positive	  utopic	  image,	  our	  response	  ought	  be	  to	  ensure	  the	  
survival	  of	  the	  actual	  negative	  utopic	  image:	  Christ.	  This	  commitment	  to	  true	  negativity	  
over	  false	  positivity	  is	  what	  will	  ultimately	  renounce,	  and	  so	  beatify,	  the	  culture	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industry.	  The	  choice	  is	  not	  between	  a	  flight	  from	  the	  world	  and	  a	  submission	  to	  the	  
world.	  The	  choice,	  rather,	  regards	  what	  sort	  of	  world	  we	  wish	  to	  build:	  one	  of	  the	  
kingdom,	  or	  one	  of	  industry.	  Theologically	  aesthetically,	  the	  choice	  is	  clear.	  To	  




To	  summarize,	  the	  culture	  industry	  does	  not	  produce	  a	  monotonous	  and	  
impoverished	  line	  of	  products.	  It	  may	  do	  this,	  it	  may	  not.46	  It	  is	  not	  primarily	  concerned	  
with	  production	  of	  products	  but	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  production	  of	  subjects	  as	  
consumers.	  Always	  an	  aesthetic	  thinker,	  even	  when	  aesthetic	  categories	  are	  not	  
explicitly	  at	  the	  fore,	  Adorno	  ultimately	  sees	  the	  culture	  industry	  as	  committing	  the	  
mortal	  sin	  of	  replacing	  art’s	  negative	  utopic	  image	  with	  mass	  culture’s	  positive	  utopic	  
image.	  For	  Adorno,	  there	  is	  hope	  that	  art	  somehow—in	  the	  subconscious	  or	  spirit—
resists	  this	  positivizing.	  For	  theological	  aesthetics,	  though,	  the	  culture	  industry	  cannot	  
merely	  wash	  away	  the	  negative	  utopic	  image,	  because	  the	  negative	  utopic	  image	  has	  
happened	  and	  has	  real,	  material,	  relational	  life.	  Not	  reliant	  upon	  the	  utopic	  ghosts	  of	  
Adorno,	  theological	  aesthetics	  can	  double	  down	  into	  its	  own	  absolute	  negativity	  and	  
renounce	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  culture	  industry.	  This	  renouncing	  is	  done	  through	  the	  
active	  remembrance	  of	  beauty	  in	  and	  by	  the	  community	  of	  beautifiers.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Much	  has	  been	  made	  of	  the	  alleged	  “democratizing	  of	  culture”	  that	  comes	  about	  from	  the	  culture	  
industry.	  This	  reading	  holds	  that	  the	  culture	  industry	  produces	  culture	  for	  the	  masses,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  is	  
democratic.	  No.	  The	  culture	  industry	  creates	  the	  masses	  itself,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  is	  totalitarian.	  	  
49	  
	  
The	  aesthetic	  path	  is	  now	  clear	  enough	  to	  more	  directly	  address	  the	  situation	  of	  
Palestinian	  oppression.	  I	  have	  sought	  so	  far	  to	  provide	  a	  critical	  aesthetics.	  This	  critical	  
aesthetics	  understands	  that	  beauty	  must	  be	  done,	  but	  also	  understands	  that	  there	  are	  
obstacles	  to	  this	  doing.	  This	  discussion	  of	  the	  culture	  industry	  named	  and	  renounced	  
one	  such	  obstacle,	  perhaps	  the	  chief	  obstacle.	  In	  this	  process	  of	  renouncing,	  beauty	  
itself	  was	  found	  to	  be	  the	  answer:	  we	  turned	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  beauty	  in	  order	  to	  
overcome	  totalitarian	  industry.	  Here	  we	  saw	  that	  the	  solution	  was	  not	  to	  run	  and	  hide	  
from	  culture,	  but	  to	  beatify	  it.	  We	  still	  do	  not	  “have”	  beauty,	  but	  it	  is	  precisely	  our	  
inability	  to	  “have”	  or	  dominate	  beauty	  that	  allowed	  us	  to	  resist	  the	  culture	  industry.	  
Such	  is	  the	  dialectic.	  Now,	  turning	  to	  Palestine,	  we	  can	  apply	  these	  insights	  in	  a	  similarly	  
dialectical	  way.	  I	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  suicide	  bombing.	  Ultimately	  I	  will	  argue	  
that	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  a	  renunciation	  of	  ugliness	  that	  is	  not	  itself	  beautiful.	  This	  will	  
challenge	  and	  probe	  our	  conceptions	  of	  renunciation	  and	  negativity.	  Then,	  ending	  with	  
what	  is	  most	  fundamental,	  I	  will	  take	  seriously	  Naim	  Ateek’s	  charge	  that	  the	  occupation	  
has	  called	  God’s	  character	  into	  question.	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  this	  has	  been	  done	  









Part	  Three:	  Towards	  a	  Theological	  Aesthetics	  of	  Palestinian	  Liberation	  
	  
Beauty	  in	  the	  Dregs:	  Suicide	  Bombing	  as	  Aesthetic	  Extremity	  
	  
The	  scope	  of	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  of	  Palestine	  is	  large	  and	  deep.	  It	  is	  too	  large	  
and	  too	  deep	  to	  treat	  systematically.	  For	  launching	  this	  aesthetic	  analysis	  of	  oppression	  
there	  are,	  of	  course,	  many	  possible	  points	  of	  departure.	  A	  profanely	  historical	  survey	  of	  
the	  occupation	  might	  be	  useful	  insofar	  as	  it	  could	  give	  content	  to	  the	  historical	  
component	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness.	  Regardless,	  historical	  surveys	  have	  been	  done,	  and	  
have	  been	  done	  well—especially	  by	  the	  aforementioned	  Illan	  Pappé.47	  Scanning	  the	  
academic	  and	  popular	  literature	  suggests	  other,	  perhaps	  more	  nuanced,	  approaches.	  
One	  can	  approach	  occupation	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  theorist,	  but	  here	  I	  
have	  little	  to	  add	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Edward	  Said.48	  Theologically,	  one	  can	  approach	  from	  
the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  liberation	  theology	  developed	  by	  Naim	  Ateek.	  I	  will	  
rely	  on	  Ateek’s	  work,	  and	  take	  his	  thought	  as	  informative.49	  But	  Ateek’s	  commitments	  to	  
biblical	  hermeneutics	  are	  not	  the	  same	  aesthetic	  commitments	  I	  have	  developed—
although	  the	  dialectic	  of	  beauty	  has	  some	  resonance	  with	  Ateek’s	  notion	  of	  an	  
advancing	  understanding	  of	  God.	  And	  so,	  my	  methodological	  point	  of	  departure	  is	  the	  
critical	  theological	  aesthetic	  I	  have	  so	  far	  developed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Especially	  A	  History	  of	  Modern	  Palestine:	  One	  Land,	  Two	  Peoples	  (2006)	  and	  The	  Ethnic	  Cleansing	  of	  
Palestine	  (2007).	  
48	  Especially	  The	  Question	  of	  Palestine	  (1992)	  and	  Palestine	  (2001).	  
49	  My	  reading	  of	  Ateek	  primarily	  makes	  us	  of	  his	  Justice	  and	  Only	  Justice:	  A	  Palestinian	  Theology	  of	  
Liberation	  (1989),	  A	  Palestinian	  Christian	  Cry	  for	  Reconciliation	  (2008),	  and	  “What	  is	  theologically	  and	  
morally	  wrong	  with	  suicide	  bombing?”	  (2003).	  
51	  
	  
But	  to	  what	  should	  this	  method	  be	  applied?	  To	  speak	  of	  “occupation”	  is	  already	  
to	  give	  in	  to	  certain	  metaphors,	  presuppositions,	  and	  political	  commitments.	  What,	  
exactly,	  is	  “occupation?”	  I	  suggest	  that,	  at	  its	  core,	  occupation	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  
phenomenon.	  Occupation	  is	  the	  walls,	  borders,	  checkpoints,	  dirt,	  and	  grime	  imposed	  by	  
occupiers.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  fighting	  for	  freedom,	  renouncing	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  and	  
beautifying	  of	  the	  resisting	  occupied.	  This	  text	  has	  sought	  to	  bring	  such	  material,	  
historical	  realities	  into	  theological	  aesthetic	  conversation.	  At	  its	  core,	  I	  have	  argued,	  
theological	  aesthetics	  is	  about	  relationship	  with	  a	  personal	  and	  fleshly	  God-­‐who-­‐is-­‐
beauty,	  and	  the	  dialectical,	  negative,	  and	  beatifying	  engagement	  with	  the	  world	  that	  
this	  relationship	  requires.	  This	  is	  how	  I	  will	  approach	  the	  injustice	  of	  Palestinian	  
oppression.	  I	  take	  Chomsky	  seriously	  when	  he	  says	  that	  we	  need	  to	  change	  American	  
public	  policy.	  However,	  I	  see	  little	  chance	  of	  doing	  so	  by	  way	  of	  arguing	  the	  demerits	  of	  
occupation	  in	  the	  abstract:	  From	  its	  original	  sin	  of	  indigenous	  genocide	  up	  through	  the	  
current	  day,	  America	  is	  a	  nation	  built	  of	  and	  on	  occupation.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  H.	  Rap	  
Brown,	  “Violence	  is	  as	  American	  as	  cherry	  pie.”	  Which	  is	  to	  say,	  talking	  about	  
colonialism	  and	  occupation	  to	  colonists	  and	  occupiers	  seems	  like	  a	  battle	  for	  which	  we	  
do	  not	  have	  time.50	  And	  so,	  I	  start	  not	  structurally	  but	  in	  the	  extremes	  of	  materiality:	  
suicide	  bombing.	  	  
Suicide	  bombing	  was	  most	  predominant	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  resistance	  during	  the	  
period	  known	  as	  the	  Second	  Intifada.	  Precise	  dates	  are	  disputed	  and	  unimportant,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  This	  battle	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  one,	  and	  I	  applaud	  the	  efforts	  of	  those	  theorists	  who	  theorize	  in	  order	  to	  
liberate.	  But	  I,	  for	  one,	  admit	  feeling	  a	  certain	  disgust	  at	  the	  discrepancy	  in	  gravity	  between	  the	  theory	  of	  




the	  Second	  Intifada	  lasted	  roughly	  from	  September	  2000,	  when	  Ariel	  Sharon	  made	  a	  
provocative	  and	  aggressive	  visit	  to	  Temple	  Mount	  in	  Old	  City	  Jerusalem,	  to	  February	  
2005,	  when	  President	  Abbas	  and	  Sharon	  agreed	  to	  the	  Sharm	  el-­‐Sheikh	  Summit	  
agreement,	  which	  promised	  an	  end	  to	  Israeli	  military	  activity	  against	  Palestinians.	  
Between	  2000	  and	  2005,	  there	  were	  241	  suicide	  attacks	  done	  by	  Palestinians.	  By	  way	  of	  
comparison,	  between	  1980	  and	  2005,	  there	  were	  23	  attacks.	  Since	  2005,	  there	  have	  
been	  seven.	  Since	  2008,	  there	  has	  been	  only	  one:	  In	  2015,	  a	  Palestinian	  woman	  
exploded	  a	  bomb	  in	  her	  car	  after	  she	  was	  stopped	  by	  Israeli	  traffic	  police	  on	  her	  way	  to	  
Jerusalem.	  She	  was	  the	  only	  fatality.51	  	  That	  the	  frequency	  of	  suicide	  bombings	  has	  
decreased	  is	  perhaps	  revealing	  of	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  occupation.	  This	  will	  be	  
discussed	  in	  due	  time.	  And	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  
predominant	  tool	  of	  resistance—which	  is	  always	  the	  same	  as	  saying,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  
predominant	  means	  of	  occupation—I	  believe	  that	  the	  sheer	  and	  deep	  ugliness	  of	  this	  
particular	  act	  demonstrates,	  in	  a	  marked	  and	  moving	  way,	  the	  terror	  of	  the	  Israeli	  
occupation	  of	  Palestine.52	  The	  ugliness	  of	  the	  act	  compels	  a	  look.	  On	  a	  simply	  strategic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  These	  statistics	  have	  been	  compiled	  from	  Johnston’s	  Archive	  
(http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/),	  Jewish	  Virtual	  Library	  
(http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:y5OC-­‐
NQXRjsJ:www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/victims.html+%22french+hill%22+junction+terro
rist&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=13),	  and	  Israel	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
(http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other%20bom
bing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx)	  	  
52	  Lately,	  heartbreakingly,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increase—not	  a	  decrease—in	  suicide	  bombings	  outside	  of	  
Israel/Palestine.	  These	  suicide	  bombings,	  which	  have	  attacked	  the	  west,	  France	  and	  Belgium,	  and	  the	  
Middle	  East,	  Turkey	  and	  Beirut,	  alike	  demand	  a	  different	  aesthetic	  analysis.	  The	  relationship	  here	  
between	  occupied	  and	  occupier	  is	  not,	  to	  me,	  clear	  at	  all.	  I	  suspect	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  the	  bombers,	  either.	  
The	  fact	  that	  these	  attacks	  are	  done	  alongside	  of	  shootings	  and	  other	  means	  of	  murder	  also	  demands	  a	  
different	  aesthetics—this	  will	  become	  more	  clear	  as	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  fleshly	  nature	  of	  suicide	  bombings	  
plays	  out.	  Regardless,	  I	  am	  concerned	  here	  with	  Palestine.	  But	  these	  recent	  events	  are	  on	  my	  mind,	  
cannot	  be	  totally	  compartmentalized,	  and	  are	  thus	  present.	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level,	  the	  existence	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  often	  used	  as	  an	  apology	  for	  occupation:	  
“These	  people	  kill	  the	  innocent,	  they	  must	  be	  occupied.”	  So,	  true	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  
Adornian	  dialectical	  and	  immanent	  criticism,	  we	  will	  overcome	  this	  apologetic	  claim	  by	  
going	  through	  it.	  If	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  held	  as	  the	  grounds	  of	  occupation,	  then	  these	  
grounds	  should	  be	  shaken.	  Before	  aesthetically	  shaking	  these	  grounds,	  it	  will	  be	  worth	  
briefly	  interrogating	  the	  merits	  of	  treating	  suicide	  bombing	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  
phenomenon.	  The	  matter	  is	  a	  somber	  one.	  While	  I	  hold	  that	  aesthetics	  has	  great	  
political	  and	  ethical	  value,	  and	  have	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  throughout	  the	  text,	  I	  
recognize	  that	  treating	  something	  as	  serious	  and	  somber	  as	  suicide	  bombing	  on	  an	  
aesthetic	  level	  can	  appear	  either	  offensively	  detached	  or	  arrogantly	  erudite.	  Can	  
aesthetics	  be	  done	  on	  the	  level	  of	  suicide	  bombing?	  
I	  say	  suicide	  bombing	  resides	  in	  the	  extremes	  of	  materiality	  because	  suicide	  
bombing	  is	  that	  phenomenon	  wherein	  persons	  use,	  abuse,	  and	  sacrifice	  their	  materiality	  
in	  order	  to	  annihilate	  the	  materiality	  of	  themselves	  and	  others.	  Murder	  by	  gun	  uses	  
matter	  to	  kill	  (the	  matter	  of	  the	  gun	  and	  bullet),	  but	  that	  matter	  is	  not	  person,	  not	  flesh.	  
Murder	  by	  suicide,	  though,	  makes	  the	  place	  and	  matter	  that	  is	  person	  into	  a	  site	  of	  
destructive	  resistance:	  the	  matter	  who	  is	  the	  bomber	  is	  converted	  from	  person	  to	  
weapon—the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  bomber	  are	  irrevocably	  changed,	  the	  body	  ends	  as	  
weapon,	  changed	  from	  “whom”	  to	  “that.”	  The	  suicide	  bomber	  does	  not	  throw	  an	  
explosive	  at	  his	  victims.	  No,	  the	  suicide	  bomber	  wants	  his	  body	  to	  be	  explosive	  and	  
exploded.	  Suicide	  bombing	  is	  a	  self-­‐hatred	  and	  hatred	  of	  the	  other	  up	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
constitution:	  of	  flesh.	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  hatred,	  then,	  of	  a	  relationship:	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  a	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hatred	  of	  the	  ugly	  relationship	  between	  occupier	  and	  occupied—it	  hates	  this	  
relationship	  so	  much	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  kill	  both	  parties.	  If	  theological	  aesthetics	  is	  serious	  
in	  its	  claim	  that	  absolute	  beauty	  is	  absolutely	  personal,	  material,	  and	  grounded	  in	  
relationship,	  then	  this	  complete	  annihilation	  of	  personal	  matter	  and	  right	  relationship	  
must	  be	  aesthetically	  critiqued.	  	  
The	  choice	  to	  begin	  with	  an	  extreme	  event	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  choice	  in	  another	  
sense,	  too.	  As	  noted,	  the	  culture	  industry,	  and	  the	  enlightenment	  ideology	  that	  
undergirds	  it,	  thrives	  on	  sameness.	  Typically,	  this	  sameness	  is	  euphemistically	  given	  over	  
as	  the	  virtue	  of	  “moderation.”53	  The	  culture	  industry	  says,	  “Dream	  not	  too	  big,	  stray	  not	  
too	  far,	  ask	  not	  too	  much—moderation	  is	  key.”	  But	  the	  critical	  aesthetics	  of	  beauty	  
forbids	  this	  approach.	  Beauty	  thrives	  in	  the	  margins—if	  we	  take	  Adorno’s	  schema,	  then	  
the	  role	  of	  beauty	  is	  precisely	  to	  create	  the	  margins:	  Beauty	  says	  ugliness	  is	  here,	  and	  
utopia,	  unreachable,	  there.	  To	  live	  in	  sameness	  and	  moderation,	  then,	  is	  to	  cower	  from	  
the	  marginalizing	  work	  of	  doing	  beauty.	  This	  cowering,	  of	  course,	  is	  simply	  a	  choice	  to	  
live	  in	  and	  re-­‐produce	  ugliness:	  beauty	  has	  already	  been	  revealed,	  and	  searching	  for	  
static	  safety	  in	  the	  middle	  ground	  is	  itself	  a	  rejection	  of	  beauty’s	  urgent	  call	  forward.	  
Christ’s	  promise	  was	  not	  moderation,	  but	  fulfillment.	  Christ’s	  beauty	  does	  not	  maintain,	  
it	  negates.	  By	  bringing	  up	  suicide	  bombing,	  then,	  this	  aesthetics	  hopes	  to	  confront	  the	  
culture	  industry—and	  other	  comfortable	  industries	  and	  cultures	  of	  oppression—with	  an	  
ugly	  extremity	  of	  its	  own	  making.	  In	  this	  way,	  simply	  performing	  an	  aesthetics	  of	  an	  
extreme	  act	  will	  help	  undermine	  the	  ugliness	  produced	  by	  the	  occupation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  That	  modern	  philosophy	  has	  made	  a	  virtue	  of	  moderation	  is	  not	  a	  novel	  insight.	  The	  alleged	  
virtuousness	  of	  moderation	  has	  arisen	  out	  of	  a	  tradition	  older	  and	  deeper	  than	  the	  Enlightenment.	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Finally,	  and	  confessionally,	  I	  admit	  that	  the	  terror	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  brings	  upon	  
me	  a	  decidedly	  aesthetic	  state.	  Metaphysics	  loses	  whatever	  luster	  is	  left.	  Upon	  hearing	  
the	  news	  of	  an	  attack,	  I	  hope	  that	  friends	  and	  loved	  ones	  in	  the	  area	  are	  okay.	  I	  am	  
saddened	  that	  the	  world	  looks	  like	  this,	  feels	  like	  this.	  Theodicy	  is	  forgotten	  and	  is	  
replaced	  by	  a	  tickle	  in	  the	  throat.	  Ethics,	  I	  suppose,	  is	  present,	  but	  only	  as	  absent,	  as	  a	  
question.	  Images	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  are	  images	  of	  grey	  and	  black,	  of	  running	  children	  
and	  abandoned	  cafes.	  Familiar	  streets	  become	  uncanny.	  The	  world	  is	  not	  the	  world	  I	  
thought	  I	  knew,	  but	  is	  more	  dangerous,	  it	  has	  more	  blown	  out	  walls,	  more	  crying	  kids.	  
But	  even	  to	  speak	  of	  knowing	  seems	  alien—I’ve	  never	  pondered	  questions	  of	  
epistemology	  after	  an	  attack;	  so	  not	  unknown,	  just	  uncanny.	  Unsettling,	  cold	  or	  hot	  or	  
whatever.	  So	  I	  retreat	  to	  friends,	  family,	  my	  dog,	  Hemingway,	  a	  cup	  of	  coffee.	  I	  
remember	  the	  strawberry	  and	  milk	  scene	  from	  Bergman’s	  “The	  Seventh	  Seal,”	  and	  like	  
Block,	  I	  try	  to	  remember	  an	  “hour	  of	  peace:	  the	  strawberries,	  the	  bowl	  of	  milk,	  your	  
faces	  in	  the	  dusk.	  Mikael	  asleep,	  Jof	  with	  his	  lute.”	  I	  wish	  to	  reclaim	  the	  matter	  and	  stuff	  
and	  relationships	  of	  the	  world	  as	  good.	  This	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  place.	  
Not	  only	  can	  aesthetics	  treat	  suicide	  bombing,	  then,	  but	  it	  ought	  to.	  	  
	  
A	  Renunciation	  of	  Occupation	  
	  
The	  aesthetics	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  hinges,	  as	  all	  aesthetics,	  on	  renunciation.	  To	  
situate	  this	  analysis,	  it	  will	  be	  fruitful	  to	  recall	  in	  rough	  the	  three	  aesthetic	  structures	  I	  
have	  presented	  in	  this	  text.	  First,	  Adorno’s	  negative	  aesthetics	  posits	  that	  beauty	  is	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always	  negative;	  that	  is,	  utopia	  is	  not-­‐here,	  and	  never	  will	  be.	  The	  beautiful	  in	  this	  
aesthetics	  renounces	  second	  nature	  and	  offers	  a	  false	  promise	  of	  happiness—false,	  
because	  the	  promised	  happiness	  is	  always	  not-­‐here.	  Against	  Adorno,	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  
the	  culture	  industry	  says	  that	  utopia	  is	  here,	  and	  any	  change	  from	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  ugly.	  
Against	  both,	  a	  critical	  theological	  aesthetics	  says	  that	  beauty	  is	  negative	  because	  the	  
status	  quo	  is	  not	  enough.	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  posit	  an	  always	  not-­‐here	  utopia,	  theological	  
aesthetics	  affirms	  that	  utopia	  is	  revealed	  and	  calls	  for	  participation.	  This	  participation	  is	  
never	  enough—we	  never	  create	  utopia.	  Yet,	  we	  hope.	  Beauty	  is	  not-­‐yet-­‐here.	  Each	  of	  
these	  aesthetics	  is	  grounded	  in	  renunciation,	  but	  the	  contours	  of	  renunciation	  are	  
different	  for	  each.	  For	  Adorno,	  renunciation	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  co-­‐constitution	  of	  
beauty	  and	  ugliness:	  beauty’s	  renouncing	  is	  cruel.	  For	  the	  culture	  industry,	  renunciation	  
maintains	  the	  status	  quo:	  all	  that	  is	  not	  (false)	  utopic	  sameness	  is	  renounced,	  and	  so	  
renunciation	  preserves	  (false)	  beauty.	  For	  theological	  aesthetics,	  renunciation	  must,	  in	  
the	  final	  analysis,	  renounce	  itself.	  Renunciation	  cannot	  be	  cruel	  to	  the	  ugly,	  but	  must	  
forgive	  and	  love	  that	  which	  it	  renounces.	  Renunciation	  is	  beatified.	  	  
What,	  then,	  is	  suicide	  bombing—as	  aesthetic	  act—renouncing?	  What	  type	  of	  
renunciation	  is	  suicide	  bombing	  doing?	  Surely	  it	  is	  a	  renouncing	  of	  ugliness.	  Naim	  
Ateek’s	  2003	  essay	  “What	  is	  theologically	  and	  morally	  wrong	  with	  suicide	  bombing?”,	  
which	  is	  a	  careful	  and	  nuanced	  “attempt	  to	  understand	  but	  not	  justify”	  suicide	  bombing,	  
makes	  this	  case.54	  In	  it,	  Ateek	  argues	  that	  suicide	  bombing	  is,	  indisputably,	  a	  response	  to	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  is	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  with	  Suicide	  Bombings?”	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occupation.	  “No	  one,”	  Ateek	  reminds	  us,	  “is	  born	  a	  terrorist.”55	  Instead,	  suicide	  bombers	  
are	  born	  in	  the	  “image	  and	  likeness	  of	  God.”	  56	  Their	  victims,	  too,	  of	  course,	  share	  in	  the	  
image	  of	  God.	  In	  characteristic	  directness,	  Ateek	  captures	  the	  gravity	  of	  this	  situation:	  	  
When	  healthy,	  beautiful,	  and	  intelligent	  young	  men	  and	  women	  set	  out	  to	  kill	  and	  be	  killed,	  
something	  is	  basically	  wrong	  in	  a	  world	  that	  has	  not	  heard	  their	  anguished	  cry	  for	  justice.	  	  These	  
young	  people	  deserve	  to	  live	  along	  with	  all	  those	  whom	  they	  have	  caused	  to	  die.57	  
	  
Here	  “beautiful”	  refers	  to	  the	  Imago	  Dei,	  and	  nothing	  else.	  Surely,	  the	  act	  of	  suicide	  
bombing	  is	  not	  beautiful,	  and	  so	  if	  we	  are	  what	  we	  do,	  then	  these	  people	  are	  not	  
beautiful.	  In	  this	  way,	  Ateek	  relies	  upon	  a	  type	  of	  transcendental	  aesthetic	  
anthropology:	  there	  is	  some	  part	  of	  the	  person—the	  beautiful	  part,	  that	  part	  which	  is	  
the	  image	  of	  God—that	  escapes	  ugliness	  and	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  sort	  
of	  beauty	  I	  have	  been	  after.	  In	  this	  passage,	  beauty	  behaves	  as	  predicate	  and,	  as	  is	  
typical	  for	  theological	  aesthetics,	  as	  a	  transcendental.	  It	  is	  a	  faith	  claim.	  This	  is	  fine,	  
perhaps	  unavoidable,	  but	  I	  want	  beauty	  to	  be	  verb,	  not	  property.	  Regardless,	  Ateek’s	  
greater	  point	  is	  unobjectionable,	  and	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  a	  more	  critical	  aesthetics	  as	  
the	  following:	  “People	  setting	  out	  to	  kill	  and	  be	  killed	  points	  to	  an	  ugly	  world,	  and	  makes	  
it	  uglier.	  These	  people	  deserve	  beauty,	  as	  do	  we	  all.”	  
This	  minor	  disagreement	  over	  Ateek’s	  particular	  deployment	  of	  the	  category	  of	  
beauty	  is	  not	  an	  indictment	  on	  his	  work.	  As	  the	  title	  of	  the	  essay	  says,	  he	  is	  interested	  
primarily	  in	  morality,	  not	  aesthetics.	  Continuing	  along	  moral	  lines,	  now	  laced	  with	  a	  
more	  overtly	  theological	  bent,	  Ateek	  notes	  that	  suicide	  bombings	  are	  done	  from	  a	  place	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  While	  not	  his	  primary	  concern,	  Ateek	  is	  also	  quick	  to	  note	  that	  the	  very	  name	  “terrorist”	  is	  a	  
construction	  of	  the	  occupier.	  In	  the	  final	  analysis,	  Ateek	  agrees	  with	  Brian	  Whitaker:	  “Terrorism	  is	  





of	  total	  despair.	  This	  category	  of	  despair,	  for	  Ateek,	  is	  essential	  for	  any	  understanding	  of	  
suicide	  bombing.58	  The	  story	  of	  one	  suicide	  bomber,	  Abdel	  Odeh,	  is	  taken	  as	  illustrative:	  
Odeh	  was	  prevented	  by	  the	  Israeli	  authorities	  from	  crossing	  into	  Jordan	  to	  get	  married	  to	  his	  
fiancée	  from	  Baghdad.	  	  The	  Israeli	  Shin	  Bet	  (security	  intelligence)	  kept	  sending	  after	  him.	  	  He	  
refused	  to	  go	  because	  he	  suspected,	  as	  often	  happens,	  that	  they	  would	  blackmail	  and	  pressure	  
him	  into	  becoming	  an	  informer.	  He	  was	  25	  years	  old,	  ready	  to	  get	  married,	  start	  a	  family,	  settle	  in	  
Jordan,	  and	  enjoy	  life.	  	  When	  everything	  was	  shut	  in	  his	  face	  and	  his	  future	  plans	  were	  shattered	  
by	  the	  Israeli	  army,	  he	  turned	  to	  suicide	  bombing.	  	  His	  father	  attributed	  his	  son’s	  action	  to	  
humiliation	  and	  a	  broken	  heart.	  	  His	  family	  first	  heard	  about	  the	  bombing	  from	  the	  TV	  …	  Such	  
stories	  abound	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  community.59	  
	  
Abdel’s	  story,	  and	  others	  like	  it,	  show	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Palestinian	  subjectivity	  is	  
constructed	  as	  despairing.	  The	  occupation	  creates	  an	  environment	  where	  despair	  is	  the	  
norm—the	  occupied	  do	  not	  despair	  for	  something,	  but	  are	  constructed	  as	  despairing,	  as	  
dehumanized.	  Ateek	  identifies	  four	  primary	  contributing	  factors	  to	  Palestinian	  despair:	  
(1)	  Unemployment	  and	  impoverishment	  create	  suffocating	  conditions;	  (2)	  Checkpoints	  
are	  institutions	  of	  humiliation	  that	  require	  Palestinians	  to	  perform	  their	  own	  
degradation;	  (3)	  Prisons	  detain	  Palestinians	  for	  indefinite	  periods	  of	  time;	  often	  until	  
they	  agree	  to	  become	  spies,	  which	  breeds	  self-­‐hatred;	  (4)	  Nearly	  all	  families	  in	  Palestine	  
have	  experienced	  pain	  and	  loss	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Israeli	  military—the	  scope	  of	  the	  
occupation’s	  violence	  is	  wide.	  Notably,	  all	  four	  of	  these	  factors	  deal	  with	  material	  and	  
relational	  instantiations	  of	  occupation.	  For	  Ateek,	  these	  four	  factors	  create	  the	  
conditions	  for	  despair.	  This	  despair	  allows	  for	  the	  disregard	  for	  life	  necessary	  for	  suicide	  
bombing:	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  not	  primarily	  an	  angry	  act,	  but	  a	  despairing	  one.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Ateek	  is	  firm	  that	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  the	  result	  of	  despair:	  “There	  were	  no	  suicide	  bombings	  before	  the	  
Oslo	  Peace	  Process.	  	  It	  is	  the	  result	  of	  despair	  and	  hopelessness	  that	  started	  to	  set	  in	  when	  an	  increasing	  
number	  of	  Palestinians	  became	  frustrated	  by	  the	  deepening	  Israeli	  oppression	  and	  humiliation.”	  Again:	  





	   Taken	  together,	  these	  factors	  demonstrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  occupation	  
works	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  aesthetic.	  With	  the	  concepts	  of	  materiality	  and	  relationality,	  
and	  the	  framework	  of	  critical	  aesthetics,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  think	  despair	  aesthetically.	  
These	  concepts	  interconnect.	  
	  
Materiality	  and	  Relationality	  
	  
	   God	  became	  flesh,	  and	  Christ	  beatified	  matter.	  The	  kingdom	  is	  not	  just	  a	  spiritual	  
one.	  These,	  I	  take	  it,	  are	  core	  truths	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  I	  have	  been	  developing.	  In	  our	  
quest	  to	  constantly	  beatify,	  we	  must	  constantly	  negate	  instances	  of	  ugly	  materiality.	  The	  
institution	  of	  the	  checkpoint	  is	  just	  one	  instance	  of	  occupation	  creating	  a	  materially	  ugly	  
world:	  There	  are	  no	  checkpoints	  in	  heaven.	  The	  ugliness	  of	  checkpoints	  refers	  not	  so	  
much	  to	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  checkpoints—although,	  daunting	  and	  dim	  as	  they	  are,	  
this	  is	  important—but	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  checkpoints,	  along	  with	  the	  barrier	  wall,	  
contribute	  to	  the	  occupation	  notion	  that	  matter	  itself	  is	  oppressive.	  The	  depth	  of	  the	  
ugliness	  of	  a	  checkpoint	  can	  best	  be	  seen	  when	  contrasted	  with	  a	  home,	  a	  place	  of	  
protection	  and	  love.	  Reworking	  Hegel’s	  famous	  meditation	  on	  home	  construction	  shows	  
this	  ugliness.	  Homes,	  Hegel	  teaches,	  are	  built	  using	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  stuff	  of	  
nature	  in	  order	  to	  restrain	  nature:	  	  
So	  also	  when	  someone	  starts	  building	  a	  house,	  his	  decision	  to	  do	  so	  is	  freely	  made.	  But	  all	  the	  
elements	  must	  help.	  And	  yet	  the	  house	  is	  being	  built	  to	  protect	  man	  against	  the	  elements.	  Hence	  
the	  elements	  are	  here	  used	  against	  themselves.	  But	  the	  general	  law	  of	  nature	  is	  not	  disturbed	  
thereby.	  …	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  wind,	  which	  has	  helped	  to	  build	  the	  house,	  is	  shut	  out	  by	  the	  
house;	  so	  also	  are	  the	  violence	  of	  rains	  and	  floods	  and	  the	  destructive	  powers	  of	  fire,	  so	  far	  as	  
the	  house	  is	  made	  fire-­‐proof.	  The	  stones	  and	  beams	  obey	  the	  law	  of	  gravity	  and	  press	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downwards	  so	  that	  the	  high	  walls	  are	  held	  up.	  Thus	  the	  elements	  are	  made	  use	  of	  in	  accordance	  
with	  their	  nature	  and	  cooperate	  for	  a	  product	  by	  which	  they	  become	  constrained.	  
	  
And	  so	  a	  home	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  cooperation	  between	  a	  builder	  and	  nature.	  Nature	  is	  
cooperative,	  and	  matter	  is	  protective.	  To	  some	  extent,	  matter	  is	  even	  sacrificial:	  matter	  
undermines	  itself,	  keeps	  itself	  out,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  builder,	  the	  home-­‐dweller.	  	  
But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  relationship	  between	  matter	  and	  a	  checkpoint.	  In	  a	  
checkpoint,	  matter	  is	  used	  not	  to	  protect	  but	  to	  keep-­‐out.	  The	  checkpoint	  forces	  the	  
Palestinian	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Israeli.	  Here,	  at	  the	  checkpoint,	  the	  aesthetics	  are	  
that	  of	  the	  butcher’s	  corral:	  bodies	  are	  pushed	  this	  way,	  flopped	  that	  way,	  stripped	  over	  
here,	  tossed	  over	  there.	  The	  checkpoint,	  as	  Ateek	  notes,	  is	  “clearly	  a	  policy	  that	  strips	  
people	  of	  their	  self	  worth	  and	  dignity.”60	  But	  the	  checkpoint	  is	  not	  just	  a	  policy;	  it	  is	  also	  
a	  place	  and	  a	  site	  built	  of	  matter.	  And,	  as	  Ateek	  also	  notes,	  it	  is	  a	  site	  that	  is	  often	  
“arbitrarily	  mounted	  at	  whim.”	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  checkpoint	  is	  a	  site	  of	  construction—
quite	  literally	  construction,	  gates	  and	  walls	  and	  fences	  and	  blocks	  and	  turrets—that	  
dehumanizes.	  Matter,	  allied	  with	  occupation,	  becomes	  dehumanizing.	  Matter	  turns	  the	  
human	  into	  matter.	  It	  is	  thus	  no	  mystery	  that	  the	  suicide	  bomber	  thinks	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  
“that”	  instead	  of	  a	  “who.”	  	  This	  is	  why	  Ateek	  says	  about	  those	  who	  become	  suicide	  
bombers,	  “if	  Israel	  labels	  them	  as	  terrorists,	  they	  are,	  after	  all	  the	  product	  of	  its	  own	  
making.”61	  Those	  on	  the	  ugly	  side	  of	  the	  checkpoint	  see	  the	  matter	  of	  nature	  used	  to	  aid	  
their	  oppression	  and	  occupation.	  Their	  occupation	  depends	  on	  stuff,	  material	  stuff.	  
Matter,	  from	  this	  standpoint,	  is	  oppressive.	  





This	  ugliness	  of	  matter	  finds	  its	  fulfillment	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  person	  to	  
weapon.	  Previously,	  I	  spoke	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  as	  a	  transformation	  of	  matter	  from	  flesh	  
to	  weapon.	  Suicide	  bombing	  reduces	  the	  person	  from	  a	  “who”	  to	  a	  “that.”	  However,	  this	  
brief	  meditation	  on	  occupation	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  who-­‐ness	  and	  flesh	  of	  the	  bomber	  
has	  been	  reduced	  from	  the	  beginning.	  As	  Ateek	  says,	  “It	  was	  in	  the	  crucible	  of	  the	  
occupation	  that	  they	  were	  shaped	  and	  formed.”62	  The	  suicide	  bomber	  does	  not	  do	  
ugliness	  by	  reducing	  his	  flesh	  to	  weapon,	  because	  it	  has	  always	  been	  reduced.	  Put	  
otherwise,	  the	  aesthetic	  crime	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  cannot	  be	  the	  reduction	  of	  flesh	  to	  
weapon:	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  crime	  of	  the	  occupier.	  In	  Ateek’s	  framework,	  suicide	  
bombing,	  then,	  is	  a	  response	  to	  this	  occupation	  of	  the	  flesh.	  Palestinian	  flesh	  is	  made	  
ugly	  by	  occupation	  and	  made	  a	  weapon,	  a	  “terrorist,”	  by	  the	  checkpoint.	  	  
	  
	   When	  initially	  contrasting	  a	  theological	  aesthetics	  with	  the	  critical	  aesthetics	  
developed	  by	  Adorno,	  I	  found	  the	  category	  of	  relationality	  to	  be	  essential.	  Adorno	  sees	  
the	  aesthetic	  encounter	  as	  one	  of	  finitude	  and,	  ultimately,	  mortality:	  because	  beauty	  is	  
absolutely	  negative,	  I,	  the	  aesthetic	  subject,	  encounter	  my	  limits	  in	  the	  encounter	  with	  
beauty.	  Against	  this	  view,	  I	  held	  that	  Christ,	  a	  person,	  offered	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  
aesthetic	  encounter.	  In	  this	  personal	  encounter	  we	  find	  not	  a	  limit	  but	  relationship—we	  
find	  expansion	  and	  promise,	  not	  finitude	  and	  mortality.	  This	  places	  the	  category	  of	  
relationality	  in	  a	  firmly	  aesthetic	  register.	  Beauty	  is	  relational.	  However,	  if	  occupation	  
fundamentally	  changes	  the	  contours	  of	  this	  category	  of	  relationship,	  then	  we	  risk	  losing	  




the	  promise	  of	  beauty.	  That	  is,	  if	  relationships	  themselves	  are	  ugly,	  then	  the	  promise	  of	  
relationship	  offers	  no	  way	  out	  of	  Adorno’s	  enigma.	  This,	  it	  seems,	  is	  precisely	  what	  
happens	  in	  occupation.	  
	   Ateek	  says	  that	  there	  is	  “hardly	  any	  Palestinian	  family	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  the	  
Gaza	  Strip	  that	  has	  not	  experienced	  some	  kind	  of	  pain	  or	  injury.”	  Statistics	  are	  hard	  to	  
find,	  fiercely	  disputed,	  and	  perhaps	  beside	  the	  point.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  statistics	  that	  are	  
available	  are	  daunting.	  There	  are	  more	  than	  4.5	  million	  Palestinian	  refugees	  worldwide.	  
The	  current	  population	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  territories	  is	  also,	  roughly,	  4.5	  million.	  A	  
Palestinian	  today	  is	  just	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  refugee	  as	  she	  is	  to	  live	  in	  Palestine.	  During	  the	  
Second	  Intifada,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  4,800	  Palestinians	  were	  killed.	  Another	  2,000	  were	  
killed	  during	  the	  First	  Intifada,	  which	  is	  known	  as	  the	  peaceful	  intifada.	  The	  1982	  
Lebanon	  War,	  Israel’s	  invasion	  of	  southern	  Lebanon,	  resulted	  in	  up	  to	  20,000	  Palestinian	  
deaths.	  The	  wars	  are	  never	  ending.	  Israel	  calls	  its	  intrusions	  into	  Gaza	  “mowing	  the	  
lawn.”63	  The	  frequency	  of	  violence	  has	  made	  violence	  the	  norm.	  Speaking	  to	  the	  
heartbreak	  of	  this	  norm,	  Chomsky	  notes	  that	  “Israel	  killed,	  on	  average,	  more	  than	  two	  
Palestinian	  children	  a	  week	  for	  the	  past	  14	  years.”64	  On	  average—times	  of	  “peace”	  and	  
times	  of	  open	  slaughter—two	  children	  are	  killed	  a	  week.	  To	  live	  in	  Palestine	  is	  to	  live	  
familiarly	  with	  death.	  
	   But	  these	  statistics	  simply	  confirm	  what	  the	  fact	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  suggests:	  
there	  is	  despair.	  Such	  a	  constant	  threat	  of	  death	  necessarily	  changes	  one’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





understanding	  of	  relationship.	  The	  aesthetics	  I	  have	  developed	  is	  grounded	  on	  the	  
notion	  that	  relationality	  is	  expansive	  and	  promising:	  Christ	  is	  the	  promise	  that	  brings	  us	  
past	  the	  limit.	  In	  Palestine,	  though,	  relationships	  often	  bring	  the	  promise	  of	  more	  
despair.	  These	  relationships	  of	  despair	  are	  illustrated,	  literally,	  in	  Palestinian	  street	  art.	  	  
The	  aesthetic	  presence	  of	  death	  is	  ubiquitous	  in	  Gaza.	  Journalist	  Eóin	  Murray	  
describes	  this	  presence:	  
The	  street	  art	  here	  in	  Gaza	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  human	  element	  of	  loss.	  On	  every	  street	  
corner,	  in	  almost	  every	  shop	  (sometimes	  because	  they	  want	  to,	  sometimes	  because	  of	  social	  and	  
political	  pressure)	  there	  are	  photographs	  and	  paintings	  of	  the	  dead,	  mostly	  young	  men	  but	  also	  
women	  and	  children	  -­‐	  people	  who	  have	  been	  killed	  by	  the	  Israeli	  army.	  …	  The	  street	  art	  
celebrates	  the	  faces	  of	  martyrs	  and	  largely	  it	  is	  a	  simple	  form	  of	  painting,	  almost	  in	  pre-­‐
renaissance	  style	  with	  little	  attention	  paid	  to	  perspective	  or	  to	  any	  sense	  of	  a	  de	  Vinci-­‐esque	  
homage	  to	  human	  detail.	  They	  usurp	  symbols	  such	  as	  the	  dove	  or	  flowers	  -­‐	  showing	  them	  as	  they	  
wither	  away	  under	  the	  occupation.	  The	  collective	  suffering	  of	  the	  people	  is	  emphasised	  by	  the	  
huddled	  crowds	  which	  appear	  on	  this	  and	  other	  murals.	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  
immediate	  sense	  of	  the	  individual	  one	  absorbs	  from	  the	  murals	  of	  the	  ‘martyrs’.	  These	  
individuals	  faced	  their	  death	  alone	  and	  are	  celebrated	  alone,	  on	  large	  murals,	  or	  small	  posters,	  
with	  a	  background	  of	  flowers	  and	  weaponry.	  Guns	  ‘n’	  Roses.65	  
	  
	  
Paying	  homage	  to	  the	  martyr,	  the	  audience	  is	  forming	  a	  relationship	  to	  death-­‐as-­‐image.	  
Here,	  Adorno	  is	  helpful.66.	  These	  murals	  are	  the	  false	  promise	  of	  Adorno’s	  aesthetics	  
taken	  to	  the	  extreme.	  For	  Adorno,	  art	  still	  offered	  happiness.	  The	  Adornian	  artwork	  lied	  
to	  the	  audience,	  and	  falsely	  promised	  utopia.	  But	  it	  undoubtedly	  offered	  utopia.	  In	  
approaching	  beauty,	  for	  Adorno,	  the	  viewer	  eventually	  comes	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  nature	  
of	  beauty’s	  lie	  and	  discovers	  that	  she	  is	  unable	  to	  shake	  off	  second	  nature,	  she	  is	  unable	  
to	  grasp	  first	  nature,	  beauty,	  happiness.	  But	  art’s	  promise,	  albeit	  a	  known	  lie,	  is	  still	  
there,	  and	  she	  can	  enjoy	  this	  promise	  and	  perhaps	  use	  this	  negative	  promise	  to	  question	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her	  surroundings:	  “this	  artwork	  promises	  happiness,	  my	  society	  does	  not,	  and	  so	  I	  can	  
negate	  my	  society.”	  These	  murals,	  though,	  operating	  with	  more	  of	  a	  realist	  aesthetic	  
than	  Adorno’s	  ghostly	  utopia,	  are	  blunt:	  “There	  is	  no	  utopia,	  let’s	  skip	  the	  happiness,	  
let’s	  get	  to	  the	  meat	  of	  the	  matter:	  this	  is	  the	  limit,	  this	  society	  is	  unhappy,	  there	  is	  no	  
way	  out.”	  In	  occupation,	  the	  aesthetic	  object	  becomes	  an	  image	  not	  of	  utopia,	  but	  of	  
death	  itself.	  This	  image	  is	  negative,	  sure,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  type	  of	  negative	  image	  that	  can	  
dialectically	  negate	  and	  beatify	  the	  status	  quo.	  Instead,	  the	  mural	  of	  the	  martyr	  infuses	  
more	  death	  into	  the	  status-­‐quo.	  The	  status	  quo	  is	  death,	  and	  these	  murals	  re-­‐present	  it.	  
The	  viewer’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  image	  is	  one	  of	  despair,	  of	  sameness,	  of	  
death.	  
All	  of	  which	  is	  to	  say:	  occupation	  occupies	  relationships.	  Familial	  relations	  are	  
not	  stable,	  for	  death	  could	  come	  at	  any	  moment—indeed,	  has	  likely	  come	  already.	  In	  
this	  way,	  occupation	  haunts	  the	  family:	  there	  are	  only	  occupied	  families.	  The	  nation	  is,	  
quite	  literally	  and	  in	  more	  ways	  than	  one,	  split.	  One’s	  relationship	  to	  her	  nation,	  then,	  is	  
a	  relationship	  to	  an	  occupied	  and	  fractured	  state;	  it	  is	  an	  occupied	  and	  fractured	  
relationship.	  	  Relationships	  to	  aesthetic	  objects	  are	  not	  relationships	  to	  personal	  beauty,	  
but	  are	  relationships	  to	  the	  opposite	  of	  living	  and	  personal	  beauty:	  they	  are	  
relationships	  to	  death.	  The	  most	  stable	  relationship	  the	  occupied	  has	  is	  with	  her	  
occupier—given	  the	  apparent	  omnipotence	  of	  the	  occupier,	  this	  is	  the	  only	  relationship	  
that	  promises	  to	  stay.	  It	  is	  thus	  no	  mystery	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  suicide	  bomber	  offers	  





An	  Ugly	  Renunciation	  
	  
	   And	  so	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  a	  response	  to	  the	  ugliness	  of	  occupation.	  Those	  born	  
into	  occupation	  are	  named	  ugly	  from	  birth.	  “It	  was	  in	  the	  crucible	  of	  the	  occupation	  that	  
they	  were	  shaped	  and	  formed.”67	  And	  so,	  the	  ugliness	  is	  twofold:	  Occupation	  is	  an	  
ugliness	  that	  names	  the	  occupied	  ugly.	  Here	  Adorno’s	  critique	  is	  again	  illuminative.	  
Occupation	  names	  its	  victims	  ugly,	  and	  in	  a	  way	  most	  cruel.	  This,	  surely,	  needs	  
renunciation.	  And	  this	  renunciation	  is	  the	  truth	  content	  of	  suicide	  bombing.	  Any	  
properly	  dialectical	  critique	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  must	  affirm,	  not	  gloss	  over,	  this	  terrible	  
truth	  content.	  
But	  suicide	  bombing	  loses	  this	  truth	  content	  in	  its	  deployment	  of	  and	  
commitment	  to	  ugliness.	  As	  a	  response	  to	  occupation,	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  a	  re-­‐
presentation	  of	  occupation.	  Suicide	  bombing	  does,	  of	  course,	  renounce	  occupation:	  
Palestinian	  suicide	  bombers	  act	  from	  a	  deep	  hatred	  of	  their	  occupiers.	  But	  suicide	  
bombing	  also	  participates	  in	  the	  double-­‐ugly	  structure	  of	  occupation:	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  
an	  ugliness	  that	  promulgates	  the	  ugliness	  it	  wishes	  to	  renounce.	  This	  was	  shown	  in	  the	  
discussions	  of	  materiality	  and	  relationality.	  Occupation	  shapes	  matter	  in	  an	  oppressive	  
way,	  and	  suicide	  bombing	  uses	  matter	  in	  an	  oppressive	  way.	  Occupation	  teaches	  that	  all	  
relationships	  are	  haunted	  by	  death,	  and	  suicide	  bombing	  injects	  death	  into	  the	  most	  
despairingly	  stable	  relationship	  of	  occupation.	  In	  these	  ways,	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  a	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reiteration	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  oppression.	  It	  negates	  nothing,	  but	  instead	  re-­‐presents	  the	  
status	  quo.	  To	  say	  that	  occupation	  creates	  suicide	  bombers	  is	  more	  than	  psychologizing.	  
No,	  it	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  “the	  crucible	  of	  occupation”	  has	  “shaped	  and	  formed”	  these	  
people	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  matter	  itself	  is	  a	  weapon	  and	  that	  to	  be	  in	  a	  relationship	  is	  to	  
engage	  and	  employ,	  if	  not	  aesthetically	  admire,	  death	  and	  finitude.	  In	  a	  suicide	  bomber,	  
we	  see	  the	  ugliness	  of	  occupation.	  	  And	  so,	  any	  critique	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  must	  also	  be	  
a	  critique	  of	  occupation.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  an	  honest	  phenomenology	  admits	  that	  the	  ugliness	  of	  suicide	  
bombing	  is	  different	  than	  the	  ugliness	  of	  occupation.	  That	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  given	  as	  
ugly	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  that	  requires	  much	  argument.	  It	  should	  be	  enough	  to	  say	  that	  as	  an	  
ugly	  response	  to	  ugliness,	  suicide	  bombing	  seems	  somehow	  further	  from	  beauty.	  Born	  
from	  despair,	  it	  is	  an	  ugliness	  that	  beclouds	  promise:	  the	  bomber	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  
death	  than	  either	  beatification	  or	  forgiveness.	  Visceral,	  it	  is	  an	  ugliness	  that	  catches	  the	  
throat	  and	  wells	  the	  eye:	  it	  saddens	  and	  scares	  more	  than	  enrages.	  The	  suicide	  bomber	  
is	  both	  victim	  and	  perpetrator,	  so	  these	  easy	  categories	  of	  ordering	  reason,	  and	  the	  easy	  
aesthetic	  contrast	  between	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  ugly,	  are	  threatened.	  We	  proclaim	  that	  
God	  has	  become	  flesh,	  but	  here	  flesh	  becomes	  dangerous,	  evil,	  and	  ugly.	  Our	  neighbors	  
become	  aesthetic	  questions:	  what	  is	  this	  matter?	  –a	  person?	  –or	  is	  this	  a	  weapon?	  
Creation	  becomes	  weaponized—malls,	  theaters,	  metros,	  and	  airports	  are	  all	  sites	  
marked	  by	  the	  ugly	  trace	  of	  suicide	  bombing.	  In	  all,	  suicide	  bombing	  forces	  the	  despair	  
of	  the	  occupied	  onto	  the	  cruel	  comfort	  of	  the	  occupiers.	  In	  a	  way,	  this	  force	  disrupts	  the	  




	   And	  so,	  the	  situation	  is	  worse	  than	  bleak.	  For	  Ateek,	  suicide	  bombing	  must	  be	  
condemned	  because	  it	  is	  a	  disregard	  for	  the	  value	  of	  life.	  This	  disregard	  works	  from	  both	  
ends:	  the	  Israeli	  disregards	  the	  Palestinian,	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  bomber	  disregards	  the	  
Israeli.	  For	  critical	  aesthetics,	  suicide	  bombing	  must	  be	  condemned	  because	  it	  is	  a	  
promulgation	  of	  ugliness.	  This	  promulgation	  works	  from	  both	  ends:	  the	  Israeli	  creates	  
ugly	  matter	  and	  relationships,	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  bomber	  affirms	  the	  ugliness	  of	  these	  
things	  through	  suicide	  bombing.	  There	  is	  no	  dialectic,	  no	  negativity,	  and	  thus	  no	  beauty.	  
We	  seem	  trapped.	  How	  can	  beauty	  promise	  change	  where	  ugliness	  begets	  itself?	  
	   Yet,	  Ateek,	  for	  one,	  at	  least	  in	  2003	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  essay,	  remains	  hopeful:	  	  	  
All	  peace-­‐loving	  people,	  whether	  people	  of	  faith	  or	  not,	  must	  exert	  greater	  concerted	  effort	  to	  
work	  for	  the	  ending	  of	  the	  occupation.	  Ultimately,	  justice	  will	  prevail,	  the	  occupation	  will	  be	  
over,	  and	  the	  Palestinians,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Israelis,	  will	  enjoy	  freedom	  and	  independence.	  	  How	  do	  
I	  know	  that	  this	  will	  take	  place?	  	  I	  know	  because	  I	  believe	  in	  God.68	  
	  
Despite	  Chomsky’s	  dire	  concern,	  and	  despite	  the	  horror	  and	  heartbreak	  of	  Israel’s	  most	  
recent	  episode	  of	  “mowing	  the	  lawn,”	  there	  may	  be	  reason	  to	  share	  Ateek’s	  hope.69	  If	  
Ateek	  is	  right	  that	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  a	  result	  of	  despair,	  then	  the	  decreased	  frequency	  
of	  suicide	  attacks	  may	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  hope	  among	  the	  Palestinians.	  If	  my	  aesthetic	  analysis	  
is	  right	  that	  suicide	  bombing	  is	  an	  internalizing	  and	  expressing	  of	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  flesh	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69	  Israel’s	  2014	  “Operation	  Protective	  Edge,”	  which	  is	  an	  English	  translation	  designed	  to	  convey	  
defensiveness	  and	  innocence	  and	  is	  more	  literally	  translated	  as	  “Operation	  Strong	  Cliff,”	  was	  a	  
performance	  of	  war	  crimes	  widely	  renounced	  by	  international	  legal	  and	  faith	  communities.	  Succumbing	  to	  tears,	  UNRWA	  spokesperson	  Chris	  Gunness	  summarized	  the	  operation:	  “What	  is	  happening	  in	  Gaza,	  particularly	  to	  the	  children,	  is	  an	  affront	  to	  the	  humanity	  of	  all	  of	  us.”	  Gunness’s	  work	  is	  important,	  laudable,	  and	  saintly.	  These	  particular	  words	  are	  moving,	  prophetic,	  and	  beautiful.	  They	  can	  be	  accessed	  here:	  www.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2Fvideo%2F2014%2Fjul%2F31%2Fun-­‐spokesman-­‐chris-­‐gunness-­‐breaks-­‐down-­‐during-­‐aljazeera-­‐interview-­‐video&usg=AFQjCNEPR_ePWTUeOuhuf4AhGKglXqdnuw	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to	  weapon	  and	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  finitude	  of	  relationship,	  then	  the	  decreased	  
frequency	  of	  attacks	  may	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  return	  of	  the	  flesh	  and	  a	  righting	  of	  
relationship.	  The	  Netanyahu	  regime	  and	  the	  Israel	  lobby	  have	  credited	  the	  construction	  
of	  security	  fences	  with	  deterring	  bombers.70	  But	  this	  claim	  does	  not	  hold	  up	  to	  scrutiny:	  
there	  has	  still	  been	  violence.	  Indeed,	  there	  has	  been	  talk	  of	  a	  Third	  Intifada,	  the	  “Knife	  
Intifada,”	  or	  “Lone	  Wolf	  Intifada.”71	  No,	  violence	  has	  not	  stemmed.	  Violence	  has	  
changed.	  Suicide	  bombers	  now	  kill	  with	  a	  knife	  instead	  of	  with	  their	  bodies.	  This	  is	  still	  
deplorable,	  but	  it	  is	  different.	  Without	  valorizing	  these	  knife	  attacks,	  we	  can	  say:	  
“Thankfully,	  we	  no	  longer	  see	  suicide	  bombings	  in	  Palestine/Israel.”	  We	  hope	  that	  these	  
bombings	  do	  not	  return.	  We	  also	  	  hope	  that	  their	  absence	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  diminishing	  
despair;	  that	  is,	  of	  hope.	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  no	  longer	  suicide	  bombers	  because	  there	  are	  
no	  longer	  Palestinians	  who	  have	  internalized	  the	  dehumanization	  dished	  out	  by	  the	  
programs	  of	  Israeli	  occupation.	  This,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  enough.	  In	  the	  final	  analysis,	  
hope—which	  is	  constitutive	  of	  beauty-­‐as-­‐promise—does	  not	  come	  from	  a	  knife.	  All	  
violence,	  all	  occupation,	  all	  renunciation	  must	  be	  renounced.	  The	  darkness	  cannot	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Conclusion:	  Conversion	  or	  Displacement?	  
	   The	  aesthetics	  of	  suicide	  bombing,	  then,	  marks	  an	  aesthetics	  of	  a	  particular	  
moment	  of	  the	  occupation	  of	  Palestine.	  The	  moment	  is	  one	  of	  despair,	  and	  shows	  how	  
the	  occupation	  works	  on	  an	  aesthetic—which	  here	  means	  relational	  and	  material—
level.	  The	  moment	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  has	  passed,	  but	  the	  occupation	  has	  continued.	  If	  
anything,	  the	  occupation—feeling	  pressure	  now	  more	  than	  ever	  from	  the	  international	  
community—has	  ossified.	  Naim	  Ateek’s	  second	  major	  work,	  A	  Palestinian	  Cry	  for	  
Reconciliation,	  was	  published	  in	  2008,	  after	  the	  Second	  Intifada	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  suicide	  
bombing.	  In	  it,	  Ateek	  articulates	  other	  moments	  of	  occupation:	  he	  devotes	  chapters	  to	  
the	  land,	  to	  Zionism,	  to	  Jerusalem,	  to	  Israel,	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  two	  state	  solution,	  and	  to	  
various	  biblical	  stories	  and	  themes	  (Jonah,	  Samson,	  the	  suffering	  servant	  contrasted	  to	  
the	  Son	  of	  David,	  among	  others).	  For	  reasons	  mentioned	  above,	  I	  chose	  to	  dedicate	  a	  
large	  section	  of	  this	  text	  to	  an	  aesthetic	  analysis	  of	  suicide	  bombing.	  However,	  now	  that	  
the	  skeleton	  of	  a	  critical	  theological	  aesthetics	  has	  more	  or	  less	  come	  together,	  it	  would	  
be	  fruitful	  to	  perform	  similar	  analyses	  for	  these	  other	  moments	  and	  articulations	  of	  
occupation.	  For	  example,	  the	  political	  ideology	  of	  Zionism	  employs	  and	  relies	  on	  a	  
thoroughly	  representational	  aesthetics:	  It	  not	  only	  represents	  God,	  but	  more	  subtly	  
perversely	  Zionism	  creates	  a	  God	  who	  desires	  a	  representational	  earth:	  Zionism	  says,	  
“Israel	  stands	  here,	  God	  stands	  here,	  you,	  the	  viewer,	  you,	  the	  Palestinian,	  stand	  there.	  
Do	  not	  move.”	  This	  inelasticity	  runs	  totally	  contrary	  to	  all	  sense	  of	  negative	  aesthetics	  
that	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  develop,	  because	  a	  truly	  negative	  conception	  of	  beauty	  admits	  that	  
there	  is	  not	  a	  “place”	  for	  Israel	  in	  the	  kingdom,	  because	  all	  places—and	  people—must	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be	  overcome,	  displaced,	  renounced,	  and	  beatified.	  The	  work	  of	  beauty	  is	  not	  to	  
preserve	  Israel,	  but	  to	  beatify	  it:	  precisely	  this	  is	  to	  tear	  down	  its	  walls;	  precisely	  this	  is	  
to	  tear	  down	  its	  Zionism.	  If	  Zionism	  wants	  beauty,	  it	  must	  renounce	  itself.	  
	   Given	  time	  and	  space,	  I	  hope	  to	  pursue	  these	  critical	  analyses	  of	  moments	  of	  
occupation.	  Even	  when	  these	  moments	  pass,	  their	  analyses	  reveal	  the	  ugliness	  of	  
occupation.	  Because	  we	  are	  fleshly,	  relational,	  hopeful,	  and	  memorial,	  occupation,	  even	  
when	  it	  no	  longer	  produces	  these	  particular	  moments,	  will	  always	  be	  marked	  by	  the	  
ugliness	  of	  these	  moments.	  As	  said,	  human	  flesh	  and	  communal	  spaces	  such	  as	  malls	  
and	  airports	  are	  now	  marked	  by	  the	  trace	  of	  suicide	  bombing.	  Our	  goal	  is	  to	  heal	  this	  
flesh	  and	  these	  spaces.	  Occupation’s	  flesh	  wears	  the	  pox	  of	  its	  history,	  and	  we	  will	  
always	  hope	  to	  beatify	  it.	  	  
Because	  I	  do	  not	  have	  the	  time	  in	  this	  text	  to	  pursue	  in	  full	  this	  research	  
project—which	  is	  performing	  a	  critical	  theological	  aesthetics	  of	  Naim	  Ateek’s	  Palestinian	  
liberation	  theology—I	  will	  turn,	  in	  conclusion,	  to	  Ateek’s	  own	  summary	  of	  his	  work.	  
While	  discussing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  bible	  for	  Palestinian	  theology,	  Ateek	  keenly	  notes	  that,	  
“God’s	  character	  is	  at	  stake.	  God’s	  integrity	  has	  been	  called	  into	  question.”72	  Tucked	  
into	  the	  middle	  of	  Justice	  and	  Only	  Justice,	  Ateek’s	  first	  major	  work,	  this	  statement	  
grasps,	  in	  a	  direct	  way,	  the	  essential	  battleground	  for	  both	  liberation	  theology	  and	  
theological	  aesthetics;	  indeed,	  for	  theology.	  For	  Ateek,	  God’s	  character	  has	  been	  
“questioned,”	  a	  euphemism	  for	  tarnished,	  by	  the	  supplanting	  of	  “spiritual	  Israel”	  with	  
the	  current	  political	  state	  Israel:	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(The)	  traditional	  spiritual	  connotation	  of	  the	  name	  “Israel”	  has	  been	  supplanted	  today	  by	  a	  
political	  and	  military	  connotation.	  Today,	  if	  I	  go	  to	  church	  and	  try	  to	  join	  in	  the	  singing	  of	  the	  
Psalms,	  I	  am	  pulled	  up	  short,	  with	  a	  jar,	  when	  the	  name	  “Israel”	  comes	  to	  my	  lips.	  The	  name	  
conjures	  up	  today	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  small,	  middle-­‐Europe	  type	  state.	  …	  The	  present-­‐day	  political	  
Israel	  has,	  for	  all	  of	  us,	  obliterated	  or,	  at	  least,	  adumbrated,	  the	  spiritual	  Israel	  of	  the	  Judeo-­‐
Christian	  tradition.	  This	  is	  surely	  a	  tragedy.73	  
	  
For	  Ateek,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  current,	  oppressive	  nation	  state	  Israel	  forces	  us	  to	  ask	  
who	  God	  is.	  Is	  this	  the	  place	  that	  God	  has	  chosen,	  and	  these	  occupiers	  God’s	  elect?	  	  
What	  demands	  does	  this	  election	  place	  on	  Israel,	  on	  Israelis?	  In	  what	  way	  can	  we	  even	  
speak	  of	  the	  current	  Israel	  as	  existing	  as	  referent	  to	  the	  sign	  “Israel”	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  
bible?	  Is	  God	  inclusive,	  or	  exclusive?	  Ultimately,	  is	  the	  God	  of	  Christ	  also	  the	  God	  of	  
Israel-­‐as-­‐occupier?	  For	  Ateek,	  these	  questions	  have	  clear	  answers.	  These	  answers	  are	  
given	  to	  us	  through	  the	  life	  of	  Christ	  and	  the	  testimony	  of	  scripture:	  
Palestinian	  Christians	  are	  looking	  for	  a	  hermeneutic	  that	  will	  help	  them	  to	  identify	  the	  authentic	  
Word	  of	  God	  in	  the	  Bible	  to	  discern	  the	  true	  meaning	  of	  those	  biblical	  texts	  that	  Jewish	  Zionists	  
and	  Christian	  fundamentalists	  cite	  to	  substantiate	  their	  subjective	  claims	  and	  prejudices.	  …	  The	  
canon	  of	  this	  hermeneutic	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  Christian	  is	  nothing	  less	  than	  Jesus	  Christ	  himself.	  …	  
Jesus	  the	  Christ	  thus	  becomes—in	  himself	  and	  in	  his	  teaching—the	  true	  hermeneutic,	  the	  key	  to	  
the	  understanding	  of	  the	  Bible,	  and	  beyond	  the	  Bible	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  action	  of	  God	  
throughout	  history.	  The	  Word	  of	  God	  incarnate	  in	  Jesus	  the	  Christ	  interprets	  for	  us	  the	  word	  of	  
God	  in	  the	  Bible.74	  
	  
Following	  Ateek	  following	  Christ,	  theological	  aesthetics,	  as	  developed	  so	  far,	  has	  been	  
forced	  to	  ask	  questions	  about	  God’s	  character	  in	  its	  own	  ways.	  Is	  the	  beauty	  of	  God	  
merely	  transcendent,	  or	  negatively	  dialectical?	  Is	  this	  beauty	  spiritualized,	  or	  is	  it	  
enfleshed?	  Does	  God	  endorse	  the	  status	  quo,	  or	  does	  God	  demand	  negation?	  Is	  
relationship	  ultimately	  relationship	  with	  death,	  or	  does	  God	  offer	  personal	  and	  
expansive	  relationship	  with	  God’s	  self?	  Does	  beauty	  offer	  a	  false	  promise,	  or	  has	  utopia	  
been	  revealed?	  Does	  God	  re-­‐present	  sameness,	  or	  does	  God	  beatify?	  What	  sort	  of	  





kingdom	  are	  we	  called	  to	  build?	  God’s	  character,	  it	  seems,	  is	  crucial	  to	  aesthetics.	  And	  
yet,	  a	  simple	  look	  around—and	  here	  I	  really	  mean	  a	  look—shows	  that	  the	  common	  
aesthetics	  of	  today,	  which	  are	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  occupation,	  are	  not	  the	  critical	  
aesthetics	  proper	  to	  God’s	  beauty.	  The	  occupation	  of	  Palestine	  exists,	  Israel	  “mows	  the	  
lawn,”	  and	  so	  we	  must	  have	  the	  character	  of	  God	  wrong.	  	  
	   I	  hold	  that,	  for	  us	  in	  the	  west,	  the	  fundamental	  stumbling	  block	  to	  our	  “getting	  
God’s	  character	  right,”	  is	  our	  involvement	  with	  and	  endorsement	  of	  the	  culture	  
industry.	  The	  middle	  part	  of	  this	  text	  elaborated	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  
culture	  industry	  prevent	  critical	  participation	  with	  the	  beauty	  of	  God.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  
culture	  industry	  has	  made	  an	  idol	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  and	  has	  done	  so	  by	  constituting	  
western	  subjectivity	  as	  consumerist.	  This	  idolatrizing	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  troubling	  from	  
two	  ends:	  First,	  most	  obviously,	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  unsustainable	  and	  ugly.	  In	  the	  status	  
quo,	  the	  Palestinians	  are	  occupied.	  In	  the	  status	  quo,	  we	  Americans	  subsidize	  the	  Israeli	  
occupation	  via	  military	  “aid”	  and	  political	  protection.	  If	  this	  is	  what	  the	  culture	  industry	  
wishes	  to	  maintain,	  then	  clearly	  we	  cannot	  maintain	  the	  culture	  industry.	  On	  a	  more	  
fundamental	  level,	  the	  culture	  industry	  has	  created	  not	  participators,	  but	  consumers.	  
We	  do	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  culture,	  we	  consume	  culture.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  
that	  the	  culture	  industry	  more	  or	  less	  permits	  apparent	  counter-­‐cultural	  movements	  to	  
arise:	  as	  Nato	  Thompson	  so	  tragically	  reminded	  us,	  these,	  too,	  will	  be	  consumed,	  and	  
sameness	  will	  triumph.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  it	  seems,	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  not	  interested	  
in	  subjects	  who	  participate	  with	  God	  in	  the	  building	  of	  the	  kingdom.	  Rather,	  the	  
consumer	  industry	  is	  interested	  in	  subjects	  who	  consume	  God.	  Consumers	  of	  God	  take	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God	  in	  as	  object,	  as	  product,	  as	  commodity.	  God	  is	  placed	  within	  a	  systematic	  economy	  
of	  sameness,	  which	  is	  the	  culture	  industry.	  In	  this	  way,	  God	  is	  that	  which	  most	  
fundamentally	  underwrites	  the	  culture	  industry’s	  false	  promise	  of	  the	  “positive	  image”	  
of	  the	  status	  quo.	  The	  culture	  industry	  can	  idolatrize	  the	  status	  quo	  because	  even	  God,	  
for	  the	  culture	  industry,	  is	  part	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  critical	  
analysis	  of	  culture	  industry,	  this	  use	  and	  abuse	  of	  God	  to	  underwrite	  sameness	  and	  the	  
status	  quo	  is	  the	  aesthetic	  crisis.	  
	   The	  affinity	  between	  the	  culture	  industry	  and	  Zionism’s	  representational	  
aesthetics	  is	  thus	  apparent.	  We	  must	  reject	  Zionism	  because	  we	  must	  reject	  any	  system	  
that	  creates	  a	  God	  who	  wishes	  to	  stabilize	  the	  status	  quo.	  The	  false	  God	  of	  Zionism	  
wishes	  for	  order,	  for	  domination—this	  is	  a	  God	  who	  lives	  not	  in	  promise	  and	  hope	  but	  in	  
an	  ever-­‐pathetic	  attachment	  to	  the	  oppressive	  present.	  Zionism	  re-­‐presents.	  The	  
renunciation	  of	  Zionism,	  then,	  calls	  for	  a	  displacement.	  We	  are	  displaced	  from	  the	  
present	  status	  quo	  by	  God’s	  beauty	  and	  we	  hope	  in	  the	  promise	  that	  the	  darkness	  will	  
not	  overcome	  the	  light—that	  our	  efforts	  to	  keep	  beauty	  alive	  will	  not	  die	  in	  vain,	  but	  
instead	  are	  a	  participation	  in	  that	  which	  has	  already	  been	  revealed:	  absolute	  beauty,	  
Christ.	  Likewise,	  our	  renunciation	  of	  the	  culture	  industry	  calls	  for	  a	  displacement.	  We	  
must	  displace	  ourselves	  from	  our	  consumerist	  selves.	  Only	  in	  this	  way	  will	  we	  be	  open	  
enough	  to	  work	  with	  God,	  and	  not	  consume	  God.	  Indeed,	  to	  work	  with	  God	  is	  to	  be	  
open	  to	  constant	  displacement.	  Beauty	  demands	  the	  renunciation	  of	  attachment—
these	  walls	  must	  fall,	  this	  state	  must	  be	  overcome,	  we	  cannot	  be	  attached	  to	  the	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ideologies	  of	  today,	  because	  today	  is	  not	  the	  kingdom.	  To	  do	  beauty	  is	  to	  displace—to	  
displace	  ourselves	  and	  to	  displace	  the	  ugliness	  of	  our	  earth.	  	  
	   On	  one	  hand,	  the	  concept	  of	  displacement	  is	  not	  foreign	  to	  aesthetics.	  Beauty,	  
for	  better	  or	  worse,	  has	  always	  been	  recognized	  as	  that-­‐which-­‐attracts.	  In	  this	  way,	  
traditionally,	  beauty	  displaces.	  Beauty	  calls	  us	  forward.	  What	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  say,	  though,	  
is	  that	  the	  displacement	  is	  itself	  beautiful.	  To	  displace—to	  reject	  a	  place,	  to	  renounce	  a	  
place,	  our	  place,	  the	  Israeli’s	  place,	  the	  Palestinian’s	  place,	  we	  can	  believe	  in	  equality	  of	  
displacement—is	  to	  do	  beauty.	  The	  fundamental	  act	  of	  aesthetics	  is	  that	  of	  
renunciation,	  and	  this	  unsettles,	  displaces.	  For	  Adorno,	  this	  displacement	  changes	  
second	  nature.	  For	  the	  culture	  industry,	  this	  displacement	  is	  an	  unpardonable	  crime.	  For	  
theological	  aesthetics,	  this	  displacement	  is	  a	  participation	  in	  the	  building	  of	  the	  kingdom	  
of	  God.	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  displacement	  is	  radically	  negative.	  We	  are	  not	  displaced	  from	  here	  to	  
there.	  No,	  we	  shake	  things	  up,	  we	  move	  along,	  we	  renounce	  and	  renounce	  and	  
renounce.	  It	  is	  the	  total	  displacement	  of	  the	  category	  of	  ugliness	  that	  allowed	  Christ	  to	  
forgive	  ugliness	  itself.	  A	  radical	  and	  extreme	  displacement	  does	  not	  rest	  content	  with	  a	  
shifting	  from	  one	  status	  quo	  to	  the	  next.	  No,	  a	  radical	  displacement	  recognizes	  that	  
beauty	  is	  uneasy,	  dis-­‐easy,	  dizzy.	  The	  moment	  beauty	  becomes	  easy,	  we	  can	  be	  sure	  
that	  whatever	  we	  have	  is	  not	  the	  beautiful:	  this	  too	  can	  be	  renounced,	  this	  too	  can	  be	  
beatified.	  It	  is	  only	  because	  of	  Christ’s	  promise	  that	  our	  dizziness	  is	  a	  participatory	  
dizziness,	  a	  dizziness	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  absolute	  beauty,	  a	  dizziness	  shared	  by	  a	  community	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of	  beauty-­‐doers,	  that	  we	  can	  march	  on.	  Perhaps	  a	  contrast	  between	  the	  typical	  category	  
of	  “conversion”	  and	  this	  call	  for	  displacement	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  idea.	  
	   Typically,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  piece	  like	  this	  calls	  for	  conversion,	  or	  promises	  that	  
our	  hope	  lays	  in	  the	  power	  of	  conversion.	  Richard	  Viladesau,	  coming	  as	  a	  Lonerganian	  of	  
sorts,	  writes	  in	  his	  tome	  Theological	  Aesthetics	  that	  the	  proper	  function	  of	  aesthetics,	  
actually	  art,	  is	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  process	  of	  conversion.	  Viladesau	  claims	  that:	  	  
Within	  the	  larger	  field	  of	  “the	  aesthetic”	  art	  has	  a	  particular	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  
salvation.	  In	  its	  very	  performance	  of	  creating	  order	  out	  of	  disorder,	  art	  can	  be	  both	  a	  symbol	  of	  
the	  redemptive	  process	  and	  an	  element	  in	  its	  accomplishment:	  an	  aspect	  of	  our	  present	  sharing	  
in	  God’s	  glory	  and	  an	  anticipation	  of	  its	  final	  victory.75	  
	  
Art	  can	  be	  both	  symbol	  and	  element	  of	  redemption	  because:	  
	  
The	  kind	  of	  art	  that	  serves	  beauty,	  as	  Balthasar	  says,	  “brings	  with	  it	  a	  self-­‐evidence	  that	  
enlightens	  without	  mediation.”	  This	  self-­‐evidence	  of	  beauty	  is	  the	  ultimate	  connection	  between	  
art	  and	  goodness,	  and	  is	  a	  fitting	  point	  on	  which	  to	  end	  these	  considerations.76	  
	  
With	  this,	  Adorno	  would	  not	  be	  pleased.	  If	  these	  reflections	  have	  shown	  anything,	  it	  
may	  be	  that	  true	  beauty	  brings	  disorder	  as	  much	  as	  it	  brings	  order.	  In	  fact,	  order,	  as	  a	  
dominating	  category	  of	  sameness	  produced	  by	  the	  culture	  industry,	  is	  antithetical	  to	  
beauty’s	  progressive	  march.	  An	  occupation	  is	  very	  orderly.	  If	  here	  Viladesau	  is	  referring	  
to	  some	  higher	  order,	  some	  divine	  hierarchy,	  then	  he	  is	  in	  fact	  calling	  for	  a	  disorderly	  
intrusion	  into	  the	  status	  quo:	  beauty	  does	  not	  bring	  order	  out	  of	  disorder,	  but	  is	  
precisely	  the	  displacing	  of	  the	  status	  quo.77	  Furthermore,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  it	  is	  precisely	  
beauty’s	  presumed	  self-­‐evidence	  that	  should	  be	  most	  critiqued.	  In	  the	  final	  analysis,	  we	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  and	  




say	  with	  John	  that	  darkness	  will	  not	  overcome	  the	  light,	  and	  that	  the	  light	  is	  the	  Word	  
made	  flesh	  in	  Christ.	  But	  how	  this	  appears	  with	  us,	  in	  second	  nature	  dominated	  by	  the	  
culture	  industry,	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  so	  naively,	  so	  uncritically.	  Finally,	  this	  talk	  of	  
conversion	  betrays	  one	  of	  our	  initial	  critical	  moves:	  Viladesau	  uncritically	  privileges	  
beauty’s	  aesthetic	  position.	  Christ	  is	  absolute	  beauty,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  be	  so,	  he	  subjected	  
himself	  to	  absolute	  ugliness.	  It	  was	  his	  ability	  to	  renounce	  renunciation—to	  see	  ugliness	  
to	  its	  end—that	  accounts	  for	  his	  absolute	  beauty.	  If	  the	  aesthetic	  results	  in	  or	  
participates	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  conversion,	  then	  it	  does	  so	  via	  an	  engagement	  with	  ugliness;	  
that	  is,	  via	  renunciation,	  which,	  after	  all,	  is	  the	  fundamental	  aesthetic	  act.	  	  
	   But	  conversion	  is	  not	  the	  language	  game	  proper	  to	  critical	  theological	  aesthetics.	  
To	  what	  should	  the	  Palestinians	  convert?	  This	  is	  offensive.	  If	  the	  Christian	  interested	  in	  
theological	  aesthetics	  has	  anything	  to	  offer	  the	  occupied,	  it	  is	  a	  program	  of	  destabilizing	  
the	  aesthetic	  structures	  of	  occupation:	  aesthetics	  can	  help	  show	  the	  difference	  between	  
a	  home	  and	  a	  checkpoint,	  between	  an	  image	  of	  a	  martyr	  and	  the	  absolute	  negative	  
image	  of	  Christ,	  and	  can	  work	  to	  beatify	  the	  situation:	  aesthetics	  demands	  that	  walls	  
come	  down	  and	  the	  kingdom	  gets	  built.	  Aesthetics	  can	  also	  comfortably	  say:	  Israel,	  
which	  occupies	  and	  wishes	  to	  keep	  it	  so,	  is	  doing	  ugliness.	  Palestine,	  which	  is	  occupied	  
and	  wishes	  to	  beatify	  the	  situation,	  wants	  beauty.	  When,	  with	  Ateek,	  we	  recognize	  that	  
God’s	  character	  has	  been	  called	  into	  question	  our	  response	  is	  not:	  “And	  so	  convert.”	  
This,	  too,	  would	  be	  felt	  as	  oppression.	  Our	  response	  is	  to	  do	  beauty	  with	  those	  who	  
want	  beauty.	  Our	  response	  is	  to	  displace	  the	  ugly	  status	  quo,	  to	  renounce	  and	  negate	  it,	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and	  to	  stand	  in	  solidarity	  with	  the	  victims	  of	  ugliness.	  We	  do	  not	  convert	  from	  this	  to	  
that,	  but	  are	  constantly	  displaced.	  The	  moment	  we	  find	  our	  place,	  we	  lose	  beauty.	  	  
	   By	  knowingly	  engaging	  this	  project	  of	  beauty,	  which	  is	  a	  project	  of	  failure	  insofar	  
as	  we	  can	  never	  rest	  easy,	  theological	  aesthetics	  makes	  its	  own	  claim	  as	  to	  God’s	  
character.	  God	  is	  a	  God	  of	  promise.	  We	  recognize	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  path,	  as	  one	  of	  
renunciation,	  is	  one	  of	  darkness.	  But	  God	  is	  a	  God	  who	  has	  shown	  and	  promised	  that	  
darkness	  will	  not	  overcome	  the	  light.	  And	  this	  on	  the	  aesthetic,	  fleshly,	  relational	  level.	  
The	  occupied	  have	  had	  their	  flesh	  reduced	  to	  mere	  matter.	  Our	  response	  reflects	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  character	  of	  God:	  Has	  God	  absolutely	  beatified	  the	  flesh	  or	  not?	  Is	  
this	  occupation	  of	  the	  flesh	  with	  or	  against	  what	  God	  has	  been	  revealed	  to	  be	  beautiful?	  
Likewise,	  wrong	  relationships	  abound,	  but	  we	  have	  been	  promised	  that	  relationship	  
with	  Christ,	  and	  Christ’s	  beauty,	  will	  never	  cease.	  Working	  from	  and	  with	  this	  image,	  we	  
can	  get	  to	  the	  work	  of	  renouncing	  the	  wrong	  relationships—and	  beatifying	  them.	  We	  
claim	  that	  Christ	  is	  the	  absolutely	  beautiful,	  and	  so	  we	  get	  to	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  
beatification.	  	  
	   Which	  is	  to	  say,	  because	  theological	  aesthetics	  is	  based	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  
beauty,	  our	  hope	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  response.	  We	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  beauty,	  which	  
lives.	  We	  must	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  stay	  put.	  If	  we	  stay	  put,	  we	  endorse	  the	  status	  
quo	  and	  make	  ourselves	  roadblocks	  to	  beauty.	  But	  if	  we	  respond	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  by	  
beatifying	  it,	  by	  doing	  beauty,	  by	  critiquing	  and	  questioning	  and	  participating	  with	  God,	  
then	  we	  make	  ourselves	  doers	  of	  beauty.	  In	  our	  renunciation	  of	  occupation,	  an	  aesthetic	  
renunciation	  which	  requires	  a	  forming	  of	  relationships	  and	  an	  engagement	  with	  
78	  
	  
materiality,	  we	  make	  ourselves	  doers	  of	  beauty.	  This	  requires	  a	  deep	  engagement	  with	  
the	  culture	  industry,	  which	  is	  what	  has	  allowed	  us	  to	  conceive	  of	  a	  God	  that	  allows	  
occupation.	  We	  must	  help	  God	  break	  out:	  break	  out	  of	  the	  consumerist	  walls	  of	  
America,	  and	  out	  of	  the	  concrete	  walls	  of	  Palestine.	  	  By	  allowing	  ourselves	  to	  be	  trapped	  
in	  these	  walls	  of	  our	  own	  making,	  as	  Chomsky	  said	  in	  the	  very	  beginning,	  we	  have	  
allowed	  the	  oppressed	  to	  be	  trapped	  by	  walls	  that	  they	  hate.	  Which	  is	  to	  say,	  complicity	  
with	  the	  status	  quo	  here	  is	  an	  endorsement	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  there:	  sameness	  begets	  
sameness,	  and	  the	  culture	  industry’s	  ban	  on	  negative	  beauty	  runs	  afoul.	  This	  is	  the	  
ultimate	  betrayal	  of	  beauty,	  and	  this	  is	  that	  from	  which	  we	  must	  be	  displaced;	  these	  are	  
the	  walls	  from	  which	  we	  must	  break	  free.	  To	  do	  beauty	  fully,	  I	  think,	  we	  must	  perform	  a	  
beautiful	  jailbreak	  everywhere.	  If	  beauty	  could	  ever	  become	  predicated,	  it	  would	  be	  
here:	  here,	  in	  the	  choice	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  earth,	  to	  second	  nature,	  to	  the	  “situation,”	  to	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